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NARRATIVE.

IT has long been my desire to lay before the public
the facts and documents which explain the operations of ·
the forces under my command in the campaign of 1861.
The misapprehensions, the misrepresentations which obtained c'u rrency in the absence of correct information
on the ~ubject, strongly prompted me to supply it, in
justice to myself and to those who served with me. I
have, however, been delayed in doing so by public considerations to which I will presently advert; but as they
have, by lapse of time, lost the for-ce that was attributed
to them, I now feel myself at liberty to make a brief
put well-attested contribution to the earlier history of
the war.
On the 25th of July, 1861, the term of the three
months' troops from Pennsylvania, whom I commanded,
having expired, I was relieved from the command of my
Department in Virginia, and, having been honorably
discharged from the military service of the United States,
returned to civil life.
The arms of the country . ~ad recently met with a
severe disaster at Bull Run, and the public, whose ex-
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pectation of success had been of the most sanguine cha,..
racter, were correspondingly depressed. Although con" scious that I had executed, as far as lay in my power,
every order th~t I had received, and was in no degree
responsible for a disaster that I could not prevent, I was
not. surprised that I, as well as every other officer holding any command of importance at the time, should be
the object of popular clamor. I was quite satisfied,
however, to await the returning sense of the people, and
to abide by their decision, when the natural passion and
disappointment of the hour should pass away, and a full
knowledge of the facts should enable them to form an
intelligent and dispassionate judgment. This would
very surely and certainly have come about, had it not
been the interest of a great many persons in authority
that the truth should not be known, and that no fair
judgment of the cause of the disaster should be arrived
at by the public.
It was.of course desirable for those who had directed
the movements at Bull Run to refer their defeat, if possible, to an occurrence for which they were not responsible, and not allow it to be attributed to any want of
foresight or military skill on their part. The theory,
therefore, that it was Johnston's unexpected arrival with
reinforcements that lost them the battle, for which I was
entirely res-ponsible, answered the purpose exactly, was
most ingenious, and . highly gratifying to the wounded
self-love of the army and the country.
The only drawback to the theory was that it was
untrue. The truth is, I could not hold Johnston in the
;
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position where they had placed me, and they knew it.
His arrival was not unexpected, for I had apprised them
of it; and his coming did not cause the loss of the battle,
as I can show by the testimony of the most distinguished
soldiers who were present at it.
In determining upon the best mode of repelling these
charges, bearing a semi-official character, I deemed it
wise to consult with some of the regular officers of high
distinction, who had served under me, and · in whose
judgment I had always placed great reliance. MajorGeneral George H. Thomas, who had held a command
under me, and whose subsequent brilliant career has
justified the high opinion I was then led to entertain
of him, writes to a mutual friend as follows :
"0.A.MP NEAR HY.A.TTSTOWN,.

MD.,

August 25, 1861.
"DEAR COLONEL :

"Your note has just been handed me. I had a conversation with Newton yesterday on the subject of General
Patterson's campaign. He was on the eve of writing to the
General, and asked me what he should state was my opinion
as to the General's course. I told him that he could say
that, if I were situated as he was, I would make a statement
of all the facts to the General-in-chief, or the Secretary of
War, fortifying it with copies of the orders, &c., and demand
justice at their hands, and, if they were· not disposed to give
it, I would then demand a court of inquiry.
"Yours truly,
" GEO. H. THOM.AS.
"P. S. I think, however, that time will set the General
all right, as I see the papers are much more favorable to him
than at first."
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General John Newton and General Fitz-John Porter
both concurring that the course indicated by General
Thomas was the true one, and that a newspaper controversy was both an improper and unsoldierly way of setting myself right, I addressed the following letter to the
Secretary of War, after I supposed that a sufficient time
had elapsed to prevent any information derived from
an investigation being of detriment to the public service
(Report Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 114):
''PHIL.A.DELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA,

November 1, 1861.

" SIR:

"Believing to the present moment that, on account of
other persons, a public examination into the manner in which
the affairs of the Department of Pennsylvania, while under
my command, were conducted, and the publication of the
correspondence with, and orders to me of the General-inchief, especially connected with the late campaign in Maryland and Virginia, might be detrimental to· the interests of
the service, I have refrained from asking for an investigation or permission to publish the orders by which I was controlled.
"The same reason has caused me studiously to avoid verbal
statements on tlie subject, in reply to numerous inquiries.
"Charges have been made publicly through the press, and
the impression created, that the design of the campaign was
not carried out by me, but rather deranged by my neglect
or violation of orders.
"Intimations against my loyalty have been insidioµsly circulated..
"From the silence of my immediate commander, I infer
he does not design to relieve me from the odium attached to
these reports and rumors.
"While I am willing, if the general good demand it, to
suffer personally, and am desirous that no course on my part
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shall prove injurious to public interests, yet I believe the
time has arrived when the question as to the mannei" in
which I executed the duties intrusted to me may be fully
investigated with safety, so that the failure to accomplish
certain results, never anticipated of my command by the
General-in-chief until he saw his defeat, may be ascribed to
the real cause.
" Further silence on my part would confirm the impression
that I plead guilty to the charges against my honor, my
loyalty, and my military capacity.- I have a right at least to
be relieve.d from the position in which my long silence,
caused solely by an earnest d~sire for the success of our cause,
has left me.
"In presenting this my application for a court of inquiry,
or permission to publish my correspondence with the Generalin-chief, I claim, and am now ready to substantiate,
" 1st. That if the General-in-chief ever designed my command to enter upon the soiL of Virginia with prospect of
success, he destroyed my power when greatest, and when
that of the enemy was weakest, by l"ecalling to Washington,
after they had crossed the Potomac, all my regular troops,
with the Rhode Island regiment and battery, leaving me but
a single company of cavalry, which had not then been one
month in service, and entirely destitute of artillery.
"2d. The General-in-chief forbade my advance, and compelled me to recall to Maryland all the troops which, confident of success, had crossed the Potomac into Virginia, in
execution of a plan which had been submitted to· him and
had received his cordial approbation.
" 3d. That for a long time the General-in-chief k~pt my
command in a crippled condition, and demanded my advance
after he had withdrawn from me all rny available artillery,
and only after the enemy had had time· to. become vastly
my superior in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and was intrenched. In answer to my earnest appeals, he reinforced
me only after the occasion for employing reinforcements
had passed away.
"4th. That if the General-in-chief designed me to do
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more than threaten the enemy at Winchester, he did not
divulge his wish.
" 5th. That if the General-in-chief expected me to follow
to ·Manassas 'close upon the heels of Johnston,' he expected
a physical impossibility; the enemy moving part of the wayby rail, from an intermediate point, and my army on foot,
entering an enemy's country, and guarding a heavy train,
and a depot retained by him in an improper place.
" 6th. The General-in-chief forbade pursuit of the enemy,
in the event that he should retire towards Manassas, fearing
to press him on Washington.
" 7th. That I was informed by the General-in-chief that
the attack on Manassas would be made on Tuesday, the 16th
of July, instead of Sunday, the 21st, at which time he directed
me to make such a demonstration upon Winchester as to
keep the enemy at that place. I claim that the demonstration was made on that day, and that he did not avail himself
of the fruits of that movement, as he had expected to do.
All that was demanded of me, and more, was effected.
"8th. That if the army I commanded had attacked Winchester on Tuesday, the 16th of July, as it has since been
claimed I was ordered to do, two armies instead of one would
have been demoralized, and the enemy would have turned
with all the :flush of victory to a triumph in front of .Washington.
" 9th. That I have suffered additional injustice at the hands
.of the General-in-chief, who sanctioned and fixed the impression that the enemy at Winchester was inferior to me in
force in every arm of the service, and yet has not corrected
the report, although he knew, two days after the Battle of
Bull Run, that siege artillery, three times as numerous, and
heavier than mine, had been left by the enemy at Winchester, while a greater number of guns had been carried away.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" R. p ATTERSON'
'' Maj or-General.''
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, This application was acknowledged as follows:

"w

.AR DEP.ARTMENT'
W .ASHINGTON, November 3, 1861.

"DEAR SrR:
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter, bearing date November 1. The Secretary of War is ·
absent on a visit North. I will forward it to him by this
day's mail, and ask for instructions.
" Very respectfully,
" THOM.AS A. SCOTT,
"GENER.AL R. p .ATTERSON,
''Philadelphia.''

"Ass't Secretary of War.

After waiting a reasonable time for an answer to my
application, I again appealed to the Secretary of War,
as follows:
"PHIL.AD:E+LPHI.A, November 26, 1861.

"SrR :
"I respectfully request that you will do me the justice to
refer to my letter of the 1st instant, and give it your early
attention. I cannot refrain from intimating a confident
hope that my application for a court of inquiry will meet
with your favorable consideration, and that an order for the
detail wiH be made at the earliest moment consistent with
the interests of the service.
" I have the honor to be, with great respect,
'"'Your obedient servant,
"R. PATTERSON,
"HON. SIMON CAMERON,,
'' Secretary of War.''

'' Major-General.

This brought me the following refusal of my application:
"W.AR DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1861.

" GEN ER.AL :

" I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
26th instant, calling my attention to your communication oi
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the 1st NovembBr, which contains a request for an inquiry
into the late campaign in Virginia, in which you commanded
a part of the United States forces.
·
" Your letter did not reach me until my return to this
city, and subsequent to the departure of Lieutenant-General
. Scott for Europe.
" There appears to have been no pre-cedent in our service
for an investigation or trial of an o:fficer,-s conduct after he
has received an honorable discharge. The inquiry you desire
to have instituted would equally concern the late Generalin-chief, and, as it appears to me, in justice to him, should
not be made in his absence.
" The respect I have always entertained for you, as well
as the friendly relations which have long existed between
us,. would claim for any personal request .from you the most
prompt and favorable attention; but, in my public capacity,
in the present condition of a:flairs, I cannot convince myself
that my duty to the Government and to the country would
justify me in acceding to your request. I must, therefore, ·
reluctantly decline the appointment of a court of inquiry at
this time.
"With much respect, your obedient servant,
" SIMON CAMERON,,
"GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

'' Secretary of War.

" Philadelphia:, Penna."

The voyage of the General-in-chief to Europe was, of
course, as unexpected to me as it was to the public at
large, although the additional insinuation was made
against me that I had taken advantage of his absence to
make my request for a trial.. The receipt of my letter
asking an investigation was, however, fortunately acknowledged before he left the country, and his speedy
return removed at least one reason for refusing to allow
me to be heard. Deter1nined to perse-vere and obtain
an investigation, if possible, I went to Washington and
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called at the War Department, had a long interview
with the Secretary, General Cameron, and the Assistant
Secretary, Hon. T. A. Scott, showed the orders and
correspondence, and insisted on an investigation. Both
admitted that the official orders and correspondence
·as presented placed the case in a very different light
from their previous understanding of it. Mr. Scott
said I ought to have a court, in order that justice might
be done to me and all others interested in the matter.
To this the Secretary assented, but said that a court
would throw the blame on General Scott, and this he
would never consent to; that General Scott had now
retired from the service full of years and full of honors ;
that he desired him to pass the remainder of his life in
repose, enjoying, as he deserved, the gratitude of the
whole country; and that no consideration on earth
would induce him to do any act that' would plant a
thorn in General Scott's pillow. To all this I cordially
assented, adding that there was no man living I more
honored and venerated than General Scott, and that, it
it were simply a question between General Scott and
myself as to who should bear the blame, if the blame
rested with either, I would be willing to bear it, and
go down to the grave with it; but that I had children and grandchildren and warm friends, and it was
due to them, and to Pennsylvania, whose officer I was,
as wen as to the troops I commanded, that the truth
should be made manifest; that I must have a trial, or
an official order or letter referring to my services and
approving them. To this General Cameron assented,
2
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and promised to. give one, but, unfortunately for me, be- ,
fore it was given, circumstances occurred which induced
him to leave the Cabinet, after which he could not issue
an order. At the close of th~ interview, General Cameron said he would like the President to see the official
orders and correspondence, to which. I replied that I
desired this exceedingly. Mr. Scott offered to see the
President at once. He did so. The President fixed
7! o'clock in the evening, at the Executive Mansion.
I called at that hour, was most kindly received, and
read the orders and correspondence, to which the President attentively listened. When I had finished, and
after some conversation, the Pres1dent addressed me. in
nearly the following words: "General Patterson, I have
never found fault with or censured you; I have never
been able to see that you could have done anything else
than you did do. Your hands were tied; you obeyed
orders, and did your duty, and I am satisfied with your
conduct." This was said with a manner so frank, so candid, and so manly, as to secure my respect, confidence,
and good will. I expressed to the President my great
gratification with, and tendered my sincere thanks for,
his fairness towards me, and his courtesy in hearing my
case, and giving me some five hours of his time. I said
that so far as he and the War Department were concerned I was satisfied, but that I must have a court and
a trial by my peers, in order to have a public approval
of my conduct, and stop the abuse daily lavished upon
me. The President replied that he would cheerfully
accede to any practi_cable measure to do me justice, but
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that I need not expect to escape abuse as long as I was
of any importance or value to the community, adding
that he received infinitely more abuse than I did, but
he had ceased to regard it, and I must learn to do the
same.
My next application for redress was to Congress. At
my request, Mr. Sherman offered the following resolution in the Senate of the United States (Report, p. 117,

No. 3):
"SEN.A.TE OF THE UNITED ST.A.TES7
December 17, 1861.

" On motion of Mr. Sherman,
" Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested, if not
incompatible with the public interests, to furnish the Senate
with copies of the correspondence between LieutenantGeneral Scott and Major-General Patterson, with all orders
from the former to the latter, from the 16th day of April,
1861, to the 25th day of July, inclusive."

To this resolution of the Senate, unanimously adopted,
the following response was made :
''WAR DEPARTMENT, December 24, 1861.

"SIR:
"In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 17th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the
Adjutant-General, from which .it will be perceived that it is
not deemed compatible with the public interest at this time
to furnish the correspondence between Generals Scott and_
Patterson, as called for.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" SIMON CAMERON'

"HoN. H. B;AMLIN,
''President of the Senate."

".Secretary of War•.
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,, HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENER.AL'S OFFICE,

w .ASHINGTON,

December 23, 1861.

"Sm:
"In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor
to report that, after due consideration, the General-in-chief
is of the opinion it would be 'incompatible with the public
interest to furnish the Senate with copies of the correspondence between Lieutenant-General Scott and Major-General
Patterson, and with all orders from the former to the latter
from the 16th day of April, 1861, to the 25th day of July, inclusive,' as called for in the Senate resolution of December
17th, 1861.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"L. THOMAS,
,, HON. SECRET.ARY OF

w .AR.''

''Adjutant-General.

Had a court of inquiry been allowed me, no publication of the orders or correspondence would have been
necessary. The court would have investigated the case,
and if it had appeared that I had obeyed my orders and
done my duty, they would have said so. I would have
been satisfied, and there the case would have terminated.
The refusal to publish my correspondence and orders,
being put upon the ground "that it was not deemed
compatible with the public interest," not only deprived
me of their official publication, but debarred me from
publishing them in any other way, although I was daily
the subject of attack, upon points which they would instantly have refuted. I was thus placed in a position
in which I could be attacked with perfect impunity,
while any answer by myself would have rendered me
liable to the reproach of publishing what the highest
military authorities deemed detrimental to the public
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service. I therefore bore, and have borne without a word
of reply, the .absurd calumnies that have been heaped
upon me. Nothing was too gross for popular belie£ It
was even asserted as a fact beyond all doubt, that General Joseph E. Johnston who commanded the forces opposing me, and with whom I had no connection or relationship, was my brother-in-law, and it is probably now
credited everywhere out of Philadelphia.
The facts which I have stated, certainly prove that
I had no desire to avoid an investigation of my official
conduct, but that I was then, as I am now, not only willing but anxious to meet frankly and fairly any allegation that could be made against me. That I had been
honorably discharged from the service of my country,
was not, as it might have been, put forward by me as a
reason why I should not ask for an investigation, but
was the excuse given by the Government for not granting it. Having by an honorable discharge declared they
had no fault to find with me, they said that no court
they could grant me could do any more.
I certainly think, therefore, I can claim that I was
justified by those who had full knowledge of what I had
done, and full authority to rebuke me had I done wrong.
The day after the War Department had declined to
furnish the Senate with copies of the correspondence
and orders received by me from the Commander-in-chief,
as being detrimental to the public interests, a Committee
of Congress on the "Conduct of the War" began an investigation of the circumstances attending the Battle of
Bull Run, including my operations. This struck me as
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somewhat inconsistent, but the suggestion did not then
occur to me that the object was, by a Star Chamber proceeding, to prepare a report setting all fair play and truth
at defiance. This too plainly appeared subsequently.
At the time I was much gratified, supposing, of course,
that the investigation would be full, fair, and candid. I
need hardly say, in addressing American citizens, that
in a question involving all that is dear to a man or an
officer, I expected to be confronted with any witness who
should testify ·against me. I presumed that I should
be allowed to cross-examine them. I supposed that at
least my own witnesses would be examined. Not so,
however, did it appear to this Honorable Committee. I
never was allowed to hear the evidence of a single witness. I never was permi'tted to have a copy of any testimony affecting my character or conduct. I was refused
the privilege of having examined the witnesses I deemed
most material. Even the following questions, left with
the Committee, certainly unobjectionable, which I reqnested, if not myself permitted to be present, n1igh t be
asked by the Committee, appear by the published testimony never to have been put to a single witness:
1. Were you with General Patterson's column in July
last? If so, in what capacity?
2. Did or did not General Patterson possess. the respect and confidence of his officers and men ?
3. What was the effect on General Patterson's army
of the order of the Commander-in-chief directing him to
send to Washington all his regular troops, with the Rhode
Island regiment and battery, and the consequent recross-
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ing of the Potomac by that part of the army which had
entered Virginia ?
4. Was General Patterson's movement from Martinsburg by Bunker Hill and Charlestown, on the 15th, 16th,
and 17th of July, in your judgment, judicious or otherwise, and were this and his other movements we~l conducted or otherwise?
5. Which do you consider the better strategic point,
Martinsburg or Charlestown?
6. What at that time, according to your knowledge
and information, was the relative strength in men and
guns, 0£ the armies of General Patterson and General
Johnston?
7. Did. you then or do you now think that General
Patterson ought to have attacked General Johnston at
Winchester, and if he had done so, what in your opinion
would have been the probable result?
8. Was there any open opposition to ·a further advance by officers or men, and if so, where or when?
9. Did or did not General Patterson use his influence with the volunteers of his command, whose term
of service was about to expire, to remain with him a
week or ten days longer, to enable him to hold his position at Charlestown till reinforced with three-years ·
men, or to obey any order he might receive from General Scott, and if so, what was the character of his appeal,
and what wa~ the response to it?
On the first day of my own examination, l said to the
Committee, "If any testimony has been given that affects
the management of my column, I would like to have it
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read before I begin. I believe it is customary to have
that done." The Chairman in response to this said,
"What Congress expects of us, is to obtain such facts as
we suppose will be useful in throwing light upon the
military operations of the army, in order to apply any
remedy that may be necessary. I perceive by the documents that you have before you, that you are about
entering upon what is a very minute narration : that
might be necessary if you were accused; it might then
be very proper." The Hon. Andrew Johnson here interfered, and on his motion I was allowed to proceed
and make my statement, certainly under the impression
that before the Committee, at least, to use the words of
the Chairman, " i was not accused," and had the refore
nothing to reply to.
It now . appears from their Report, that the main
portion of the testimony upon which they have relied
to make out an accusation against me, was then in their
possession, yet it was thus withheld from me, and it was
only by the courtesy of Mr. Johnson that I was permitted to make a statement.
That it was not the intention of Congress that any
co~mittee of their body should so prostitute their functions, I sincerely believe. No stronger evidence can be
given of their sense of the gross unfairness of the course
pursued by this Committee than the resolution adopted
in the House of Representatives in 1862, on the motion
of Mr. Colfax.
Mr. Colfax's resolution was adopted,-yeas 90, nays
41. It is as follows:
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" Resolved, That the course adopted by the Naval Investi-

gating Committee of 1859, of communicating to the officers
of the Government copies of the evidence apparently adverse
to them, and giving them an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against them, or to refute or explain their testimony, is, in the opinion of this House, worthy of imitation,
whenever practicable, by the investigating committees appointed by order of the House of Representatives, especially
when the said committees receive and collect such testimony
in secret session ; and that it is ·contrary to the plainest principles of justice to condemn any citizen upon ex parte evidence,
taken against him by a committee in secret, and the purport
of which has not, if practicable, been laid before him by the
said committee, with an opportunity to explain 'Or refute it
before the report is made public."

Any body or committee seeking truth could hardly
have acted otherwise. It is only those bent on making
a report consonant with their own wishes, who could
lose sight of all fairness and justice in effecting their
purpose.
Since the Committee, in its published Report on the
Battle of Bull Run, has endeavored to countenance the
imputation of blame to me for "failure to hold the forces
of Johnston in the Valley of the Shenandoah," I presume that I am at liberty, as r can no longer hope for
a military investigation, to state my own case without
detriment to the public interest. This I propose now
to do.
On the 15th of April, 1861, the President, by proclamation, called for a military force of seventy-five thousand men, of which the quota assigned to Pennsylvania
was at first sixteen (afterwards reduced to fourteen) regi-
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ments, to serve as infantry or riflemen, for the term of
three months, unless sooner discharged. On the 16th,
myself and the late Major-General W. H. Keim were
selected by Governor Curtin as the Major-Generals to
· command the Pennsylvania troops.
On the same day, instantly relinquishing the large
business in which I was engaged, I commenced organ- .
izing regiments for service in Philadelphia, with great
and immediate success.
To use the words of the then Adjutant-General of our
State:
" " Pennsylvania not only furnished promptly her assigned
quota of fourteen regiments, but 'increased the number to
twenty-five, and such was the patriotic ardor of the people
that the service of about thirty additional regiments had to
· be refused, making in all more than one-half the requisition
of the President. Four days after this call, Pennsylvania
had placed at the national capital six hundred men, the first
to arrive for its defence, and ten days later the entire twentyfive regiments were organized and in the field."

While performing my part in this preparation, in
which all were zealous and active, I was by the order of
Lieutenant-General Scott, placed in command of " the
Department of Washington," embracing the States of
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District
of Columbia, my headquarters being in Philadelphia.
I was unceasingly occupied in organizing, equipping and
forwarding troops for the defence of the city of Washington, in sustaining the Union feeling in Maryland and
Delaware, and in the adoption of means to prevent one
or both from seceding and joining the States in rebellion,
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also, in providing means for the defence and protection
of the frontier of my. Department, and of the Delaware
River. My attentioµ was also early engaged in opening
a route to Washington via Annapolis, for which purpose I sent the Hon. John Sherman of Ohio, one of my
aides-de-camp, to General Scott, with a desp~tch pointing out the advantage of the Annapolis route at that
time.
My suggestion was adopted, and the Annapolis route
approved. · Pending this, I had ordered Brigadier-General B. F. Butler with a Massachusetts regiment to proeeed to Annapolis, in a steamboat patriotically furnished
for the purpose by S. M. Felton, Esq., President of the
Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company. General Butler was ordered to hold Annapolis,
to employ the regiments as they arrived there .in opening
the way to Washington, to seize the Annapolis Junction,
to station a competent force there, and guard the whole
line of road thoroughly. These services he rendered in
conformity with my orders.
Having succeeded in securing a well-protected line
of communication with Washington, I turned my attention to re-establishing the route through Baltimore,
and compelling the turbulent spirits of that city to submit to lawful authority, and in this I was well aided by
his Excellency Governor Hicks. The troops to force a
passage through Baltimore, were the First Regiment
Pennsylvania Volunteer Artillery (Seventeenth of the
line), and Sherman's Battery, the whole- under command of my son, the late General Francis E. Patterson.
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It is due to the officers and men of this command to say,
that their entrance into and passage through Baltimore,
was an encouraging exhibition of Union determination.
I had been deeply convinced that the contest upon
which we were entering was very much underrated by
our rulers, and that the three months' troops, though
very well for the moment, should not be our sole dependence for carrying on operations of the magnitude which
I thought that I foresaw.
I felt that if advantage was not taken of the time
which their service gave us to prepare for tl;ie future, we
should find ourselves at some critical moment with all
our troops going out of service and none coming in to
replace them.
The interruption of all communication with Washington left me, in the absence of orders, to rely wholly
upon my own judgment as commander of the Depart- ,
ment, and I then took a step by which I incurred very
great responsibility; and, although I received the implied censure of the War Department by their revocation
of my order, as soon as they were able to communicate
with the North, yet I have never regretted it, and I confidently appeal to subsequent events to justify my action.
On the 25th of April I addressed the following letter
to the Governor of Pennsylvania:
,, H~A.DQUA.RTERS
MILIT A.RY DEP A.RTMENT OF
PHILADELPHIA.,

w A.SHINGTON'

April 25th, 1861.

"SIR:
"I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided
opinion that the force at the disposal of this Department
should be increased without delay.
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" I, therefore, have to request your Excellency to direct
that twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one
regiment of cavalry be_called for forthwith, to be mustered
into the service of the United States.
"Officers will. be detailed to inspect and muster the men
into service as soon as I am informed of the points of rendezvous which may be designated by your Excellency.
"I have the honor to be, with great respect,
"Your obedient servant,

"R.
G. CURTIN,
''Governor of Pennsylvania."

"HIS EXCELLENCY ANDREW

PATTERSON,

''Major-General.

The 0-overnor, with his usual promptness, responded
to this appeal, and had actually raised a large body of
men, when the War Department, declined to indorse my
call. On the contrary, they would not enlarge their first
requisition to cover the regiments already in the field
from Pennsylvania, but stated " that it .was more important to reduce than enlarge the number."
In spite of this rebuff, I determined to make one more
effort to obtain at least some troops "for the war" while
they had the disposition to enlist for that term. With
this view, I sent to the Secretary of War my aide-decamp, the Hon. John Sherman, Senator from Ohio, who
had done me the honor of serving on my staff, hoping
that his well-known character for patriotism and ability might add weight to my views, and induce the Secretary to modify his determination, and permit me to
secure at least three of my finest regiments, who were
willing to remain and re-enlist. But in vain, as the following letter will show:
"WASHINGTON,

"MY

May 30, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL :

"I have had, as you suggested, an interview with the

·
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Secretary of War. He says he cannot now accept any more
regiments for the war; that no doubt the three years' men
wiH be needed, but that the question of their acceptance for
the war cannot be decided until near the expiration of their
present enlistment. I feel very well assured that if the as"".
pect of affairs is not materially changed that these regiments
will be accepted, if within the next month they justify your
confidence in them..
'' The Secretary informs me that the two New York regiments now at Harrisburg will be left under your command.
"I write in great haste to send by present opportunity. .
"With great respect,
"JOHN SHERMAN.
"M.A.JOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON."

The Executive of Pennsylvania fortunately took a
broader view of the subject, and induced the Legislature
to pass an act to take into the service of the State the
men whom, at my request, he had commenced raising
for the United States. In his messege of 1862 he says:
~

"Men more than sufficient in number to form some ten
regiments of the Reserve Corps had, previous to the 15th of
May, been accepted by me in pursuance of a call on me
(afterwards rescinded) for twenty-five regiments, and were
then already assembied and subject to my control. Most of
these men volunteered for the Reserve Corps, and were immediately organized."

This was the origin of the famous Reserve Corps of
Pennsylvania, which was so gladly taken into the service
of the United States immediately after the Battle of
Bull Run, and by its prompt transfer from Harrisburg
to Washington, gave security to the national capital.
Of their glorious after career, it is not necessary for
me to speak; it forms one of the brightest pages in the
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history of the war. Had they been accepted by the
Government when I asked for them, they could have
been ready for the movement of General McDowell, and
twenty-five thousand three years' troops would thus
have been added to his force. If added to my column,
I could have left the Pennsylvania border amply protected on my advance, and could have joined battle
without violating my instructions, to be "in superior
or equal force," and with every prospect of a brilliant
result.
Having established order in Baltimore and secured
free communication with Washington, my attention was
next turned to the recapture of Harper's Ferry, then held
by the rebels under General Joseph E. Johnston.
To accomplish this a camp was formed at Chambersburg, under the late Major-General W. H. Keim. On
the 2d of June I left Philadelphia and took command
in person of the troops at Chambersburg, intending to
carry out a plan previously submitted to and approved
by General Scott, to attack and capture or disperse the
enemy at Harper's Ferry. On the 4th of June I was
forbidden to advance until certain reinforcements were
sent me. The order was as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON,

"MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,

June 4, 1861.

u. s. A.,

Chambersburg, Pa.

" General Scott says, do not make a move forward until
you are joined by a battery of the Fourth (4th) Artillery and
a battalion of five (5) companies Third U. S. Infantry, to
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leave here the 6th inst. for Carlisle. Company F, Fourth
Artillery, is the one to be mounted.
" Orders have been given to purchase horses and collect
the guns, equipments, &c., as soon as possible, at Carlisle.
It will require some days, but the General considers this
addition to your force indispensable. If two (2) Ohio regiments come to you, retain them.
"Also halt the first two (2) regiments that may pass
through Harrisburg from the North to this city and add them
to your force. You will receive a letter from the General
before you move.

"E. D.

TOWNSEND,

"Asst. Adjt. Genl..''

The following is the letter of instruction referred to
(see Report, vol. ii, p. 118) :
''HE.A.DQU.A.RTERS OF THE ARMY,

w .A.SHINGTON' June 8, 1861.
"SIR:

"I think your expedition against Harper's Ferry well
projected, and that success in it would be an important step
in the war. But there must be no reverse. Hence I have
given you the best reinforcements within my reach, and
have just ordered Colonel Burnside's fine Rhode Island regiment of infantry with its battery (about twelve hundred
strong) to proceed to Carlisle and there receive your orders.
A company of the Fourth Artillery (to receive its horses and
battery at Carlisle), with the battalion of the Third Infantry,
took the same route, and with the same instructions, yesterday. This battery may not be ready for you in time. These
heavy rains must swell the Potomac and delay your passage
some days. I am organizing to aid you a small secondary
expedition under Colonel Stone. He will have about twentyfive hundred men, including two troops of cavalry and a
section (two pieces) of artillery.
" The movements by road and canal will commence the
10th inst., and, passing up the country (touching at Rockville), be directed upon the ferry opposite Leesburg. This
may be but a diversion in your favor, but possibly ·it may be
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turned into an effective co-operation. Colonel Stone will be
instructed to open a communication with you, if practicable,
and you will make a corresponding effort on your part. I
do not distinctly foresee that we shall be able to make any
diversion in your behalf on the other side of the Potomac,
beyond repairing the lower part of the railroad leading from
Alexandria towards the Manass·as Gap.
"I have said that w·e must sustain no reverse; but this is
not enough : a check or a drawn battle would be a victory
to the enemy, filling his heart with'joy, his ranks with men,
and his magazines with voluntary contributions.
" Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly; make a
good use of your engineers and other experienced staff officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted
and not inferior to you in numbers.
" With entire confidence in your valor and judgment,
" I remain your brother soldier,
"WrNJfIELD ScoTT.
"MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,

''United States Forces. "

When General Johnston perceived that I was about
to cross the Potomac, he abandoned Harper's Ferry and
retreated towards Bunker Hill.
On the next day my forces commenced crossing the
Potomac in pursuit. Part of my forces were on one
side of the river and part on the othe!, all in the highest
state of confidence and excitement, when I received a
. telegraphic despatch to send " all the regular troops,
horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment, to Washington." ·
,, WASHINGTON,

June 16, 1861.

"What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy,
do you propose to make consequent on the evacuation of
3
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Harper's Ferry? If no pursuit, and I recommend none,
specifically, send to me, at once, all the regular troops, horse
and foot, with you, and the Rhode Island regiment.
'' wINFIELD Seo TT.
"MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON."

In my response to this despatch, I said (Report, vol. ii,
p. 122), ''To-day and to-morrow about 9000 will cross to
Virginia, there to aw3't transportation, and to be sent
· · forward in detachments well sustained;" and I requested
that "the regulars be permjtted to remain for the present," and I submitted my desire, "first, to transfer to
Harper's Ferry my base of operations, depots, headquarters, &c.; second, to open and maintain free communication east and west along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; third, to hold at Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, and
Charlestown, a strong force, gradually and securely advancing, as they are prepared, portions towards Winchester, ·&c., and operate with the column in the third
proposition towards Woodstock, and cut off all communication with the west. We will thus force the enemy
to retire, and recover without a struggle a conquered
country," &c. I also added, " If I am permitted to carry
out this plan, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and Canal
.
will be in operation in a week, and a free line to St.
Louis established." In answer to this the General-inchief telegraphed to me :

.

-~

"WASHINGTON,
/

June 16, 1861.

"Why a detachment upon Winchester? If strong enough,
the detachment would drive the enemy from Winchester,
Strasburg, and Manassas Junction, or perhaps from Winchester via Staunton, towards Richmond. What would be the
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gain by driving the enemy on either of these places? And if
your detachment be not strong, it would be lost. Hence the
detachment, if not bad, would ·b e useless. The enemy is
concentrating upon Arlington and Alexandria, and this is the
line to be looked to. Is Wallace, at Cumberland, threatened
from below ? If so, the threatening detachment is cut off by
your passage of the Potomac. McClellan has been told today, to send nothing across the mountains to support you,
since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. You are strong
enough without. The regulars with you are most needed
here; send them and the Rhode Island regiment as fast as
disengaged. Keep within the above limits until you can
satisfy me you ought to go beyond them. . Report frequently.

" wINFIELD SCOTT.

''MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,

Commanding.''

" wASHINGTON' June 16, 1861.
" You tell me you arrived last night at Hagerstown, and
McClellan writes you are checked at Harper's Ferry. Where
are you?
"WINFIELD SCOTT.
"MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,

Commanding."

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

W .ASHINGTON, July 17, 1861.

" To GENERAL PATTERSON:
" We are pressed here. Send the troops I have twice
called for, without delay.
"WINFIELD SCOTT."

This last was imperative, and the troops were sent,
leaving me without a single piece of artillery, and for
the time with but one troop of cavalry, which had not
been in service over a month. Of this recall General
Cadwalader, in his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, thus speaks:
"Answer. My division, as a part of General Patterson's

•
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column, was in the advance. I crossed the Potomac from
Williamsport, and when Johnston retreated, as we advanced
upon Harper's Ferry, we went down as far as Falling Waters,
on the Virginia side.
"I was there met with an order to send to Washington
all the regular troops-they were all under my commandas it was thought that Johnston had fallen back to reinforce
Beauregard, and that Washington was in danger. All the
regular troops being ordered to Washington, and the object
of dislodging the enemy from Harper's Ferry having been
accomplished, General Patterson was compelled, or rather
induced, to give me the order to fall back. I was then on
the way to Martinsburg, and had got as far as Falling Waters,
some miles on the other side of the Potomac. General Patterson was still at. Hagerstown. A great misfortune, by-theby, was that recall."

I

The Hon. John Sherman, in a letter addressed to me,
dated August 30, 1861, gives it as his judgment that
"the great error of General Scott undoubtedly was, that
he gave way to a causeless apprehension that Washington was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress,
and therefore weakened you when you were advancing.
No subsequent movement could repair that error." This
I venture to say, will be the conclusion of any one who
dispassionately examines the subject. I was mortified
a~d humiliated at having to recross the river without
striking a blow. I knew that my reputation would be
grievously damaged by it; the country could not understand the meaning of this crossing and recrossing, this
marching and countermarching in face of the foe, and
that I would be censured without stint for such apparent vacillation and want of purpose. In this I was not
mistaken, for not only the public, but persons in "the
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highest military positions'' at Washington, did great injustice ·to me and my command. I was criticized, too,
for not doing, exactly what my own plan contemplated,
and what I was actually carrying out, when forced to
return to this side of the Potomac by the action of the
General-in-chief. Of this I was informed in the subjoined letter from the Hon. John Sherman.
"wASHINGTON,
" MY

June 30, 1861.

DEAR SIR:

. . . . "Great injustice is done you and your command
here, and by persons in the highest military positions. I
have been asked over and over again why you did not pu.s h
on to Martinsburg, Harper's Ferry, and Winchester. I have
been restrained by my being on your staff from saying more
than simply, that you executed your orders, and that when
you were prepared to advance your best troops were recalled
to Washington. . . . .
"Very truly, yours,
"JOHN SHERMAN.
"MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON."

On the 20th of June, the General-in-chief asked me
"without delay to propose to him a plan of operations."
On the 21st I submitted one; as follows (Report, vol. ii,
p. 123):
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
HAGERSTOWN, MARYLAND,

June 21, 1861.

"COLONEL:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the tele:gram of the General-in-chief, calling for a plan of operations,
with a portion of my force, to sweep the enemy from Leesburg, &c.
" Inclosed is a copy of my telegraphic reply. The following is my plan. To carry out the views of the Generalin-chief, I propose," 1st. To occupy the Maryland Heights, with a brigade

•
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(2100 men); fortify and arm with Doubleday's artillery;
provision for 20 days, to secure against investment.
" 2d. To move all supplies to Frederick, and immediately
thereafter. abandon this line of operations, threatening with
a force to open a route through Harper's Ferry, this force
to be the sustaining one for the command on Maryland
Heights.
" 3d. To send everything else available, horse, foot, and
artillery, to cross the Potomac near Point of Rocks, and
unite with Colonel Stone at Leesburg. From that point I
can operate as circumstances shall demand and your orders
reqmre.
" If no blow is to be struck here, I think this change of
position important to keep alive the ardor of our men, as
well as to force an enemy. The reasons for this change of
depot will be so apparent to the General-in-chief th~t I need
not refer to them. By the employment of the local transportation of the country, I can soon make the necessary
changes, and will hasten to carry out your orders.
"I have many reports in regard to the movements of the
force opposite us in Virginia, and have reason to believe that
when the regulars were withdrawn, General Johnston, with
13,000 men and 22 pieces of artillery, .was marching to the
attack, that night posted his forces, expecting aB attack the
following morning. I regret we did not meet the enemy, so
confident am I that with this well-appointed force, the result
would.·have been favorable to us, and that this portion of
Virginia would now be peaceably occupied. Reports of the
enemy having returned to Harper's Ferry, and driven the
occupants ·to this shore, reached me yesterday. I immediately despatched a strong force to take the position in the
vicinity of Sharpsburg, and protect all parties on this side of
the river, and drive back any force which may attempt to
cross.
" I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
" Your obedient servant,
" R. p ATTERSON'
'' COLONEL

E. D.

'' Maj or-General, . Commanding.
TOWNSEND,

''Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C."
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Had this plan been adopted, the army of General
McDowell and my own would have been precisely where
they ought to have been. I would have been in a position to have aided General McDowell, and to have taken
and torn up, if I could not have held, a portion of "the
railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia." This would not only have destroyed" the communications between the forces under Beauregard and
those under Johnston," but it would have prevented
either from throwing large reinforce men ts to the other
when assailed.
And if I could not prevent Johnston from joining
Beauregard,
which I certainly
could not do while sta.
.
tioned anywhere between Williamsport and Winchester,
I could have joined McDowell in the attack on Manassas, and assailed and turned the enemy's left. Had my
suggestions been adopted, the Battle of Bull Run might
have been a victory, ~nstead of a defeat.
It thus appears that, just one month before the Battle
of Bull Run, knowing that I was upon a false line and
could do no good there, I proposed to abandon it and
go to Leesburg, where it is now admitted I ought to
have been. The wisdom of this plan is singularly confirmed by the opinion of one of the ablest military
writers and critics of the day, Major-General Halleck.
In an article on " The Art of War," published in the
New York Times, of the 22d of July, 1862, and written
in entire ignorance of my having previously suggested
the very course he recommends, he says :

40

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN

"Patterson and McDowell's columns moved on exterior
lines, leaving the armies of Johnston and Beauregard between them ; they concentrated their forces at Bull Run and
defeated McDowell's army, and might have done the same
thing to the army of Patterson. Had the latter crossed the
Potomac at Leesburg, he would have threatened Johnston's communications much more effectually than at Martinsburg, and at
the same time would have been near enough to McDowell to assist
him, or to receive assistance from him, as circumstances might
have required.
"Johnston must then have abandoned Harper's Ferry and
Winchester, and united with Beauregard, or the latter must
have moved to the assistance of the former; for had they
remained separated, both Patterson and McDowell could have
moved between them.
"In that case, Beauregard must have fallen back towards
Richmond, and Johnston must have been isolated. If Johnston had fallen back upon Manassas Junction (as in fact he
did on the 21st day of July), Patterson would have been able
to assist McDowell at the Battle of Bull Run ; whereas, by
his exterior line of operations he actually gained nothing.
Newspaper critics have attempted to throw all the blame of
this defeat upon Patterson, and h;tve compared him to
Grouchy at Waterloo. From all the information we can
obtain on this subject, we can see no parallel in the two
cases. Grouchy made an eccentric movement from interior
lines, thus changing his interior to an exterior position,
leaving the great body of Blucher's army nearer to that of
Wellington than he was to Napoleon. Nevertheless, he was
near enough to hear the cannonading of Waterloo, and
might have reached the field of battle in time to prevent
the disastrous retreat, if not to save the defeat. The country was an open one, and his army could have moved as
rapidly as that of the enemy. On the contrary, Patterson's
position was, from the beginning, an exterior one; he was
some sixty miles from the battle-field, with a strong force
between him and McDowell. Moreover, Johnston had a
railroad at his command, and could reach Manassas J unc-
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tion in a few hours; whereas, Patterson, without cars (the
railroad being obstructed and the bridges destroyed), could
not have reached Bull Run in less than two days, to say
nothing of the opposition which he would have encountered
from the army of Johnston. ·
"We know nothing of the reasons why Patterson's army
was at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry,-whether his line
of operations and his positions were of his own selection, br
were the result of superior orders ; our criticism is based
solely upon the movements as they occurred, without any
intention to blame or to exculpate any one."

· I ·now return to my correspondence with the Generalin-chief. On the 23d of June, I reported as follows :
"HE.ADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
HAGERSTOWN, MARYLAND,

June 23, 1861.

"COLONEL:

" Up to the present instant I have received from Captain
J. Newton, Engineer Corps, only a report of a part of his
reconnoissance of the Maryland Heights . and the ground
adjacent, made in compliance with the injunctions of the
General-in-chief. I hasten to give the result thus far, expecting to-morrow evening to p1"esent the whole.
" Captain Newton approached the Heights from this side,
ascending over rough and steep roads, difficult for artillery.
The summit he found capable of defence, of ample character,
by about 500 men. The main difficulty to be overcome is
the supply of water, the springs, which a week since afforded
an ample supply, having become dry. He found no water
within a half mile of the position selected on the Heights for
an intrenched camp. In Pleasant Valley, on the east, near
the. base of the mountain, springs are reported to abound;
their character will be ascertained to-morrow. Water would
have to be hauled from this valley, and he reports the ascent
very difficult.
" In this valley I propose to place the force sustaining that
on the Heights. The whole command, if the location prove
favorable, need not exceed 2500 men. That force would
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render the position safe; anything less would invite attack.
The following is what I have to report in relation to the
enemy. Deserters from their ranks, some one or more of
whom come in daily, all agree in saying that the whole of
the force originally at Harper's Ferry (said to have been
25,000 men) is still between vVilliamsport and Winchester;
about 8000 coming this way arrived on Friday at Martinsburg. The remainder are distributed in a semicircle, and on
the route to Winchester within four hours' march of the advance. The advance is approaching Falling Waters, under
the command of General Jackson, who now commands the
whole.
" The force.under Jackson controls the people of Berlteley
County, who, I believe, are sorely oppressed, and would welcome our approach. That force has become some little encouraged from our not adva1?-cing, and .may soon annoy us.
If so, I shall not avoid the contest they may invite ; indeed,
if it meets the approval of ·the General-in-chief, I would
march my whole force, as soon as the batteries receive harness, upon the enemy, and drive him step by step to Winchester.
"I believe this force can in ten days rid the adjoining
portion of Virginia of its oppressors. I may be forced to
this course. My fear is that I may interfere with the general
plan of the General-in-chief, and drive the enemy to the aid
of the main body.
" They would, however, go as fugitives, to aid in its demoralization. My means of transportation are coming in
rapidly.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" R. p ATTERSON'
'' Maj or-General, Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
"A. A. Gen. U.S. Army, Washington City.''

" COLONEL

I here distinctly state all that I could effect " to drive
the enemy to Winchester." Once there I had no doubt
that he could intrench and defy me, or by striking the
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railroad, elude me, and by destroying it or removing
the cars, prevent me from following him.
Two days afterwards I received the following (No.
18, p. 125, Conduct of the War):
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

w ASR'INGTON, June 25, 1861.
"I write ·by mail in substance. Remain in front of the
enemy while he continues in force between Winchester and
the Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force you may
cross and attack him. If the enemy should retire upon his
resources at Winchester, it is not enjoined that you should
pursue him to that distance from your base of operations,
without a well-grounded confidence in your continued superiority.
"Your attention is invited to a secondary object, a combined operation on Leesburg between a portion of your
troops and the column of Colonel Stone at, and probably
above, the Point of Rocks, to hold that village. The enemy
has reinforced Leesburg to sixteen hundred (1600) men, and
may increase the number. ·Inquire.
,.
"WINFIELD SCOTT.
,, MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON."

This gave me the permission I desired," if I considered myself superior or equal in force to the enemy."
I had at this time ten thousand volunteer infantry, six
hundred and fifty cavalry. and · artillery, and six guns?
but no means of moving them. The force of the enemy
was reported by Captain (now Major-General) Newton,
of the U. S. Engineets, who had been for two days engaged at Harper's Ferry in obtaining intelligence, as
consisting of fifteen thousand ·men, and twenty to twentyfour guns; while General Cadwalader's information was
that the enemy had twenty guns; "they were counted
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as they passed." The accuracy of these reports is fully
confirmed by the report of General Joseph E. Johnston,
which has since been published. He says:
I

"I assumed command of Harper's Ferry on the 23d of
May. The force at that point consisted of nine regiments
and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery,
with sixteen pieces, without caissons, harness, or horses, and
about three hundred cavalry. I was employed until the
13th of June in continuing what had been begun by my
predecessor, Colonel (now Major-General) Jackson, the organization, instruction, and equipment of the troops, and
providing means of transportation and artillery horses. On
the morning of the 15th, the army left Harper's Ferry for
Winchester. The force had been increased by three regiments (i. e., the Tenth and Thirteenth Virginia and Third
Tennessee) since the 1st of June, and encamped four miles
·beyond Charlestown."
By~ the

adn1ission of the enemy, therefore, his force
consisted of 12 regiments and 2 battalions of infantry,
4 companies of artillery, 16 guns, 300 cavalry, which
was increased before the 2d of July, when I crossed the
river, according to General Johnston, "by the arrival
of General Bee and Colonel Elzey, and the Ninth
Georgia regiment."
Y ~t the Commander-in-chief, who had on the 25th
given me permission to offer battle '' if superior or equal
in force," on the 27th, when he knew I had but six
guns and no mode of moving them, telegraphs : " I had
expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the
enemy." To this I wrote the following reply ( Condtwt
of the War, p. 126, No. 21) :
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'' Hll:.ADQU.ARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
HAGERSTOWN, MARYL.AND,

June 28, 1861.

"COLONEL:

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram from the General-in-chief, dated 27th instant, saying:
'I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of
the enemy.'
"I infer from this that orders have been sent me to cross
and attack the enemy. If so, I have not received them. Captain Newton, of the Engineers, returned at midnight,
after two days' absence in the direction of Sharpsburg and
Dam No. 4, and reports, on information he considers reliable,
five thousand men from Falling Waters to Dam No. 4, four
thousand five hundred men in the vicinity of Shepherdstown
under General Jackson, and a reserve of five thousand five
hundred men under General Johnston, near Bunker Hill.
He also reports twenty to twenty-four guns, and a large
cavalry force with General Jackson, and thinks General
Negley, whose brigade is on my left, near Sharpsburg, will
be attacked, the river being fordable at almost every point.
To meet this force of fifteen thousand men, with twenty-two
guns, and nearly one thousand cavalry, I have about ten
thousand volunteer infantry, and six hundred and fifty cavalry and artillery, the latter being nearly all recruits. The
horses are untrained, and we are still without harness for
the battery. I have repeatedly asked for batteries, and ought
to have one for each brigade, but have none. The only one
fit for service sent me was the Rhode Island battery, and
that the General-in-chief was compelled, by the necessities
of his own position, to take from me, when most wanted,
and within a week after it joined me.
" I have neither cavalry nor artillery sufficient to defend
the fords of the river between Harper's ]ferry and Hancock,
but I would much rather attack than defend, and would
have more confidence in the result. While I will not, on
my own responsibility, attack without artillery and superior ·
force, I will do so cheerfully and promptly if the Ge1rnral-inchief will give me an explicit order to that effect.
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" To insure success, I respectfully but earnestly request
that the troops taken from me when Washington was menaced be sent to me with all speed, with a number of field
guns equal to those of the insurgents. I will then be enabled to choose my point of attack, offer battle to the enemy,
and, I trust, drive them before me, clearing the Valley in
front, and taking such position as the General-in-chief may
indicate.
"I respectfully suggest that Colonel Stone's column be
sent me, with other reinforcements, and venture to add that
the sooner I am reinforced with reliable troops and abundant.
field artillery the better. I am making arrangements for
crossing the river, and will do so without waiting for orders
or reinforcements, if I find that the strength of the enemy
has been overrated.
"I beg to remind the General-in-chief that the period of
service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a
month, and that, if we do not meet the enemy with them,
we wiU be in no condition to do so for three months to come.
The new regiments will not be fit for service before September, if then, and meanwhile this whole frontier will be exposed.
" I have got my command into as good condition as I
could expect in so short a time.
" Officers and men are anxious to be led against the insurgents, and if the General-in-chief will give me a regiment
of regulars and an adequate force of field artillery, I will
cross the river and attack the enemy, unless their forces are
ascertained to be more than two to one.
" I beg you to assure the General-in-chief of my sincere
desire to sustain him faithfully, and to promote, by all the
means at my command, the success of his general plan of
operations.
"I am, sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
''Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army,
"Washington, D. C."

'' COLONEL
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On the 29th of June, the harness for my battery arrived. On the 30th a reconnoissance in force was made,
my troops were then concentrated at Williamsport, and
on the 2d of July I crossed the Potomac with less than
11,000 men and with one battery of six smooth-bore
guns, to which the horses had never been attached until
I moved, and to the sound of which they were entirely
unaccustomed.
After crossing the Potomac, just beyond Falling W a~
ters, the advance brigade of the enemy, 3500 infan. try, with artillery and a large cavalry force, all under
" Stonewall" Jackson, were · encountered, and after a
sharp contest, principally with General Abercrombie's
brigade, were forced back and driven before our troops
several miles, the relative loss of the enemy being very
heavy.
The follQwing official report of the affair was transmitted to the War Department :

. "HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
MARTINSBURG, VIRGINIA,

July 6, 1861.

" SIR:

"I telegraphed my intention to cross the Potomac on the
1st instant. I now have the honor to report my movements
since that date.
"I left Hagerstown on the afternoon of tbe 30th ult., the
earliest day my command could take the field in a proper
condition for active service, intending the following morning
to enter Virginia with two columns (at Dam No. 4, and at
Williamsport), to be united the same day at Hainesville, the
location of the rebels. Owing to the danger and difficulty
attending the fording at Dam No. 4, I placed all the force at
Williamsport.
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" My order of march for the 2d instant is given in the
accompanying circular. The advance crossed the Potomac .
at 4 A. M., all taking the main road to Martinsburg, with
the exception of N egley's brigade, which, about one mile
from the ford, di verged to the right, to meet the enemy
should he come from Hedgesville, to guard our right, and
to rejoin at Hainesville.
"About five miles from the ford the skirmishers in front
and on the flank suddenly became engaged with the enemy
posted in a clump of .trees. At the same time their main
body appeared in front, sheltered by fences, timber, and
houses. Abercrombie immediately deployed his regiments
(First Wisconsin and Eleventh Pennsylvania) on each side '?f
the road, placed Hudson's section, supported by the First
Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry, in the road, and advanced
to the attack against a warm fire before him.
"The enemy being supported by artillery, resisted for
twenty-five minutes with much determination. Lieutenant
Hudson, after getting in position, soon silenced their guns.
"In the meantime, Thomas's brigade rapidly advanced
and deployed to the left flank of the enemy. The enemy,
seeing the movement and being pressed by Abercrombie,
retired, hotly pursued for four miles by artillery and infantry.
" The cavalry could not be employed, on account of numerous fences and walls crossing the country.
" In the enemy's camp was found camp equipage, provisions, grain, &c.
" This brush was highly creditable to our arms, winning,
as we did, the day against a foe superior in numbers to those
engaged on our side.
"They were well posted, sheltered by timber, and sustained by artillery and cavalry. Our men advanced over
open ground against a warm fire of artillery and infantry.
I present the report of Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas,
and Lieutenants Perkins and Hudson, and take much pleasure in bearing testimony as an eye-witness to the admirable
manner in which their commands were handled, and their
commendations earned.
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"~also

bear testimony to the efficient service, in posting
portions of the troops and conducting them to the front and
into ac~ion, rendered by the· members of my staff present
and on the field of battle, Colonel Porter, Captain John Newton, and Lieutenant Babcock, and Majors R. Butler Price
and Craig Biddle, who were employed conveying orders,
also Surgeon Tripler in attending to the wounded.
" The loss of the enemy was over sixty in killed. The
number of wounded cannot be ascertained, as a large number were carried off the field.
"I am, sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
"Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army,
''Washington, D. C."

" COLONEL

Subsequent operations of our forces, upon much
grander scales, have caused this brilliant little affair to
be forgotten. At the time, however, being the first instance that any number of our troops had been under
fire, their gallant behavior in resisting an attack led by
so able a commander as " Stonewall" Jackson, was a
matter of very general congratulation and natural pride. .
On the 3d of July, the army under my command
entered Martinsburg. There I was compelled to halt
and send back for supplies, and to wait for Colonel
Stone's command, ordered on the 30th of June to join
me, which he did . on the 8th of July. My means of
transportation were utterly inadequate, without an increase of which it was impossible to advance. I had
wagons and teams for baggage only, and none for
a supply train. The reinforcements being without
wagons only added to my difficulty. Not one wagon,
4
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horse, mule, or set of harness, was sent to me from
Washington. All the transportation I had was· furnished, under my own orders, by the energetic efforts
of my efficient Deputy Quartermaster-General, Colonel
Crosman.
As an evidence of this, I insert the following, from
other orders of the same character issued at this tin1e
(Report Condiwt of the War, vol. ii, p. 135) :
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
MARTINSBURG,

July 8, 1861.

No. 94.
"Division and brigade commanders will require those
regiments which have not reduced their number of tents to
four common and one wall tent for each company, and one
wall tent for other officers, at once to pack the surplus, mark
them, and turn them in to Captain Woods, Acting Assistant
Quartermaster, at the depot. The spare wagons which will
thus be created must be used to carry provisions.
" Every wagon which can be spared from transporting the
regiments will at once be taken to Colonel Crosman, who
is authorized to call for what he requires.
" The commanding General calls upon every one to reduce their amount of transportation, to enable him to move
a larger force to the front, and to keep his army provisioned.
"By order of Major-General Patterson.
"F. J. PORTER,
" SPECIAL ORDERS,

"Ass't Adjutant-General."

This deficiency of transportation, which I had anticipated on advancing on this line, now began to be a
source of serious embarrassment.
Immediately on the .arrival of Colonel Stone I issued
the following order to advance, the object being to attack
the enemy at Winchester (Report, vol. ii, p. 135) :
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''HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
MARTINSBURG, VA.,

"GENERAL ORDER.

July 8, 1861.

CIRCULAR.

" The troops will move to-morrow morning, in the following order:
"The First (Thomas's) Brigade, with the Rhode Island
Battery temporarily attached thereto, will advance by the
Winchester turnpike, accompanied by one squadron of cavalry.
"The Seventh (Stone's) Brigade, with Perkins's Battery
attached thereto, will take the main street of the town (by
the Court-house); and will continue on the road parallel to
and east of the Winchester turnpike. One company of cavalry will be attached to this command.
"The First (Cadwalader's) Division will follow the march
of Thomas's Brigade. Doubleday's Battery will advance
with this division, one regiment of which will be detailed
for its guard, to accompany wherever it may be ordered.
"The Second (Keim's) Division will pursue both routes,
General N egley's Brigade following the march of Colonel
Stone and Colonel Abercrombie's, and General Wynkoop's
that of General Cadwalader.
"The Twenty-eighth and Nineteenth New York Regiments will be temporarily attached to General Keim's Divis10n.
" General Keim will detail a strong rear-guard of his division for the wagon train.. The rear-guard will march on the
flanks and rear of the train, and will be reinforced by a
squadron of cavalry.
" General Keim will detail a competent field-officer to
command the rear-guard.
" The wagons will advance in one train in the rear of the
troops, and will be required to keep closed.
" The troops of the several divisions and brigades will
keep closed.
"By order of Major-General Patterson.

"F. J.

PORTER,

'' Ass't Adjutant-General."
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About midnight the order was countermanded, as
some of the troops that had arrived under Colonel Stone
were reported by him so weary and footsore as to be
quite unable, Without repose, to bear the fatigue of a
further march, and be in a condition to fight.
On the next morning, the 9th of July, finding from
conversation with some of my officers that their opposition to the plan of advancing upon Winchester, made
known by the circular, appeared to be very strong and
decided, I was induced, before renewing the order, to
call a council of all the division and brigade commanders, the officers of Engineers, and chiefs of the Departments of Transportation and Supply. These were :
Major-General Wm. H. Keim, Brigadier-General Cadwalader (now Major-General), Colonel Abercrombie
(now Brigadier-General), Colonel Geo. H. Thomas (now
Major-General), Brigadier-General Negley (now MajorGeneral), Colonel Stone (now Brigadier-General), Captain Newton, U. S. Engineers (now Major-General),
Captain Simpson, U. S. Topographical Engineers (now
Colonel), Captain Beckwith, Subsistence Department
(now Colonel), Lieutenant-Colonel Crosman, Quartermaster's Department (now Colonel): seven distinguished
officers of the regular service, and three experienced
officers of the Volunteers, the survivors of whom are all
now in the service, where they have earned new laurels
and high promotion.
I had the less hesitation in consulting with these
officers, because, after they were ordered to my command, and I was about to attack Harper's Ferry, the
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General-in-chief, in his despatch of June 8th, already
quoted, says :
"I have said that we must sustain no reverse; but this is
not enough : a check or a drawn battle would be a victory
to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men,
and his magazines with voluntary contributions.
" Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly; make
good use of your engineers and other experienced staff officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted
and not inferior to you in numbers."

The suggestion of a council coming from these very
"engineers, staff officers, and generals," I felt bound not
to disregard, and, in case of disaster, I could scarcely
say that " I had attempted nothing without a clear
prospect of success," if my defeat had been foretold by
the very men I was expected to consult. I submitted
to the council my instructions, orders, and the following
statement (Report Conduct of the War, vol. ii, pp. 85,
86, 87) :
" This force was collected originally to retake Harper's
Ferry. That evacuated, it was directed'to remain as long as
Johnston remained in force in this vicinity. Threatening,
as he was, either to move to the aid of the force attacking
Washington, or annoying the frontier of Maryland, this
army was permitted to cross the Potomac and offer battle.
" If accepted, so soon as Johnston was defeated, to return
and approach Washington.
" The enemy retires, for what? Is it weakness, or a trap?
Can we continue to advance, and pursue if he retires? If
so, how far? When shall we retire ?
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" Our volunteer force will soon dwindle before us, and we
may be left without aid. If our men go home without a
regular battle, a good field fight, they will go home discontented, will not re-enlist, and will sour the minds of others.
We have a long line to defend, liable at any moment to be
cut off from our base and depot, and to a blow on our flank.
"Our forces must not be defeated, nor checked in battle,
or meet with reverses. It would be fatal to our cause.
·"A force threatens Washington. If we abandon our present position, Johnston will be available to aid.
" The command has been largely reinforced to enable us
to sustain our position, to clear the valley to Winchester, to
defeat the enemy if he accepts battle, and to be in position
to aid General McDowell, or to move upon Washington,
Richmond, or elsewhere, as the General-in-chief may direct.
General Sanford, with two rifled guns and three regiments,
will be up to-morrow.
" Our force will then be as large as it ever will be. Under
the prospect of losing a large portion of our force in a few
d~ys, by expiration of service, what shall be done?"

The result of the deliberation is given in the following
minute, taken at the ti~e by Major Craig Biddle, of the
staff (Report, vol. ii, p. 85, &c.) :
" Minutes of Council oj War, held July 9, 1861, at Martinsburg,
Virginia.

" Colonel Crosman, Quartermaster, thought nine hundred wagons would be sufficient to furnish subsistence, and
to transport ammunition to our present force. The calculation for the original column was seven hundred wagons, of
which five hundred were on hand and two hundred expected.
The great difficulty will be to obtain forage for the animals,
the present consumption being twenty-six tons daily.
"Captain Beckwith, Commissary. The question of sub-
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sistence is here a question of transportation. Thus far no
reliance has been placed on the adjacent country. A day's
march ahead would compel a resort to it. As far as known
those supplies would be quite inadequate.
" Captain Simpson, Topographical Engineers. The difficulty of our present position arises from the great facility
the enemy has to concentrate troops at Winchester from
Manassas Junction. By the railroad, twelve thousand men
could be sent there in a day, and again sent back to Manassas. Our forces should combine with the forces at Washington.·
" Captain Newton, Engineers. Our 'p resent position is a
very exposed one. General Johnston can keep us where
we are as long as he pleases, and at any time make a demonstration on our rear. Our whole line is a false one. We
have no business here, except for the purpose of making a
demonstration. Ile threatens us now. We should be in a
position to threaten him. We should go to Charlestown,
Harper's Ferry, Shepherdstown, and flank him.
" Colonel Stone. It is mainly a question for the staff.
Our enemy has great facility of movement, and to extend
our line would be accompanied with great danger. Johnston should be threatened from some other point. We
might leave two regiments here, two guns at Shepherdstown,
and proceed to Charlestown, and threaten from that point.
" General Negley, ditto to Captafo Newton.
" Colonel Thomas approves of a flank movement to
Charlestown.
" Colonel Abercrombie, the same.
" General Keim, the same.
" General Cad walader opposed to a forward movement."

The wisdom of this decision of the council held on
the 9th was confirmed in my mind by the receipt of the
following telegram from the General-in-chief two days
afterwards (see Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 86):
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"W.AR

DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON,

" MAJOR-GENERAL

July 11, 1861.

p ATTERSON,

''Martinsburg, Virginia.

" The author of the following is known, and he believes
it authentic:
"'WASHINGTON,

July 9, 1861.

" ' The plan of operations of the Secession army in Virginia
contemplates the reverse of the proceedings and movements
announced in the Express of yesterday and Saturday. A
schedule that has come to light meditates a stand and an engagement by Johnston, when he shall have drawn Patterson
sufficiently far back from the river to render impossible his
retreat across it on being vanquished, and an advance then by
Johnston and Wise conjointly upon McClellan, and, after the
conquest of him, a march in this direction, to unite in an
attack upon the Federal forces across the Potomac, with the
army under Beauregard at Manassas Junction, and the wing
of that army, the South Carolina regiments chiefly, now nine
(9) miles from Alexandria. Success in each of these three
s~veral movements is anticipated, and thereby not only the
possession of the capital is thought to be assured, but an
advance of the Federal troops upon Richmond prevented.
The plan supposes that this success will give the Confederate
cause such prestige, and inspire in it such faith, as will insure
the recognition of its Government abroad, and at the same
time so impair confidence in the Federal Government as to
render it impossibl~ for it to procure loans abroad, and very
difficult for it to raise means at home. Real retreats, which
have been anticipated, it will be seen are, by this plan, altogether ignored. According to it, fighting and conquest are
the orders.'

" E. D.

TOWNSEND,

''Asst. Adjt. Genl."

This paper, transmitted from the headquarters of the
army, speaks for itself.
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That this was the plan agreed upon by the Confederate
generals there is no doubt; and it was a judicious one.
My information of a similar kind had come from various
quarters. My most experienced officers of the regular
service, with whom ~ fully and freely consulted, Co- ·
lonels George H. Thomas, Abercrombie, and Crosman,
Major Fitz John Porter, Captains Newton, Beckwith,
and many others, men of long service, merit, and great
experience, all concurred in the opinion that I was too
far advanced at Martinsburg; that Johnston had fallen
back _for no other purpose than to lead me on; that he
had a trap set somewhere, and that, if not very cautious,
I should·fall into it.
Each of these officers, not only approved warmly of
the management of my command, but opposed, both in
and out of council, a further advance. With their opposition to an advance well known, five of the number
have since been made general officers.
The enemy were at Winchester intrenched. The
phrase "intrenchments," at the beginning of the war,
was very much misunderstood, and was popularly supposed to refer to permanent works. Experience has
shown, on several occasions, that earthworks thrown up
in a night have defied the efforts of the best troops.
The superiority of t~e enemy at Winchester in men
and guns as well as in position, was well known. · The
information was obtained from Union men who had
been there, from prisoners, from deserters, and from
other sources, all agreeing on an average of about forty
thousand men and over sixty guns. Captain W ellmore,
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belonging to a Maryland regiment, taken prisoner at
Charlestown by a party sent by me from Harper's Ferry,
gave forty thousand. A gentleman from Berkeley
County, of high respectability, serving under Johnston
as an unwilling Virginia volunteer in Jackson's Brigade,
at the battle of Falling Waters, subsequently gave the
following statement, taken down by General Negley,
and by him given to me:
" General Jackson retreated with his brigade, consisting
then of four regiments and four pieces of artillery (Captain
Pendleton), to Big Spring, three and a half miles south of
Martinsburg. General Johnston arrived at Darkesville the
same night with about fourteen thousand men. He was
then reinforced by one regiment and one battery (four guns)
flying artillery. General Jackson retreated to that point.
The army made a stand there for four days ; they then retreated to Winchester. When we arrived there, we found
fortifications commenced by the militia. All the army
there assisted, and in two days the city was fortified all
around, within two miles of the suburbs, with intrenchments. Reinforcements commenced pouring in. Ten 42pounders were placed, masked, around the fortifications ;
also, artificial thickets planted for riflemen. The force
consisted of forty-two thousand, including four thousand
militia. General Johnston then received a despatch, as
read to the men, that General Patterson was out of the
way; that he had gone to get in Beauregard's rear, and that
Jeff. Davis had ordered him to cut off General Patterson, in
order to save the country; that General Beauregard had
been ~attacked by an overwhelming force. General Johnston's army moved at 1 o'clock, P.M., Thursday, consisting
of nine brigades, with fifty-two pieces of flying artillery,
including three ten-inch columbiads, represented to me as
such. Among the artillery was a detachment of the Washington Artillery, consisting of eight guns, four of which were
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rifled cannon. General Johnston took with him thirty-five
thousand men, leaving the militia and volunteers, to the
number of seven thousand, in Winchester."

Mr. McDonald, a reporter, gave the following statement, taken down by General Cadwalader, and by him
given to me:
" General Johnston's force at Winchester was forty-two
thousand men, infantry, artillery, and ca·v alry; of which,
eight hundred were Virginia cavalry, under Colonel Stuart,
and three hundred from Southern States. Forty regiments,
thirty-five thousand· men, left Winchester, at 1 o'clock P. M.,
on Thursday, by order of General Beauregard; took the
road to Berry's Ford, on the Shenandoah, thirteen and a half
miles, over the Blue Ridge to Piedmont Station, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, :fifteen miles, making twenty-eight and
a half miles, requiring two days' march. Freight and passenger cars had been hauled over the road, on their own wheels,
to Strasburg last week, and on them Johnston's forces were
expected to be transported, on the Manassas Railroad, from
Piedmont to Manassas Junction, thirty-eight to forty miles.
There remained at Winchester seven thousand troops until
S.aturday afternoon, when they left for Strasburg, on their
way to Manassas, except about two thousand five hundred of
the militia of the neighboring counties, disbanded and sent
home. A large quantity of arms in boxes was sent to Strasburg. The Virginia cavalry remained (under Colonel Stuart),
and went to Berrysville to observe the movements of General Patterson's column. The rest of the cavalry went with
General Johnston. They had at Winchester sixty-two pieces
of artillery in position in the fortifications; about ten 42pounders (some, they thought, were columbiads) were left.
The remainder were taken by General Johnston. A detachment of the Washington Artillery, from New Orleans, had
eight heavy guns, of which four were 32-pounders. These
were hauled by twenty-eight horses each; the rest (smaller
guns) by six and four horses each. Part, if not all of them,
were brass rifled guns. The fortifications surrounded Win-
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chester, except to the southward, upon the high ground;
very heavy earthworks, made ·with bags and barrels filled
with earth, &c. In front of the breastworks deep trenches
were dug, communicating below with inside of the .w orks.
The guns were all masked with artificial thickets of evergreens, which were intended in some cases to be used as
ambuscades for riflemen a_n d sharpshooters. Among the
regiments was one of Kentucky riflemen, armed with heavy
bowie-knives. They refused to take more than one round
of cartridges. They proposed to place themselves in the
bushes for assault. All the fences had been levelled for
miles in front of Winchester. The fortifications extended
two and a half miles. The trees had been felled between
Bunker Hill and Winchester, to impede an advance. Fifteen hundred sick at Winchester, confined with measles,
dysentery, and typhoid fever. Prisoners taken from our
column were sent to Richmond. Wise had been recalled,
it is said, with his troops, from Western Virginia. Beauregard and Davis had done it in opposition to General Lee's
advice."

Mr. Lackland, brother of Colonel Lackland, residing
a short distance from Charlestown, and just returned
from Winchester, stated, July 20th, 1861, that Johnston
had at that place,
"2 regiments from Kentucky, Duncan and Pope,
2 regiments from Tennessee,
5 regiments from Alabama, strong,
5 regiments from Georgia, strong,
1 regiment from North Carolina,
5 regiments from Mississippi,
2 regiments from Maryland,
Several regiments from Virginia,
Militia from Virginia,
One regiment of cavalry, .
Several batteries,

1,300
1,800
4,500
4,600
1,000
4,500
1,200
10,000
5,000
600
700
35,200

" On Wednesday, the 18th, at 2 P.M., he commenced his
movement southeast. Number taken, 30,000 Confederate
troops; number left, 5200 militia."
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These statements, with many others, taken by different officers, from different p(jrsons, at different times
and places, agree very much in the main facts.
Like most other reports, these were doubtless exaggerated, and required, as they received, due allowance.
We are not, however, to rush into the other extreme,
and believe nothing, because the narrator may be supposed to have exceeded the truth. We have in the
present case a most valuable witness, one whose interest
it was to underrate his own force and overrate mine,
General Johnston himself. Stating my force at thirty
thousand, he alleges his inferiority in men as a reason
for not attacking me, and would therefore, to justify
himself, make his force as small as possible. By his
official report he had, on the 23d of May, 9 regiments
and 2 battalions of infantry, 4 companies of artillery, 16
pieces ·of artillery, 300 cavalry. To this were added, on
the 13th of June, 3 regiments of infantry, and, on the
15th of July, 8 regiments of infantry, with 2500 militia
to man the fortifications. Of intrenchments he says
that, after my first advance across the Potomac, on the
16th of June," Major Whiting was ordered to plan defensive works, and to have some heavy guns on navy
carriages mounted. About twenty-five hundred militia,
under Brigadier-General Carson, were called out to man
them.''
General Scott, also, in a despatch addressed to my
sm;cessor, General Banks, which I received before I was
relieved, gives the following information as to the num-
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her of guns which Johnston had left behind him at Winchester (Report, vol. ii, p. 140) :
''WAR DEPARTMENT,
W ASHINGTON 1

July 23, 11.30

P.M.

" The following information has just been received from
A. N. Rankin, editor of the Republican and Transcript:
There are nine 32-pounders, four 44-pounders, and two
6-pounders, and one thousand stand of arms at Winchester,
with but five hundred men, raw militia, to guard the same.
There are also one thousand tents, and a very large amount
of powder, balls, and shells.
" WINFIELD SCOTT.
" MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,

"Headquarters Army, Harper's Ferry."

General Abercrombie, a regular officer of more than
forty years' service, writes me from Winchester on the
17th of March, 1862 :
"I rode over the ground occupied by Johnston ~n July,
and, after a careful examination, I found that I had no reason
to change my opinion as to the course you adopted.
" The works themselves were of no great strength, but
the judicious disposition made of them, the favorable character of the ground, size and number of guns, and numerical
strength of force, ought to have defeated double the number.
" I think you may rely on this: Johnston had twenty-six
thousand volunteers that were mustered into the service,
and between six and seven thousand of what they call militia,
making some thirty-two or thirty-three thousand men. The
trenches extend some four or five miles. They commence
at the turnpike leading to Charlestown, due east from Winchester, and run to the base of the hills west of the town,
and at every few hundred paces we found platforms for
heavy pivot guns, some of them rifled, so I am told. . On
the hills alluded to, some very heavy guns were admirably
arranged, and commanded the whole valley. These also
were made to traverse in every direction. Most of these
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earthworks were constructed with regard to the Martinsburg route. On the 16th, Johnston had his whole force
under arms, in battle order, and waited some hours, under
the jmpression that you were approaching from Bunker Hill
to attack him, and has since said he regrets not having
attacked you.
" General Johnston had not less than thirty-two thousand
men, a very strong position, and between sixty and seventy
guns, eleven of them pivot and of heavy calibre.
" I have conversed with a number of intelligent persons
on the subject, and all agree very nearly as to the strength
of Johnston's force and number of guns, and my own observations and personal inspection (of the abandoned earthworks) satisfy me of the correctness of their statements."

I will here take occasion to say that my force was
always greatly overestimated, not only by the public,
but apparently by the General-in-chief himRelf. There
were twelve regiments ordered to join me, one Delaware
and three New Jersey on the 24th of May, two New
York on the 30th of May, two Ohio and two Northern
regiments on the 4th of June, and two Pennsylvania
on the 10th of June, but they never did so. I was,
therefore, probably operating with a force less by twelve
regiments than the General-in-chief intended : a fact
sufficient to explain his exaggerated ideas of the strength
of my command. My largest force was accumulated at
Martinsburg, about eighteen thousand two hundred
men. When I marched from there, I had to leave two
regiments, taking about sixteen thousand eight hundred
men with me, and, deducting from them the sick, the
rear and wagon guards, I could not have gone into
action with more than thirteen thousand, and at the
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time Johnston marched from Winchester I could not
have taken into action ten thousand men.
If I .had been defeated a large portion of my army
would have probably been destroyed and the others made
prisoners of war. The affair would have been more
disastrous than Bull Run, for the Potomac ws.s behind
me and I had no reserves to fall back upon. The enemy,
flushed with two victories instead of one, with no army
in position to check them, might have been in possession
of Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, within five
days. The reason assigned for not advancing on Washington by the commander of the Confederates in his
official report after Bull Run, was the fact of my army
being intact and ready to advance. This Shenandoah
Valley, through which the enemy have since twice penetrated into Pennsylvania, I was always loath to leave unguarded. On the 20th of June, when about to cross the
Potomac, I had written to General McCall as follows :
(Report, vol. ii, p. 82) :
'' HE.ADQU .ARTERS, DEP .ARTMENT OF PENNSYL v .ANIA,
HAGERSTOWN,

" MY

June 26, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL :

" If I can get permission to go over into Virginia, I intend
to cross the river and offer battle to the insurgents. As the
regulars and Rhode Island regiment and battery have been
taken from me, I will require all the force now here, and
must leave the Pennsylvania line unguarded. Please inform me how many men you can throw forward, and how
soon.
"Very respectfully and truly yours,

"R. p .ATTERSON."
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To which Major-General McCall replied as follows
(p. 82) :
"HARRISBURG,

Sunday, June 30, 1861.

"MY DEAR GENERAL:

" On my return from Pittsburg this morning, I find your
note of the 26th instant, informing me of your purpose to
cross the river and offer battle to the insurgents, and askin.,g
what force I can throw forward on the Pennsylvania line.
"In reply I have to say that the only force (on~ regiment
rifles, and one infantry, with a section of artillery) of my
command as yet armed and equipped, has been pushed forward to the support of Colonel Wallace at Cumberland, and
for the protection of our border settlers in that direction;
the other regiments are without clothing, arms, or equipments, still, notwithstanding my efforts to fit them for the
field. You will therefore perceive how impossible it will
be for me, although I much regret it, to comply with your
request.
" With great regard, very truly yours,
"GEORGE

A.

McCALL."

It will be seen from the letter of General McCall that
with all his efforts, he had but two regiments and a section of artillery fit for the field, and this force, under
Colonel Charles J. Biddle, was then beyond Bedford, ·
"for the support of Colonel Wallace at Cumberland,
and for the protection of our border settlers in that
direction." I was thus made responsible for our entire
frontier from Cumberland to Edwards' Ferry, while I
had not cavalry or artillery enough to guard the fords
between Hancock and Harper's Ferry. These were
some of the reasons which prevented me from attacking the enemy at Winchester. My instructions were,
" If the enemy were to retire upon his resources at Win5
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chester, it is not enjoined that you pursue him to that
distance from your base of operations without a wellgrounded confidence in your continued superiority."
Will any fair-minded man say, that I could under
these circumstances have entertained any such confidence?
•
But what was to be gained by an attack, the object
being to detain Johnston ?
I had been anxious to go to Leesburg, where, if Johnston attempted to elude 1ne, I could reach McDowell as
soon as he could join Beauregard. This, however, was
not permitted, but I was kept on a false line, where I
could no more prev~nt Johnston by force from going to
Manassas than an army at Washington could prevent
one at Philadelphia going to New York. Neither could
I follow him, for he had a railroad behind him which he
could use and then destroy. Johnston says, in his
official report, " I proceeded to Winchester. There the
army·was in position to oppose either McClellan from
the west, or Patterson from the northeast, and to form
· a junction with General Beauregard when necessary."
After the conference with my officers, I wrote to the
General-in-chief, as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
MARTINSBURG,

July 9, 1861.

"COLONEL:

"I have received the telegrams of the General-in-chief,
notifying of the additional regiments sent to me. Colonel
Stone and the Nineteenth and Twenty-eighth New York regiments arrived yesterday. General Sanford, with the Fifth
and Twelfth New York regiments, will join to-morrow.
" Since I last addressed you, I have made no movements ;
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in fact, have been prevented by the necessity of sending all
my wagons to the rear, to obtain provisions for a few days
in advance and to bring up troops. The commissary has
supplies (with those in hands of troops) for about two days.
Though the quartermaster has spared no exertion, and his
agents have been very active, he has not as yet been able to
provide a supply train for the command. I am, therefore,
much restricted in my movements, being compelled after
three days' advance to send back for provisions. The difficulty will increase as I advance ; indeed, I am now almost at
a stand. Instead of receiving aid from the inhabitants, I
find ~yself in an enemy's country, where our opponents can
procure supplies and we nothing, except by seizure. Even
information is studiously kept from us. Supplies, especially
provisions, are very scarce, and not even one day's rations
can be relied upon. The supply of grain also is very limited.
Under these circumstances, I respectfully present to the General-in-:-chief the following plan, which with my present views
I desire to carry into operation so soon as I can do so with
safety, and the necessity for following Johnston ceases. I
propose to move this force to Charlestown, from which point
I can more easily strike Winchester, march to Leesburg
when necessary, open communication to a depot to be established at Harper's Ferry, and occupy the maiµ. avenue of
supply to the enemy. My base will then be some seven
miles nearer, more easily reached by road, and my line of
communication rendered more secure than at present. I
can establish communication with the Maryland shore by
a bridge of boats. In this way I can more easily approach
you, and the movement, I think, will tend to relieve Leesburg and vicinity of some of its oppressors. My present
location is a very bad one, in a military point of view, and
from it I cannot move a portion of the force without exposing
what remains to be cut off.
" General Sanford informs me by letter that he has for me
a letter from you. I hope it will inform me when you will
put your column in motion against Manassas, and when you
wish me to strike. The enemy retired in succession from
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Darkesville and Bunker Hill to Stevenson's Station, a few
miles from Winchester. There he has halted, and report
says is intrenching. His design evidently is to draw this
force on as far as possible frorri its base, and then to cut my
line, or to attack with large reinforcements from Manassas.
As I have already stated, I cannot advance far, and if I could,
I think the movement very imprudent. When you make
your attack I expect to advance and offer battle. If the
enemy retires, shall not pursue. I am very desirous to know
when the General-in-chief wishes me to approach Winchester.
If the notice does not come in any other way, I wish you
would indicate the day by telegraph thus: ' Let me hear
from you on - - . '
" I am, sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
'' Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
''Washington, D. C."

"COLONEL

On the 13th I received the following telegram from
General Scott :
"WASHINGTON,

July 12, 1861, 1.30 P.M.

" Go where you propose in your letter of the 9th instant.
Should that movement cause the enemy to retreat upon
Manassas via Strasburg, to follow him at this distance would
seem hazardous, whereas the route from Charlestown via
Keyes' Ferry, Hillsboro', and Leesburg, towards Alexandria,
with the use of the canal on the other side of the river for
transportation, may be practicable. Consider this suggestion well, and, except in extreme case, do not recross the
Potomac with more than a sufficient detachment for your
supplies on the canal. Let me hear from you on Tuesday.
Write often when en route.
"WINFIELD SCOTT.
''MAJOR-GENERAL

p ATTERSON,

"Martinsburg, Virginia."
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This gave me the desired permission to go to Charlestown; and the phrase, " Let me hear from you on
Tuesday," announced that General McDowell's attack
was to begin on that day.
On the next day, the orders were substantially reiterated in the following despatch:
'' W .ASHINGTON, July 13 7 1861.

"I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat
the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to
detain him in the valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in
force towards Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him,
then consider the route via Keyes' Ferry, Leesburg, &c.
"WINFIELD SCOTT.
"GENER.AL

R.

PATTERSON."

I did not consider myself" strong enough to beat the
enemy," nor did any officer with whom I consulted; I
determined, therefore, "to make demonstrations so as
to detain Johnston in the valley of Winchester" at the
time indicated. This gave me no opportunity to change
my base promptly, and the 11ttempt to do so I thought
might send Johnston to Manassas at the very time the
General-in-chief desired him to be kept at Winchester,
to wit, on the following Tuesday. I therefore postponed
my movement to Charlestown until after that day.
This I considered a fulfilment of my orders to the very
letter, and as I reported every movement I was making
fully to headquarters, as appears by the following letters,
I could at any moment have been stopped by telegraph,
had it been desired that I should act differently (Report,
vol. ii, pp. 132, 138, 139):
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'' HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNS YI.IV ANIA,
MARTINSBURG,

July 14th, 1861.

" COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND,
''Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
'' Washington City.

" UoLONEL : l have thus far succeeded in keeping in this
vicinity the command under General Johnston, who is now
pretending to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but
prepared to retire beyond striking distance if I shall advance far.
" To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill, preparatory to the
other movement. If an opportunity offers I shall attack,
but unless I can rout shall be careful not to set him in full
retreat upon Strasburg.
"I have arranged for the occupation of Harper's Ferry,
·opposite which. point I have directed provisions to be sent.
"Many of the three months' volunteers .a re very restless
at the prospect of being retained over their time. This fact
will cause you to hear from me soon in the direction of
Charlestown. Want of ample tr~nsportation for supplies
a~d baggage has prevented my moving earlier in the direction I desired.
" I am, sir, very respectfully, your 9bedient servant,
" R. p ATTERSON'
'' Major-General, Commanding.''

p ENNSYL V .A.NIA,
July 16th, 1861.

" HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF
BUNKER HILL,

" COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND,
"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
''Washington City.

"COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the General-in-chief, my advance and arrival at this
place yesterday, opposed only by a body of six hundred
cavalrJ., of which one was killed and five taken prisoners.
"To-morrow I move upon Charlestown. A reconnoissance shows the Winchester road blocked by fallen trees
and fences placed across it, indicating no confidence in the
large force now said to be at Winchester. I send you a
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'
sketch, prepared
by Captain Simpson, of the works said to
have been erected in the vicinity of Winchester.
"Preparations have already been commenced to occupy
and hold Harper's Ferry with the three years' troo.ps. If
the General-in.chief desires to retain that place (and I advise
it never to be evacuated), I desire to be at once informed
by telegraph.
" I have to report that the term of service of a very large
portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an
undercurrent expression of feeling, I am confident that many
will be inclined to lay down their arms the day the term
expires. With such a feeling existing, any active operations
cannot be thought of, until they are replaced by three years'
men. Those whose terms expire this week, and will not
remain, I shall arrange to send off by Harper's Ferry; those
for Philadelphia via Baltimore, those for Harrisburg via
Hagerstown.
" If Harper's Ferry is to be held, after securing that, I shall,
if the General-in-chief desires, advance with the remainder
of the troops via Leesburg, provided the force under Johnston does not remain at Winchester after the success which
I anticipate from General McDowell.
" I wish to be advised if these propositions meet with the
approval of the General-in-chief.
" The Wisconsin regiments are without arms and accoutrements, which I have directed the commander of the
Frankford Arsenal to provide ..
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
,, R. p .ATTERSON'
''Major-General, Commanding.' 7
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA,

July 17, 1861.

" The terms of service of the Pennsylvania troops (eighteen
regiments) expire within seven days, commencing to-morrow. I can rely on none of them renewing service. I must
be at once provided with efficient three years' men, or withdraw to Harper's Ferry.
"Shall I occupy permanently Harper's Ferry, or with-
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draw entirely? I wrote yesterday on this subject, and now
wish to be informed of the intentions of the General-in-chief.
My march to-day was without opposition or incident of importance. The country has been drained of men. This
place has been a depot for supplies for the force at Winchester,
and the presence of the army is not welcome.

.

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.
" COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND,
" Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
" Washington, D. ()."
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
W .A.SHINGTON 7 July 17, 1861.

"I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but am
glad to learn, through Philadelphia papers, that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a
small force in front while he reinforces the Junction with
his main body.
" McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-house. The Junction will probably be
carried to-morrow.
·
,., WINFIELD SCOTT.

'' GENERAL p ATTERSON,
''Commanding U. S. Forces, Harper's Ferry.''

To this I replied as follows :
'' HE.A.DQU.A.RTE RS DEP.A.RTMENT OF PENNSYL v .A.NI.A.,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA, July 18, 1861.

" Telegram of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no
march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by
threats and reconnoissance in force, caused him to be reinforced. I have accomplished more in this respect than the
General-in-chief asked, or could well be expected in face of
an enemy far sup~rior in numbers, with no line of communication to protect.
" In future, Post-office, Sandy Hook.
'' R. p ATTERSON'
''Maj or-General, Commanding.
" COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND,
"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
'' Washington.''
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On the same day I received the following:
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON,

July 18, 1861.

"I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy;
if not, to h_e ar that you had felt him strongly, or at least had
occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have
been at least his equal, and I suppose, superior in number.
Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward
Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win a victory.
The .time of volunteers counts from the day mustered into
the service of the United States. You must not retreat
across the Potomac. If necessary, when abandoned by the
short term volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for reinforcements.
" WINFIELD SCOTT.
'' MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,

" Commanding U. S. Forces."

To this I replied :
''HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA,

July 18, 1861, 1.30

A. M.

" Telegram of date received. Mine of to-night gives the
condition of my command. Some regiments have given
warning not to serve an hour over time. To attack under
such circumstances against the greatly superior force at
Winchester is most hazardous. My letter of the 16th gives
you further information. Shall I attack ?

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
''Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
''Washington, D. C."

"COLONEL

(To same, 1 P. M.)

"I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the
General-in-chief, in keeping General Johnston's force at
Winchester. A reconnoissance in force on Tuesday caused
him to be largely reinforced from Strasburg. With the ex-
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isting feeling and determination of the three months' men to
return home, it would be ruinous to advance, or even to stay
here without immediate increase of force to replace them.
They will not remain.
"I have ordered the brigades to assemble this afternoon,
and shall make a formal appeal to the troops to stay a few
days until I can be reinforced. Many of the regiments are
without shoes; the Government refuses to furnish them;
the men have received no pay; and neither officers or soldiers have money to purchase with. Under these circumstances I cannot ask or expect the three months' volunteers
to stay longer than one week. Two companies of Pennsylvania volunteers were discharged to-day and ordered home.
I to-day place additional force at Harper's Ferry an<.} establish communication with Maryland. I sent Captain Newton to prepare for its defence.

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding."

Thus, from Charlestown on Thursday, the 18th of
July, three days before the b:;ittle of Bull Run; at 1.30
A.M., twelve hours before any part of General Johnston's
command left Winchester for Manassas, I telegraphed
General Scott my opinion of the probable result of an
attack on Winchester, and asked, "Shall I attack ?"
To this no answer was returned, and I was left in
utter ignorance of General McDowell's movements from
Wednesday, July 17th, until Monday, the 22d, when I
first heard of the disastrous result through the newspapers. If the Commander-in-chief, who was perfectly
acquainted with my condition, desired me to attack, he
here had an opportun.i ty of directing it; with his order,
I would cheerfully have advanced, let my force have
been what it would and the result what it might. And
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if General Scott had desired me to join him at Manassas,
an order to me at that time would have effected it, and
I could have been there, if ordered on that day, as soon
or sooner than Johnston.
/ On the same day the following letter was also sent :
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA,

July 18, 1861.

"COLONEL:

"I arrived at this place on the 17th instant. · Nothing of
importance occurred on the march. The principal inhabitants left some days since, anticipating its occupation by the
Federal troops. It was, till our arrival, the location of a
band of Secession militia, engaged in pressing into the service the young men of the country. I have to acknowledge
the receipt of two telegrams from the General-in-chief, of the
17th and 18th instant, both looking to a movement and
attack upon Winchester. A state of affairs existed which
the General-in-chief is not aware of, though in some respects anticipated by his instructions, that if I found the
enemy too strong to attack, to threaten and make demonstrations to retain him at Winchester. I more than carried out
the wishes of the General-in-chief in this respect. Before I
left Martinsburg, I was informed of a large increase in Johnston's command, and of the visit to Winchester of the leading members of the Confederate army. Just before General
McDowell was to strike, I advanced to Bunker Hill, causing
surprise, and" I have since learned an additional increase of
force. On Tuesday I sent out a reconnoitring party towards Winchester. It drove the enemy's pickets, and caused
the army to be formed in line of battle, anticipating an
attack from my main force. This party found the road
barricaded and blocked by fallen trees. The following day
I left for this plac~.
"Before marching from Martinsburg, I heard of the mutterings of many of the volunteer regiments, and their expressed
determination not to serve one hour after their term of ser-
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vice should expire. I anticipated a better expression of
opinion as we approached the enemy, and hoped to hear of
a willingness to remain a week or ten days. I was disappointed; and when I prepared for a movement to the front,
by an order for the men to carry two days' provisions in
their haversacks, I was assailed by earnest remonstrance
against being detained over their term of service, complaints
from officers of want of shoes and other clothing, all throwing obstacles in the way of active operations. Inqeed, I
found I should, if I took Winchester, be without men, and
be forced to retreat, thus losing the fruits of victory. Under
these circumstances, neither I nor those on whom I could
rely, could advance with any confidence. I am, therefore,
now here, with a force which will be dwindling away very
rapidly. I to-day appealed almost in vain to the regiments
to stand by the country for a week or ten days. The men
are longing for their homes, and nothing can detain them.
I sent Captain Newton to-day to Harper's Ferry to arrange
for defence and re-establish communication with Maryland,
and the Massachusetts regiments. The Third Wisconsin
will soon be there. Lieutenant Babcock };las been at Sandy
Hook several days trying to get the canal in operation, prepare the entrance to the ford, putting in operation a ferry,
and reconstructing the bridge. Depots for all supplies will
soon be established, and there I shall cause to be turned in
the camp equipage, &c., of the regiments, and to that place
I shall withdraw if I find my force so small as to render my
present position unsafe. I cannot intrench sufficiently to
defend this place against a large force.
"I shall direct the regiments to be sent to Harrisburg and
Philadelphia, to be mustered out by Captain Hastings, Major
Ruff, and Captain Wharton.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" R. p ATTERSON'
"Major-General, Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
'' Washington, D. C. ''

" COLONEL

/
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"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLV.ANI.A 7
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA,

July 19, 1861.

"Almost all the three months' volunteers refuse to serve
an hour over their time, and, except three regiments which
will stay ten days, the most of them are without shoes or
pants. I am compelled to send them home, many of them
at once, some to Harrisburg, some to Philadelphia, one to
Indiana; and, if not otherwise directed by telegraph, I shall
send to the place of muster, to which I request rolls may be
sent, and Captain Hastings, Major Ruff, and Captain Wharton ordered to muster them out. They cannot march, and,
unless a paymaster goes to them, they will be indecently
clad, and have just cause of complaint.

"R.

PATTERSON,

''Major-General, Commanding.
"ADJUTANT-GENER.AL

u. s.

ARMY,

"Washington, D. C."

I succeeded then in detaining Johnston up to the afternoon of Thursday, the 18th, and no portion of his force
arrived on the field of battle at Manassas until the afternoon of Sunday, the 21st, so that Johnston was kept
from joining Beauregard not only on " Tuesday," or,
"the early part of next week," but during the entire
week. That the battle of Manassas was by that time
fought and won by our troops I had no doubt. General
Scott had telegraphed me on Wednesday, the 17th:
"McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-hous~; the Junction will probably be
carried to-morrow."

So that knowing Johnston to be still in my front, and
that it would take him three days to reach Manassas, I
felt confident that everything was progressing in accordance with the plans of the General-in-chief. Instead,
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however, of "the Junction being carried to-morrow"
(Thursday), there was not even an attack made upon
it until Sunday, the 21st, and then late in the day. Of
all of which I was profoundly ignorant, never having
received an intimation of it from any source whatever,
so that I assumed, and had a right to assume, that if the
General-in-chief told me he would fight on Tuesday, the
16th, and on the 17th had told n1e he h.ad driven the
enemy beyond a certain point, and would probably complete ·the operation on the next day, that it was his
duty to inform me if he had not done it, otherwise, I
must of course infer that he had done it. More especially,
when it was in his power to have communicated with
me by telegraph.
I informed the General-in-chief of Johnston's departure to join Beauregard in ample time to enable him
to abstain from delivering battle, if he desired to do so.
I telegraphed as follows on the 20th of July :
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA,

July 20, 1861.

"With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester,
by the road to Millwood, on the afternoon of the 18th ; his
whole force 32,500.
" R. p ATTERSON'
,, COLONEL

'' Major-General 1 Commanding.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
"A. A. G. U.S. A., Washington, D,. C.''

In this connection, and to show the disposition of
"the Committee on the Conduct of the War" towards
myself, I will mention an incident which occurred in
regard to this despatch in the House of Representatives.
General Scott himself acknowledges the receipt of it in .
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his commentary on my testimony. That I had filed this
despatch with the Committee was well known by John
Covode of Pennsylvania, and D. W. Gooch of Massachusetts, for both spoke of it when I handed it in, and
Mr. Covode observed that he knew the fact, as he had
heard it from several persons ; and yet both afterwards
denied the existence of it, as niay be seen by reference
to the Daily Globe of 15th February, 1862, during a debate in Congress, when Mr. Blair of Missouri was censuring the General-in-chief for forcing the Battle of Bull
Run, without having my .army to join General McDowell's after it was known that Johnston had come down.
Mr. Blair said :
"I wish to state that it was well known to the General
commanding the United States army, that General Johnston with his forces had eluded Patterson and was present at
that :fight at the beginning of it. I want to state that it was
well known by despatches from General Patterson himself,
and that when this information came here, the President of
the United States went to General Scott and protested against
the army proceeding against Bull Run and Manassas, but
General Scott insisted upon its being done. And that whole
defeat of the American army there occurred with the full
knowledge of this fact upon the part of the General in command, and when they still insisted upon marching upon
Manassas, they did it with the full knowledge that Beauregard had been reinforced by Johnston, and against the protest
of the President of the United States. That, sir, is the fact in
reference to this matter. It is a fact that I stated in the
special session of Congress. It was not denied then, it cannot be denied now.
"Mr; Covode. Do I understand the gentleman to say that
General Patterson had telegraphed General Scott that Johnston had eluded him ?
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':Mr. Blair of Missouri. Yes, sir, on Friday or Saturday
preceding the Battle of Bull Run.
"Mr. Covode. Well, Mr. Speaker, I cannot explain the
matter, but I simply say to the gentleman from Missouri,
that he is mistaken.
" Mr. Blair of Missouri. And the gentleman from Missouri
says he is not mistaken. He knows as much in reference to
this matter as the gentleman upon the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, and has as high authority for what he
states as the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
"Mr.· Covode. I say that General Patterson never telegraphed any such thing to General Scott.
" Mr. Gooch. Do I understand the gentleman from Missouri to say that General Scott had the information from
General Patterson that General Johnston had eluded him?
" Mr. Blair. Yes, sir, General Patterson.
"Mr. Gooch. I think the gentleman from Missouri is mistaken, and I would like to know on what authority he makes
the statement.
"Mr. Blair. I know the fact. I desire to be as particular
as positive. I know that the President and General Scott
were advised of the fact by General Patterson himself.
" Mr. Bingham. When ?
" Mr. Blair. I have stated several times. It was on Friday or Saturday previous to the battle. The President went
to General Scott. I do not know whether he protested or
not, but he suggested the propriety of waiting until General
Patterson could be here with his forces, inasmuch as Johnston had eluded him. General Scott disregarded the wish
and advice of the President on the subject. The military
commander at that time, sir, brought upon us the disaster
which befell our arms at Bull Run.
" Mr. Gooch. I think it possible that the President of the
United States might have been in possession of the information to which the gentleman from Missouri refers, but I
think, I know that be did not receive the information from
General Patterson in any way whatever. The fact may have
been telegraphed to the papers in Philadelphia, and from
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there may have been telegraphed here, but I do not think that
General Patterson ever sent it to him or ta anybody else in Washington.
" Mr. Oovode. . . . In regard to the telegraphic despatch from General Patterson. I have been astonished that
the gentleman from Missouri has persisted so long in argument with gentlemen on this floor, who had their hands tied,
and were not in a position to answer him, when it was boldly
asserted by them that that despatch was never sent by General Patterson."

Here is a series of assertions and contradictions. Mr.
Blair, an independent member, anxious to vindicate the
truth of history, asserts facts to the best of his knowledge,
and although not a member of the Committee, nor having seen the evidence or documents, yet, every word he
utters is truth.
Messrs. Covode and Gooch, partisan members of the
Committee, with all the evidence and documents in their
possession, positively assert that which was entirely false,
in their extreme anxiety to make me the scapegoat. I
had informed the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
Messrs. Covode and Gooch being members, and both.
present at the time (see Report, vol. ii, p. 97), that on
the 20th July I telegraphed Gen~ral Scott as follows:.
" With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester bythe road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th."

It so chanced that one of my staff, Major Craig
Biddle, was present in the House of Representatives at
this debate. Major Biddle, knowing that I had so informed General Scott, ahd that the assertions of Covode
and Gooch were untrue, telegraphed to me for a copy ot
6
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my telegram to General Scott, which on receipt he placed
in the hands of Mr. Blair, who again brought the subject
before the House.
I quote from the Congressional Globe:
" Mr. Blair of Missouri. . . . In July last, or 1st of August, when I first spoke upon the subject in this House, for
the purpose of putting that responsibility where it belonged, I
stated what I knew to be a fact, and reiterated that fact on
Friday last, that the General in command of the army knew
that General Johnston had eluded General Patterson, and
left Winchester to reinforce General Beauregard at Manassas. That is what I said, but it seemed that gentlemen upon
the other side were so full of some secret they had got in
committee, that they at once raised this side issue with me,
as to whether General Patterson sent the despatch or not.
" Mr. Gooch. If the gentleman will permit me to interrupt him, I desire to say that, so far as I am concerned, I
desire tq raise no side issue with him, so far as the main
question is concerned, as to this information being received
by the authorities here. I did, however, desire to correct
the gentleman in reference to his statement that General
Patterson furnished this information."

(That is, Mr. Gooch was quite willing that Mr. Blair
should say that the authorities were informed of the
fact, but it would not answer their purpose to let it be
known that General Patterson had given the information.)
" Mr. Blair said: I believed at the time that this information came direct from General Patterson to the General in
command here; but that General Scott received the inf01:mation th.ere is no earthly doubt. Nor is there any doubt that
the President suggested to General Scott the propriety of
waiting for General Patterson's army, in order to support the
column of General McDowell. I have no doubt of that fact,
for I have knowledge of it. It is of no importance whether
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General Patterson sent the information or not, but it appears
from the letter which I hold in my hand that I am correct,
and that General Patterson did send a despatch to 13-eneral
Scott on the subject. I received the letter from a gentleman
with whom I am very well acquainted, and I will read it for
the information of the House :
"W.A.SHINGTON, February 16th, 1862.

" MY

DEAR COLONEL :

" I inclose a copy of a despatch which has been forwarded
to me by .General Patterson. It, as well as my own recollection, fully confirms the statement made by you in the
House, that <?-eneral Patterson on the 20th of July communicated to the headquarters of the army at Washington the
intelligence that Johnston had, with a portion of his force,
left Winchester by the road to Mill wood. This despatch
was given in evidence .before the Investigating Committee,
as appears by its record. General Patterson's force at Martinsburg was eighteen thousand two hundred men.
" Very sincerely yours;
" CRAIG BIDDLE.,,

(Despatch.)
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHARLESTOWN, VIRGINIA, July 20, 1861.

" With a portion of his force, Johnston l~ft Winchester
by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th. His
whole force thirty-five thousand two hundred.

"R. PATTERSON,
"Major-General, Commanding.
,, COLONEL E. D. TOWNSEND,
''Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army,
" Washington, D. C."

This debate gives a fair sample of the "reliable information" which members of this Committee were
enabled, by their position, to foist upon the public, and
which not every one is so lucky as to be able to prove
utterly mendacious by their own record, before the very
body that appointed them.

84

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN

No one acquainted with the country needs to be told
that mymovement from Martinsburg to Charlestown was
in no respect a retreat or withdrawal from the enemy.
When I arrived at Charlestown, and was about to
advance frpm that point; the difficulties which I anticipated from the expiration of the time of service of the
regiments under my command •culminated. I have
shown that my requisition on the Governor of Pennsylvania for three years' troops in May had been countermanded. I,. therefore, having none but three months'
troops under my command, in my communications to
the General-in-chief never failed to urge the danger of
acting just as their terms of service were expiring. On
the 20th of June I had used to Gen~ral Scott (Repor·t on
the Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 126) the following emphatic, and, I may say, prophetic lai:iguage :
"I beg to remind the General-in-chief that the period of
service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a
month, and that if we do not meet the enemy with them, we
will be in no condition to do so for three months to come."

Yet, w~th this fact perfectly well known, the attack
on Manassas was delayed until the 21st of July. On
the 16th, I had said (p. 132) :
" I have to report that the term of service of a very large
portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an
undercurrent expression of feeling, I am confident that many
will be inclined to lay down their arms the day their time
expires. With such a feeling existing, any active operations
towards Winchester cannot be thought of, until they are
replaced by three years' men."
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And on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, the same thing
(Report, p. 92).
What made the matter still worse, was an order, published at w .ashington, which had become known to the
command, directing that all volunteers in service should
be returned to their homes in time to be mustered out
at the expiration of their term of service. This was in
accordance with the law on the subject, but no reinforcements were sent me to replace the troops of which a
literal compliance with this order would have entirely
stripped me.
My time after this was employed in sending off the
troops under my command, until, on the 25th of July,
I was relieved by General Banks.
This is a plain unexaggerated statement of the whole
of my operations.
I think that I have shown:
" 1st. That I have always courted an investigation of any
charge that could be made against me.
" 2d. That my whole course was entirely approved by the
officers attached to my column, whom I was instructed to
consult.
" 3d. That I complied with every order issued to me.
"4th. That I kept Johnston from joining Beauregard, not
only on the day was directed to do so, but for :five days
afterwards.
" 5th. That I was never informed that the battle had not
been fought at the time indicated, though within reach of a
telegraph, but on the contrary, the only despatch received
convinced me that the battle had been fought.
" 6th. That for the delay in :fighting it I was in nowise
responsible.

r
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" 7th. That the General-in-chief, when I told him I was
not strong enough, in my opinion, to attack Johnston, could
have ordered me to do so, if he differed from me, as I told
him all the circumstances, and asked, ' Shall I attack?'
" 8th. That I informed him that Johnston had gone to
General Beauregard, and he himself, in his comments on
my testimony (see page 241, vol. ii, Conduct of the War),
admits that he knew it before delivering battle on the 21st
of July."

Of the testimony taken before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, relative to the operations of my
column, it is unnecessary for me to make a minute
examination. The documentary evidence and the best
informed witnesses sustain me in all that I have here
presented. Some of the witnesses were honest, wellmeaning gentlemen, but acquainted neither with my
orders, my force, the amount of my transportation, nor
anything which would enable them to form a fair judgment. Some were without any military knowledge or
experienfe. To notice their strictures minutely would
be tedious to the reader, and seems to be superfluous.
These reflections do not apply to the remarks of General Scott, which I desire to notice with all the consideration to which anything coming from him is entitled.
His statement, sent to the Committee, is as follows:
"NEW YORK,

March 31, 1862.

"On the statement of Major-General Patterson, submitted
by him as evidence to the Honorable the Committee of the
House of Representatives on the Conduct of the War, I beg
leave to remark:
" 1. That his statement, one hundred and forty-eight long
pages, closely and indistinctly written, has been before me
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about forty-eight hours, including a Sunday when I was too
much indisposed to work or to go to church; that I cannot
write or read at night nor at any time, except by short
efforts, and that I have been entirely without help.
"2. That, consequently, I have read but little of the statement and voluminous documents appended, and have but
about two hours left for comments on that little.
" 3. The documents (mainly correspondence between General Patterson and myself) are badly copied, being hardly
intelligible in some places from the omission and change of
words.
"4. General Patterson was never ordered by me, as he
se~ms to allege, to attack the enemy without a probability
of success; but on several occasions he wrote as if he were
assured of victory. For example : June 12th, he says he is
'resolved to conquer, and will risk nothing;' and July 4th,
expecting supplies the next day, he adds, as soon as they
'arrive I shall advance to Winchester, to drive the enemy
from that place.' Accordingly he issued orders for that
movement on the· 8th, next called a council of war, and stood
fast at Martinsburg .
." 5. But although General Patterson was never specifically
ordered to attack the enemy, he was certainly told, and expected, even if with inferior numbers, to hold the rebel army
in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from reinforcing
Manassas Junction, by means of threatening manceuvres
and demonstrations, results often obtained in war with half
numbers.
" 6. After a time, General Patterson moved upon Bunker
Hill, and then fell off upon Charlestown, whence he seems
to have made no other demonstration that did not look like a
retreat out of Virginia. From that movement Johnston was
at liberty to join Beauregard with any part of the army of
Winchester.
" 7. General Patterson alludes, with feeling, to my recall
from him, back to Washington, after the enemy had evacuated Harper's Ferry, of certain troops sent to enable him to
take that place, but the recall was necessary to prevent the
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Government and capital from falling into the enemy's hands.
His inactivity, however, from that cause need not have been
more than temporary, for he was soon reinforced up to, at
least, the enemy's maximum number in the Winchester
valley, without leading to a battle, or even a reconnoissance
in force.
" 8. He also often called for batteries and rifled cannon
beyond our capacity to supply at the moment, and so in
respect to regular troops, one or more regiments. He might
as well have asked for a brigade of elephants. Till some
time afterwards, we had for the defence of the Government
and its capital but a few companies of regular foot and
horse, and not half the number of troops, including all descriptions, if the enemy had chosen to attack us.
"9. As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge made against me on the floor of
Congress, that I did not stop Brigadier-General McDowell's
movement upon Manassas Junction, after I had been informed of the reinforcement sent thither from Winchester,
though urged to do so by one or more members of the
Cabinet.
" Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to
call off the troops from the attack, and, besides, though
opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and sanguine of success; and it is not true that I was
urged by anybody in authority to stop the attack, which was
commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July.
" 10. I have but time to say that, among the disadvantages
under which I have· been writing are these: I have not had
within reach one of my own papers, and not an officer who
was with me at the period in question.
"Respectfully subro.itted to the Committee.
"WINFIELD SCOTT.
'' NEW YORK,

March 31, 1862."

General Scott's infirmities, th us detailed by himself,
entitle him to the most sincere sympathy. His admission that he has been able to read but little of the
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"documents (mainly correspondence between General
Patterson and myself)," while it detracts very ·much
from his comments upon them, is certainly creditable to
his frankness. If too numerous to read, they must surely
be too numerous to remember, especially by one who,
at the time they were written or received, was occupied
in the direction of other important military o.perations.
The · General admits that I was "never ordered to
attack without a probability of success."
In fact I was never ordered to attack at all, and as I
did not see a probability of success, nor did any of the
officers he had attached to my command and instructed
me to consult, I claim that I was right ~ot to attack the
enemy's intrenched position at Winchester.
Every despatch I ever received impressed upon me,
not the necessity of striking a blow, or making a bold
dash upon the enemy, but the exercise of the greatest
caution; to risk nothing, arid never to give battle without a well-ascertained superiority. All felt that the
first blow should be a decisive one, and that any success
by the rebels would prove, as it did, ·an encouragement
to years of resistance. After actually issuing the order
for an attack on Winchester, I yielded reluctantly to
the belief of my inability to do what I hoped, on the
clearest .evidence, and upon the judgment of those entitled to be consulted.
I did, with greatly inferior numbers, "hold the rebel
army in my front on the alert," and I did prevent it
from reinforcing Manassas Junction, by means of threatening manoouvres and demonstrations " as ordered by

•
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my military superior," not only on the day General
Scott desired me to do so, but for five days afterwards.
That no advantage was taken of this was not my fault.
That the General-in-chief should cast any reflection upon
the movement to Charlestown, is certainly singular, as
he had himself ordered me to go there (ante, p. 68),
and I had told him the precise day I was going and the
route, via Bunker Hill, which I should take (ante, p. 70).
After my arrival in Charlestown the expiration of the
term of service of most of my troops prevented any
further demonstration. The fact that they would not
in any number remain beyond their term of service at
my request, created remark at the time, but as every
commander who has since tried the experiment, has met
with similar experience, I do not deem it necessary to
give any of the details of my efforts to detain them.
I regretted the recall of certain troops, just as I was
partially across the Potomac, as it left me entirely without artillery. If it was necessary to paralyze my force
to save Washington, I have no complaint to make. But
after it was done, I do object to being blamed for the
temporary delay occasioned by it.
I did subsequently move, two days after receiving a
single battery of six guns, and crossed the Potomac with
less than 11,000 men, in the face of a force proved by
the official report of General Johnston to be greatly my
superior, and having, according to my information, 24
pieces of artillery.
Whether batteries and cannon could <:>r could not be
supplied me, I shall not discuss. As my adversary had,
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as he admits, at least 16 pieces of field artillery, together
with heavy siege guns, I think no one will blame me
for my attempts, ineffectual though they were, to obtain
some additions to my six. My siege train when near
Winchester consisted of one 30-pounder, one 24-pounder, ·
and an old eight-inch howitzer.
General Scott scorns to avail himself of the misstate- ·
ments of the Committee, but frankly admits that he
received the intelligence of Johnston's approach, but
determined to fight the battle of Bull Run in spite of
it. How absurd is it then to attribute the disaster of
that day to the unexpected arrival of Johnston. It was
known, but evidently deemed of small moment; so great
was the confidence at Washington, that they would not
wait until . I could come up. They deemed, and public
opinion supported them in it, that their force was perfectly irresistible against everything that the rebels could
oppose to it. To use General Scott's own words:
" Though opposed to the movement at first, we had
all become animated and sanguine of success."
I did not write to General Scott "as if assured of
victory," though repeatedly declaring n1y readiness to
assault Winchester if ordered by him to do so. I said
nothing in my reports to foster the too sanguine expectation of success which precipitated the attack of
McDowell, while from my position it was impossible for
me to co-operate with him. That my estimate of the
difficulties of an advance in the Shenandoah Valley,
with the three months' volunteers, was not exaggerated,
sufficiently appears from the ill success that has since
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attended the movements, in that direction, of more experienced troops, successively commanded by Generals
Stone, Fremont, Banks, Miles, Milroy, Sigel, Wallace,
and Hunter. The first successful campaign there since
I relinquished the command was made very recently, by ·
General Sheridan, at the head of a veteran army, after
first meeting serious reverses.
General Scott, in his recent Autobiography, has added
nothing to his criticisms on this campaign, further than
to say, in speaking of the attack on Vera Cruz:
" Several Generals and Colonels, among them Major-General Patterson, an excellent second in command, notwithstanding his failure as chief on the Shenandoah in 1861,
solicited the privilege .of leading storming parties."

While I am duly grateful for this compliment to my
services in Mexico, I must protest against the assertion
that I acted "as Chief on the Shenandoah in 1861." I
was a subordinate, without knowing the plan of my principal. I was ordered to co-operate in a movement which
was not-and I was not informed of its postponement-made at the time indicated. When I was in a condition
to move into Virginia, and had actually crossed the Potomac, I was ordered back, and told " to keep within my
limits, until I could satisfy the General-in-chief I ought
to go beyond them." When I presented my plan to go
to Leesburg, it was disapproved. When I asked for instructions, they were not given. My movements were
regulated by telegraphic despatches, received from day
to day and hour to hour, and I never was invested with

IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH.

93

the dignity of "Chief," until it became expedient to
make me ~esponsible for the failure of the campaign.
It will appear by an examination of the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the
arrival of General Johnston at Manassas was one of the
very least of the causes of General McDowell's (J.efeat.
In answer: to questions put by the Committee, the
· following evidence was given.
General J. B. Richardson:
" I moved back to see what had become of the New York
12th, on the left. It had probably taken as much as twenty
minutes to go through with this formation. I found, on
arriving at the left, parts of two companies of the New York
12th, about sixty men altogether, retreating outside of the
woods, carrying along a few wounded. I asked what the
matter was and where they were going. They said the
regiment was all killed, and they were falling back; the
regiment had fallen back, those that were not killed. Says
I, 'What are you running for? ther.e is no enemy here. I
cannot see anybody at all. Where is your Colonel?' They
knew nothing about it. The men knew nothing about any
of their officers. I could not find any officers with the men
at all, I believe.
" Question. Why was it concluded to fight that battle on
Sunday, without any knowledge of where Patterson and
his men were, and of the position of Johnston ? Did you
know at the time where they were? I will ask that first.
"Answer. Yes, sir. I knew General Johnston was on
our right before we moved from there at all."

General Richardson further says that if he had captured certain batteries on Thursday night, which he
could.have done, there· would have been no serious fight;
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that reinforcements from Richmond under General
Davis, and from Winchester under General Johnston,
came during Friday and Saturday nights, and he gives
very clear reasons for the defeat at Bull Run. He
says:
" There is another thing I would like to say. From what
we have learned since, the enemy handled every reserve
they had, whereas our reserves were not handled at all. The
three brigades of reserves, ·Blenker's, Davis's, and mine,
that were on the field 'that day, and Runyon's reserve, which
was at Fairfax Station, six miles off, I believe, and not handled at all, make 24,000 who were useless, whereas the enemy
handled all their reserves. This 1s nothing new. I said the
same that night."

General Richardson adds :
"We marched 50,000 men and 49 pieces of artillery, of
which we saved 35 pieces."

Major-General Heintzelman attributes the loss of the
battle to the delay in · bringing it on, and to improper
disposition of the troops. Tyler's division, having but
the shortest distance to go, was ordered to move first.
Hunter's, which had the longest distance to go, followed
Tyler's; and Heintzelman says :
"I think if we had reversed it, let Hunter go first, then
let me follow him, and then Tyler follow me, that delay at
Centreville would not have occurred.
" Question to General Heintzelman. What in your opinion
really led to the disaster of that' day?
"Answer. It is hard to tell. There were a number of
causes. In the first place, the delay of Friday and Saturday

/
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at Centreville was an efficient cause. Another cause was
the three
..., hours lost at Centre-ville on Sunday morning."

•

Major-General Franklin :
"Question by the Chairman. I have always wondered
that the battle was fought then, when it was, after it was
understood in the army that Johnston had come down, contrary to the expectation which was entertained, that Patterson would hold him in check.
" Answer. I will tell you what suggested itself to me,
when I got to Bull Run, and that is : we ought to have encamped at the fine hills there, and waited there overnight,
and got up early in the morning, when we could have whipped them.
" Question by the Chairman. It has always seemed to me
that, when you knew that Johnston had come down, you
should have got twenty-five thousand men from here, and
as many more, perhaps, from Fortress Monroe, and then you
would have had the thing sure. I al:vays wondered why
that was not done when Patterson had not held Johnston in
check, as it was understood he would do.
"The witness. Patterson's officers give a very good account of him. He knew nothing about ~hat the army was
to do. He supposed the battle had come off on Tuesday,
and knew nothing about what was really doing.
" The Chairman. It strikes me that it was a great fault
that so important a circumstance was not understood before
the battle was begun.
"The witness. I think that if we had stopped at Sudley's
stream they would have fought us in the morning, but we
would have fought them on our own ground, and would
have whipped them.
" The Chairman. They would then have lost the benefit
of all their batteries. I have always wondered at you going
into that fight there, when you should really have got reinforcements of twenty to thirty thousand more men.
" The witness. I think it would have been an advisable
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plan to have stopped there at Bull Run. We would probably
have had to fight about the same time, but then we should
have fought on our own ground, and should havt had a
better position than they could have got. We could have
got a beautiful position."

From the testimony of General Wadsworth :
" Question. What is your opinion as to the result of that
battle, had the provisions and transportation been brought
up on Thursday, and the battle fought on Friday morning,,
instead of Sunday ?
"Answer. We would have walked over the field. Johnston is regarded by our officers as much superior to Beauregard; as much the ablest officer in this army. All the
reports show that he had a great deal to do with the disposition of the enemy on that day."

General ;Henry W. Slocum :
" Question by Mr. Odell. You were in Hunter's division
and rested at Centreville, did you not?
" Answer. Yes; sir.
" Question. Do you remember why it was you rested there
an hour or an hour. and a half on Sunday ~orning?
"Answer. I never understood that. I understood that
there was some confusion among the troops ahead of us;
somebody in the way, I understood. It was a · very unfortunate resting spell.
" Question by Mr. Chandler. But for that you would
have won the day?
"Answer. Yes, sir, I think so."

General William F. Barry:
" Question. Can you state to us what led to the rout of
our army on the field that day ?
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"Answer. I think the principal cause was the uninstructed
state o~ our troops. The troops were raw, many of the
officers were indolent, and they did not behave themselves
as they should have done on that day."

Further on, General Barry says:
"It was impossible to rally the Eleventh regiment, the
Fire Zouaves. I rode in among them, and implored them
to stand. I told them the guns would never be captured if
they would only stand, but they seemed paralyzed; standing
with their eyes and mouths wide open, and did not seem to
hear me. I then reminded them of all the oaths they had
sworn at Alexandria, after the death of Ellsworth, and that
that was the best chance they would ever have for vengeance,
but they paid no attention to what I said at all.
" Question. So far as the whole fight was concerned, the
enemy had infinitely the advantage of our troops in position?
"Answer. Yes, sir, the ground was of their own selecting.
I think if the battle had been fought at the hour it was
expected to be fought, at St or 8i o'clock in the morning,
we would have won it. There was a loss of three hours
then, which I think had a very important effect on the success of the day. It enabled their fresh _troops to get up;
it prevented our turning their flank so completely as we
would have done by surprise, for when our column halted
the enemy discovered the direction we were going to take,
and prepared for it ; and, worse than that, the halting, the
standing still, fatigued the men as much, if not more, .than
by marching that time.
"Question. So that our men were really very much exhausted when they went into the field?
"Answer. Yes, sir.
"Question. But if the battle had been fought three or
four hours earlier, then Johnston's reserves would not have
been up in time?
"Answer. I think the fate of that day would have been
decided before they got upon the ground. I look v.pon that
delay as the most unfortunate thing that happened. The
7
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troops that ought to .h ave been out of the way were in the
way before we could ~t to the turning-off point of the road."
G~neral

E. D. Keyes :

" Question by the Chairman. To what do you attribute
the di~aster of the day ?
"Answer. To the want often thousand more troops. That
is, I think if we had ten thousand more troops than we had
to go into action, say at eleven o'clock in the morning, we
should certainly have beaten them. I followed along down
the stream, and Sherman's battery diverged from me, so
that it left a wide gap between us, and ten thousand men
could have come in between me and Sherman, which was
the weak point in our line, &c.
" Question by the Chairman. Had it been known that'
Patterson had not detained Johnston, would it not have been
imprudent to hazard a battle then anyhow?
"Answer. If it had been known that the thirty to forty
thousand men that Johnston was said to have had, would
have been upon us, it would have been impolitic to have
.m ade the attack on Sunday.
"Question by the Chairman. Even after the disaster, what
-prevented your making a stand at Centreville, and sending
for reinforcements and renewing the fight there?
"Answer. I was not the Commander-in-chief.
"Question by the Chairman. Was there not a strong brigade on Centreville Heights that had not been in the engagement at all that day?
"Answer. There was a division there,-three brigades."

General John G. Barnard, chief engineer to General
McDowell:
" Question by Chairman. Without going minutely into
the matter, will you state concisely to what you attribute the
disaster ~o our army in that battle?
"Answer. One of the influential causes was, I think, the
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loss of time in getting underway the morning of the fight.
The fact the repulse turned into a disastrous defeat, I attribute to the fact that our troops were all raw. General
McDowell had not even time to see all his troops. They
were brigaded only for the march, and put under officers
whom the troops had not time to know, and who had no
time to know the troops, &c.
" Question by the Chairman. You attribute the first bad
phase of that battle to the fact that our troops did not get
on the ground in time ?
"Answer. Yes, sir. I think one hour's difference would
have gained the battle. We had almost gained it as it was.
" Question. What caused that delay ?
"Answer. There were two causes, distinct from each
other. One was, that in the plan of the attack, General
Tyler's division was to move first, &c. The second was,
the much longer time it took for the column of Hunter to get
around Sudley's Ford than we calculated for," &c.

Captain (now General) Charles Griffin:·
In answer to the question of the Chairman, "Will
you please inform us what, according to your best judgment, led to the disaster of that day?" replies at length,
and gives as . reason, that his battery, also the battery
of Captain Ricketts, were put entirely too far in advance,
in a wrong position and without an adequate support,
with only the New York Fire ·Zouaves; that he took
the position he was ordered to, against his judgment,
saying, the Zouaves would not support him; saying, "l
will go, but mark my words, they will not support·us,''
and that when the firing began, the supports " broke
and run,'' and the batteries were lost.
" Question by the Chairman. You say if your battery and
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Ricketts' had been properly supported, it could not have been
taken?
"Answer. If those eleven guns had been properly supported, I think the day would have been different, and I
think that if we had not been moved on that point, and the
Captains of the batteries had been allowed to exercise their
own judgment, the day would have resulted differently.
" Question. Was it not necessary, in your advanced position, that you should have had the largest requisite number
to support you ?
" Answer. Yes, sir. In the first place, a battery should
never have been sent forward to reconnoitre. That is a
military mistake; of course I am only a Captain, and a great
many would censure me for saying this, but it is so. It was
the duty of the infantry to have gone forward and found out
what the enemy were doing, and not to .have sent the battery forward to find that out."

Further on he says (p. 174) :
"My last words were, ' These Fire Zouaves will never
support me.'
" Question. Why did you think that ?
"Answer. I had seen them on the field in a state of disorganization, and I did not think they had the moral courage
to fight. I do not think that any troops that will go through
the country in a disorganized state, thieving and robbing,
are brave men. I had no support all day long, with the
exception that the New York 14th came to me when I was
in my second or third position. An officer said, 'I have been
ordered here to support you; where shall I go?' He went
to a fence in rear of the batteries. I said, 'Don't go in
rear of us, for you will stand a chance of being hit. If their
batteries fire at me and don't hit me, it will pass over me
and hit you.' They then went to one side, and when I saw
them again they were falling back, every man for himself,
about five hundred yards from me. That was the last I saw
of that regiment that day.
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" Question. You consider one of the errors, the serious
error of the day, was the fact that the artillery was not properly supported by the infantry?
"Answer. Undoubtedly . . I consider that the first great
error that was committed that day was the sending these
batteries forward without support.
" Question. These two errors you think led to the first and
most important repulse of the day?
" Answer. I think these two errors led to the first and
the repulse of the day."

Colonel Thomas A. Davies :
" Question. What led to the final defeat, as near as you
could ascertain on the ground?
" Answer. I can tell you what I think is the cause of the
whole defeat of that day. The troops were raw; the men
had been accustomed to look to their Colonels as the only
men to give them commands. They had never been taught
the succession of officers, &c., &c. The officers did not themselves know what to do. They were themselves raw and
green, &c., &c. That I think was the cause of many of the
regiments returning from the field, not from any cowardice
or fear of fighting, but because, having lost their Colonels,
they supposed they were out of the battle. I consider that
the great cause of our army being put in rout on the right
wmg.
" Question. What would have been the e:flect had you
waited there at Centreville Heights, and rested your men a
day or two, seeing that Johnston was down there, until Patterson's army had followed him there, and been ordered to
turn their left ?
"Answer. We should, undoubtedly, have won the battle.
" Question. Would you have had any difficulty in rallying
your whole forces and holding your position on Centreville
Heights, while you sent for Patterson, or for reinforcements
from here and Fortress Monroe? vVould you not have
worsted the enemy in that way?
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"Answer. We never should have been compelled to leave
the place, with what troops I had under my command. I
could have held my position there with the troops I had,
which · were, my brigade, Richardson's brigade, Blenker's
brigade, and some batteries.
" Question. Was it not a terrible military blunder to come
back to Washington in disorder ?
" Answer. That is putting it rather strong. I should not
like to say it was a military blunder.
" Question. Well, it was a mistake then?
" Answer. I think this : that we could have held our
position there. There is no doubt about that.
" Question. Then you ought to have held it, ought you
not?
" Answer. That is a matter I am not responsible for, &c.
" Question. Would it not have been easier to have defended Washington on Centreville Heights than to have
come pell~ell here to do it?
"Answer. I can answer that very readily. I think it
would. There is no doubt about that."

General Daniel Tyler :
" Question by Chairman. Please give a brief and concise
statement of what you saw there, and how the battle was
conducted, &c., &c. Do this without questioning at first.
I want to get particularly what, in your judgment, caused
the disaster on that day.
" Answer. The first great trouble was the want of discipline and instruction in the troops. The troops needed that
regimental and brigade instr:uction which would have enabled them to act- together in masses to advantage.
"Question. Were there any more proximate causes than
that?
"Answer. There was a great want of instruction and professional knowledge among the o:ffi.cers,-the company and
regimental officers.
" Question. Why did you move first, as you were to move
the shortest distance on the road ?
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"Answer. That was the order of march by General McDowell.''

General Andrew Porter was asked the following
leading question :
" Had Patterson detained Johnston in the valley of Winchester, so that no reinforcements would have been brought
down by Johnston to Beauregard, what, in your opinion,
would have been the result of that battle ?
"Answer. Well, it might have ended one way or the
other. Our troops could not stand the attacking of the
enemy; they were played out quite early. The men were
exhausted; somehow or other, they seemed to have no heart
in the matter. The officers were more to blame than the
men," &c., &c.

General William W. Averill:
" Question. What, in your judgment, caused the disaster
of that day?
" Answer. They commenced, I presume, almost from the
time we started from Arlington, from the other side of the
river. There were a great many causes that combined to
lose the day to us. The most apparent cause, however, at
the time we first felt we were beaten, that we had to retire,
and that we had felt for some time beforehand, was the
want of concentration of the troops; the feeling that we
ought to have had more men in action at one time.
" Question. The want of concentration in the field?
" Answer. Yes, sir. We crossed the Run with eighteen
thousand men. I do not believe there were over six or eight
thousand actually engaged at any one time.
" Question. ·w as not the nature of the battle-field such,
that it was exceedingly difficult to bring a large body of
men into action at any one time?
"Answer. I think it was about as fine a battle-field as
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you could find between here and Richmond. I have no
idea there was any better.
" Question. Was the field favorable for the movements
and manamvring of large bodies of men ?
"Answer. One or two divisions of the size we had there
could have manamvred very well."

Further on, General Averill says (p. 214) :
" There was the want of a headquarters somewhere on the
field. All the staff officers who knew anything about the
position of the enemy, had to act without orders."

General Ricketts :
" Question. Was it good generalship to order you to advance with your battery without more support than you had?
" Answer. Do you mean the one regiment?
" Question. Yes, sir, the Fire Zouaves you speak of.
"Answer. No, sir, I do not think it was, &c., &c.
" Question. Suppose that battle could have been fought
two weeks before it was fought, what would have been the
result?
"Answer. I believe if we had fought it even two days
before, we would have walked over the field.
" Question. As a military man, to what circumstances do
you attribute our disaster on that day ?
"Answer. I impute it to the want of proper officers
among the volunteers.
" Question. Do you mean the Colonels and Generals ?
" Answer. I mean throughout. I cannot say particular
Colonels and particular Captains, because many of them
were excellent. But, as a general rule, many of the officers
were inferior to the men themselves," &c.

These extracts from the testimony of fourteen general
officers, out of eighteen examined, nearly all of them
experienced and distinguished in the service, show that
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there was no difficulty whatever in ascertaining the true
cause of defeat at Bull Run. Each gave his opinion as
to what caused the defeat on that day, all going to show
conclusively that the defeat was attributable to the following causes:
1st. The failure of General McDowell to attack Manassas, as he could have done, before the 21st of July,
prior to the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements, instead of on that day, after they had arrived.
2d. The delay of the whole army for several hours
on the 21st of July.
3d. The throwing of two of our batteries to the front,
, beyond support, thus causing their capture.
4th. The failure to have within supporting .distance,
and to bring into action at the critical moment, the
ample reserves of that army, which were more than
double the number of my entire command.
5th. The want of discipline in the troops.
In the face of this testimony, the Committee assert in
their report:
" That the principal cause of the defeat on that day was,
the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the Valley of the Shenandoah.'_'

Had the arrival of Johnston, five days after the time
I was directed to hold him, had the effect attributed to
it, common fairness should have induced the Committee
to say, not that it was my failure to hold Johnston: but
that it was the delay in fighting the battle of Bull Run
that was the principal cause of the defeat of General
McDowell. ·
·
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I have thus thrown together, as concisely as I could,
the facts bearing on my case. It has been necessary to
refer to many documents and papers, the perusal of
which will be tedious, and even when read, not so sat~s
factory to the unmilitary reader as the opinion upon
them by competent and intelligent officers. The present Major-General George H. Thomas, whose reputation as a soldier and a man is second to none, and who
served under me during my whole campaign, in a letter
received a few months ago, after an experience of three
years of most arduous service, thus writes:
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., Aug.

"MY

8th, 1864.

DEAR GENERAL :

" Your favor of the 16th July, was only received a few
days since, owing doubtless to the irregularities of the mails
to the front. In the council of war at Martinsburg, I in substance advised an advance towards Winchester, at least as
far as Bunker Hill, and if your information, after the army
reached Bunker Hill, led you to believe that Johnston still
occupied Winchester in force, then to shift our troops over
to Charlestown, a hat move would place our communications with our depot of supplies in safety, and still threaten
and hold Johnston at Winchester, which I understand was
all that you were expected or required to do. I should have
advised a direct advance on Winchester, but for the character of the troops composing your army. They were all, with
the exception of a couple of squadrons of the Second U. S.
Cavalry and two batteries of regular artillery, three months'
men, and their term of service would expire in a few days.
Judging of them ~s of other volunteer troops, had I been
their commander, I should not have been willing to risk
them in a heavy battle, coming off within a few days of the
expiration of their service.
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"I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed
myself, that your management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests
of the service, considering the means at your disposal, and
the nature of the troops un.der your command.
"With much respect and esteem, I remain, General,
" Very sincerely and truly yours,
" GEORG;E H. THOMAS, .
"Major-General
,, MAJOR-GENER.AL ROBERT

U.S. V.

p .ATTERSON7
'' Philadelphia 7

Pa."

I also take great pride in presenting other testimonials,
from officers who were familiar with the events as they
occurred:
Letter from Major-General W. H. Keim:
,, SURVEYOR-GENER.AL'S OFFICE, ST.ATE OF PENNSYLVANI.A7
HARRISBURG,

"MY

p .A.7 Nov.

22d7

1861.

DEAR GENERAL :

"I read your vindication of the campaign in Virginia, delivered at the First Troop festival, and believe it places
your action in the proper .light, and enlightens the public
upon a subject which is little known to the people. I know.
that you had the advice and support of the regular army
officers, as well as those of the volunteer service. The difficulties under which we labored, of men called out for three
months, a serious evil; the short supplies of transportation,
and the difficulty to keep up the subsistence, are not known
to the army at this matured state of affairs, and can hardly
be fully appreciated by any persons not connected with military movements on a large scale. I had the pleasure of an
interview with the President a few weeks since, when, in
speaking of my connection with your column, I took occasion to speak freely of the injustice done to you and your
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command, enumerated the trials and obstacles thrown in our
way, and the folly of attacking an intrenched force with
equal or inferior forces. I have no doubt time will vindicate and do justice to all.
"Yours, very truly,
" w. H. KEIM.
'' MAJOR-GENER.AL

p ATTERSON.''

Letter from Colonel Richard A. Oakford :
"SCRANTON,

" MAJOR-GENERAL

December 4th, 1861.

R. p ATTERSON.

By reason of a lame hand, I have been unable
for some time past to use my pen ; with the returning use of
my hand, I cannot resist the desire to express my gratification that you have (at the supper of the First City Troop),
seen a suitable time to defend yourself in part, against the
false and unjust charges made against your strategy in Virginia.
"Living as I do in a part of Pennsylvania which is from
circumstances closely connected with New York, and drawing most of its newspaper opinions from that city, I have
found it difficult to disabuse the minds of my neighbors, of
the false opinions they had received through the New York
press.
" Your speech has had a good effect. I hope you will,
when a fitting time arrives, publish all the orders, &c., connected with the movements of your corps d' armee, feeling well assured that when the public are aware of all the
facts, that you will not only be exculpated from all censure,
but that all your moves will be not only approved, but applauded.
" With best wishes, yours truly,
" RICHARD A. OAKFORD,
"DEAR SIR :

''Late Colonel, Commanding 15th Reg't P. V."
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From Major-General James S. Negley.
''HEADQUARTERS NEGLEY ' S BRIG.A.DE,
CA.MP NEVIN,

November 24th, 1861.

"MAJOR-GENERAL Ro BERT p ATTERSON'
"Philadelphia.

" DEAR GENERAL : I read your speech at the Continental
with much pleasure. While I deeply regretted the necessity
of an old officer and well-tried friend of the Union having to
vindicate his honor and patriotism at a festive board, I hope
your words have reached the ears of an impartial public,
who will now be willing to do you justice. I think there is
no longer a necessity to blame the weak to shelter the strong.
"My staff join me in oftering you their congratulations,
and sincere wishes for your good health and continued prosperity, and assure you that you still have our friendship as
warmly as when on the banks of the Potomac, and only regret that you are not with us.
"I have the honor to remain yours, very truly,
"JAMES s. NEGLEY."

Also a letter from Colonel (now General) George H.
Gordon, formerly of the Regular army:
''HEADQUARTERS SECOND MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT~
FREDERICK, Mn.,

December 22d, 1861.

" GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
'' Philadelphia.

"MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 20th inst. reached me
yesterday. It is with pleasure I reply. You are aware there
are many facts known to me only as common rumor, in
relation to your movement from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill,
thence to Harper's Ferry, Virginia, such as the actual information you received as to when General McDowell was to
give battle, and from whom you received it, also as to the
number of the rebels at Winchester, their armament, defensive works, &c. Of these subjects, so vital in forming an exact
conclusion, I have, as said before, no information but general

/
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rumor. I believe the rebels J:iave never given us either their
number at Winchester, the number or calibre of their artillery, or the nature and extent of their fortifications ; if they
have, I think you can accept their statements as conclusive.
If it agrees with or is larger than your estimate at Bunker
Hill, to have attacked Winchester with the force and armament you had would, in my judgment, have been bad·generalship, would have been followed by certain defeat, with
terrible loss of life. I again have to regret that the few days
intervening between my arrival at Martinsburg, Virginia,
where I joined your column, and the day you marched towards Winchester, did not give me an opportunity of better
informing myself of the number and nature of the troops
under your command. I joined you on Thursday, the
11th day of July, 1861, and marched as one regiment of
your column on the Monday following, the 15th. From
my own observation, and from what was told me by officers
generally, I believed your force to consist almost entirely of
those whose time, in a large majority of the regiments, was
about expiring. I also believed, from what I heard, that
my own was the only three years' regiment under your
command. Much of your force, indeed I can except few
regiments, I found more in rags than uniforms, and quite
indifierent to discipline ; some regiments appeared more
like mobs than soldiers. As to the numbers of your column,
I had been led to believe that it varied from thirty to forty
thousand, but was astonished to learn from your AdjutantGeneral, now General Porter, commanding a division in the
Army of the Potomac, that you had less than twenty thousand men under your command. When we left Martinsburg en route to Winchester, it was the prevailing opinion
among all officers of rank that you had been informed McDowell would engage the rebels near Manassas on the 15th
or 16th of July at farthest. For one, I placed implicit
confidence in the report.
" On Monday night your whole column reached Bunker
Hill, my regiment encamping on ground vacated that afternoon by the rebels, their fires still smoking, and evidences
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of their hasty retreat apparent. We were but a few miles
from Winchester; the road thence was obstructed by logs;
rebel pickets thrown out almost within sight and sound of
our own. Here we remained until Wednesday morning,
the 17th of July.
"At this time, from general rumor and from information
received, I had no doubt of three facts: :first, that a battle
near Manassas had been fought by McDowell ; second, that •
we had held the rebel leader at Winchester, Jo. Johnston,
in check, and thus prevented his uniting his forces to those
under the rebel Beauregard; third, that the rebels at Winchester numbered between thirty and forty thousand, supported by thirty or forty pieces of heavy siege artillery, and
well posted behind strong fortifications. Then there seemed
nothing more for your column to do but to establish itself
on a different base-line than that from Williamsport to Martinsburg. A road over which supplies must be hauled by
wagons from Hagerstown, Maryland, to Martinsburg, Virginia, thence by some mode · of conveyance to any other
portion of Virginia southward, is certainly not preferable to
one which conveys all the way by rail, both in the loyal and
rebel portion of the country. If we could establish ourselves
at Harper's Ferry, to operate in the Shenandoah Valley and
southward, between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac, there
can be but one opinion of its military propriety, when it is
known that the rebels had evacuated all the region north of
Winchester, and that opinion must be favorable to you.
"You thus, on Wednesday, the 18th of July, moved
your column, of less than twenty thousand, with all its encumbering wagon train, by flank, around Winchester, reaching Charlestown, Virginia, on the line of rail from Harper's
Ferry to Winchester, Virginia, late in the afternoon of the
same day. None doubted that we were risking much in
making the detour.
"An exasperated force of rebels, largely outnumbering
our own, with metal heavier and more numerous, would not,
we supposed, permit us to get between them and the sources
of our supplies, would not permit us to hold the key to the
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Shenandoah Valley and the Valley of the Potomac, without
at least :fighting a. severe battle, and seeking compensation
for the loss, which we supposed we had occasioned them by
preventing a junction with the rebels opposite Washington.
But the movement was made, and made with signal ability,
each brigade ready at a moment's notice to throw itself into
iine of battle, to protect its train, and to manceuvre, as occasion might require. I felt, sir, on Wednesday night, that you
had outwitted the rebel Johnston. On Thursday morning,
the 18th of July, you discovered the expected battle opposite
Washington had not been fought. We were now at Charlestown, Virginia, but about ten miles from Winchester, rebels
and patriots occupying about the same relative position as at
Bunker Hill, although we had greatly the advantag~. If the
rebel Jo. Johnston expected an attack from Bunker Hill side,
and had fortified accordingly, we had obviously gaine~ much
by appearing on the opposite side of Winchester, with a paved
road and a railroad from Charlestown to that place. He
could, in my judgment, be as well checked by your column
at Charlestown as at Bunker Hill, and unless he had been
attacked from the latter place immediately after our arri va],
and defeated or severely cut up, we gained much by going
to Charlestown in opening a way for future subsistence and
receiving, if needed, by rail, other forces. If you could not
defeat or cut up the rebel Johnston, it was wise to place
yourself in better communication with your rear. In this
you were governed, as I have said, by your reconnoissance.
On Thursday, the 18th of July, the day after your arrival at
Charlestown, I knew of your intention (having learned that
McDowell had not engaged the rebels up to that time) to
advance on Winchester, the rebel Jo. Johnston then being
there with his forces. On the morning of that day I had
been ordered to issue three days' rations to my command
for this movement, but during the afternoon I received
orders to move with my regiment to Harper's Ferry, to
hold that place. I knew, by common report, that, in furtherance of your plan to attack the rebel Johnston, you on
Thursday and Friday, the 18th and 19th of July, made
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repeated efforts to induce your command (many regiments
of which were then out of service) to remain with you for
only a few days, while you advanced and held the rebels in
Winchester, or give them battle if they had met you. I
heard that you plead, entreated, and expostulated with regiments whose term of service had expir~d, but with few exceptions it availecJ_ nothing. I was informed that the number
of your force with which you could, under these circumstances, ;have attacked the rebels, did not exceed seven or
· eight thousand men; with these, in my judgment, to have
moved elsewhere than Harper's Ferry would have been folly.
"To sum it all up, it appears to me, writing from memory,
after some six months have intervened, that if you had
known ·that McDowell had not attacked the rebels, while
you were at Bunker Hill, the question of whether you should
have attacked Johnston depended upon your reconnoissance
and means of information of his strength. The force of
your reasoning, that° you ought not to attack, is much more
cogent, if your information was positive that McDowell
would attack on Monday or Tuesday, the 15th or 16th of
July, or if you were only ordered to hold Johnston in
check during those days, for then you were holding him
in check. Your movement to Charlestown, whether McDowell had attacked or not, was wise for reasons, and also,
that you were in better position to make the attack. You certainly
lost nothing, as the rebel Johnston did not leave Winchester during
your flank movement. Your attempt to hold Johnston, when
you learned at Charlestown, ;McDowell had not engaged the
rebels, failed from causes not within your control. Men
whose term of service had expired, would have fought no ·
better at Bunker Hill than at Charlestown or Bull Run. I
am very sure, attacks upon you would never have been made,
for the cours~ you pursued, had McDowell fought the battle
of Manassas when J!Ob. were informed and had ·the best of
reasons for believing he was going to.
.
"If these statements, hurriedly thrown together, meet your
conviction as arguments, I am happy to be able to furnish
them. At the time, I heard none condemn you, but, my
8
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dear sir, when will man .cease to be reviled by the ignorant
and malicious?
"I am, very truly,
"Your obedient servant,
" GEORGE

H.

GORDON'

'' Colonel Second Massachusetts Reg't. ''

From the gallant General Shields :
"WASHINGTON, D.

" MY

C.,

Feb.

20, 1862.

DEAR GENERAL:

" I long wished to write you, and write you as an old and
true friend, who feels the full force of the injustice that has
been attempted towards you, but I determined to wait until
I could see what the Senate was disposed to do in my own
case. Yesterday I was confirmed, after holding up my nomination for weeks. .
"But your case was one of crying injustice. It was forthe
attacking army to wait until you could co-operate with them.
They had the power to time their attack to your movements,
but you had not t~e power to accommodate your movements
to the attack. But, General, military men do you justice, and
the country is beginning to do it; and for one I have never
failed everywhere to cry shame upon the base treatment you
have received, and now I don't hear a man, who has a particle of sense, who does not do the same.
"Your sincere friend,
"JAMES SHIELDS.
"GENERA.L ROBERT

p ATTERSON,

"Philadelphia.''

From Colonel Gibson, a Regular officer of great distinction:
" HEADQUARTERS FORT DELAw .A.RE, DEL.'

July 25·, 1861.
·"GENERAL:

/

" I am, my dear sir, acquainted with the nature of your
~service, and the difficulties opposed to you, in your recent
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campaign. It is impossible for an officer of ordinary intelligence, to refer to the disasters of this week, without reflecting upon the .untimely and crude plans of offensive operations in which no commander could take part but ·as a
victim. I make allusion to these matters only to assure you
of my respect, and that I shall consider it fortunate to be
under your command, with . the able staff that served you,
should you be called upon to take the field again.
" A. A. GIBSON'
''Captain Second Artillery, Commanding.
''MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON'

" Philadelphia."

The following resolutions of two regiments, the
Twenty-fourth and Fifteenth Pennsylvania, who served
under me, and were ready to remain if required, it gives
me great pleasure also to refer to.
" Proceedings of a Meeting of the Field, Staff and Company
Officers of the Twentyjourth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Joshua T. Owen, held at the
Encampment near Charlestown, Virginia, on the 18th July,
1861.
"Whereas, We, the officers of the Twenty-fourth Regiment
Pennsylvania Volunteers, believing that in the contest in
which we are now engaged is involved the maintenance of
constitutional freedom, and being devotedly attached to the
Government of the United States, because of the great blessings it confers alike upon rich and poor, native and foreign
born citizens, and
"Whereas, A sense of duty as citizens induced us to take
the field in defence of the Government, and
"Whereas, Major-General Robert Patterson has this day
appealed to us as patriots, to prolong the period of our service, in order that he may maintain his present strategical
position, without detriment to the cause. Therefore,
" Resolved, That having entire confidence in the capacity
of our Commanding General as a soldier, and his integrity ~s
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a patriot, and admiring the skill with which he has advanced
his column thus far without loss, or unnecessary delay, we
will stand by him until our places are supplied by other
troops.''

Second, those of the Fifteenth Regiment, whose gallant
Colonel, Richard A. Oakford, was killed on the battlefield of Antietam:
P. v.,
FERRY, July 24, 1861.

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH REGIMENT
HARPER'S

"At ameeting of the officers and men of the Fifteenth Regiment, held this evening, they expressed unanimously their
approval of General Patterson's official administration, at
the same time deeply regretting that his military judgment
should be questioned, knowing as they do the superior force
of the enemy in position, and the unavoidable circumstances
which controlled the movements of this column. It is also
painful to their feelings to find the many important but
bloodless victories achieved by his command overlooked in
the hasty opinion of the public.
"RICHARD A. OAKFORD,
" Colonel Commanding."

In the debate in Congress to which I have referred
(ante, p. 79), the representative of the District where
I live, the Hon. Charles J. Biddle, distinguished in the
war with Mexico, and commanding at the beginning of
this war, a body of State troops, addressed the House
as follows:
" MR. BIDDLE.

I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts to

yield to me.
"MR. LOVEJOY.
" MR. BIDDLE.

I object.
I ask the gentleman from Illinois to with-
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draw his objection. It can do him no harm to hear a few
words from me on this subject.
"MR. LOVEJOY. I withdraw my objection.
"MR. GoocH. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
but I take it for granted that if my time expires, that I shall
be allowed two minutes after he has conc.luded.
" MR. BIDDLE. I thank the gentleman.
"Mr. · Speaker, General Patterson is my townsman and
constituent, and I may assume to know as much of him as
the gentleman from Tenness.ee. I have no personal knowledge of the movements of the column which he commanded
in July last. I was at that time in the military service, but
in another part of Virginia, within the limits of General
McClellan's command. But I have personal knowledge of
the character of General Patterson. In his command were •
many of my constituents, connections, and friends, and I
never heard one of them mention him in other terms than
those of respect and confidence. He had upon his staff some
of the most distinguished officers of the Regular Army, now
deservedly filling positions of great trust; he had on his
staff men of high character from civil life. They were fully
cognizant of General Patterson's conduct and motives; their
characters are additional guarantees for his.
" I believe that no man, really cognizant of the facts, has
ever brought any charge against him, and that the vague,
base]ess rumors that have been circulated to his disadvantage
are but hearsay upon hearsay, like the statement of the gentleman from Tennessee. Upon the occasion before Martinsburg, a brilliant affair at that time, when our greater and
more glorious victories had not eclipsed it, General Patterson's conduct was distinguished alike by military skill and
personal intrepidity. All the contemporary accounts, verbal
and published in the newspapers, from all sources, agreed in
that.
" With respect to his character at an earlier period, in the
war with Mexico, I would not offer my humble testimony;
but I sent to the adjoining library and have had brought
here the volume of reports, from which I can cite, under the
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clear and venerable name of Winfield Scott, the high testimony that was then borne to General Patterson's character
as a soldier. At the siege of Vera Cruz, General Scott says
that 'he can only enumerate the few who are isolated by
rank or position, as well as by noble services.' He then
mentions ' Maj or-General Patterson, second in command.'
At Cerro Gordo, General Scott says:
'' 'Major-General Patterson left a sick-bed to share in the dangers and fatigues of the day, and after the surrender went forward to command the
advanced forces towards Xalapa.'

"Ile also served during the war of 1812, as lieutenant and
captain, in the Regular Army. Of course I had no contemporary knowledge of his services there ; but I know that by
,. those who had, he was esteemed as a soldier, even at that
early period of his life.
" This statement I have felt bound to make in behalf of a
•
man who is my constituent, and who, I believe, has been
unjustly aspersed by vague rumors and suspicions, only too
common, and gaining too easy credence with us. Let me
add, however, that in so doing I take no part in the criticisms
upon General Scott, for whom no man living entertains
higher respect than I do." (Congressional Globe, Feb. 17,
1862.) "

The numberless private communications, both verbal and written, which I have received, approving my
course, I shall refer to no further than to say, that
they will ever merit, as they have always received, my
warmest gratitude.
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This Appendix, embracing letters from men of high distinction ancl of
every shade of political opinion, and editorials from leading journals, is
printed, not for gene'ral cirwlation, but for distribution to members of rny
own family, to those of my staff, ancl to othe1· gentlemen who have served
'Uncier my c01nmand, and also to a few 1Jersonal friends who have e·ver
zealously and f em·lessly defended rny character when unjustly assailed by
ignorance or malice.

R. PATTERSON.
1300

LOCUST STREET, PHILADELPHIA,

December 18th, 1873.
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LETTERS FROM DISTINGUISHED MEN.
245 SouTH FOURTH STREET, February, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm:
I thank you sincerely for your "Narrative," which I have read with
avidity and with real satisfaction. Nothing can be more clear or
cogent than its details, or more logically drawn than its conclusions.
My opinions upon military matters are in general of no value; but there
is little difficulty in mastering such objeetions as WEtre advanced against
the movements of the army under your command in 1861, and there is
no one of them, I think, which you have not answered with perfect
success.
Allow me to congratulate you upon an exposition so calm and clear,
and so gratifying to your friends.
Very respectfully and truly yours,
HoR. BINNEY.

PHILADELPHIA, January 31st, 1864.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I acknowledge with great pleasure and gratitude the
receipt of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." I shall refer to it doubtless with great interest, for I notice
already what interests me much, your clear and manly demand for a
court of inquiry. What justice there can be in imputing blame, and
refusing investigation, I do not understand. Your record here as before
must be your vindication.
With my thanks for your remembrance of me, and my best wishes for
your health and prosperity,
I am very respectfully and truly yours,
F. CARROLL BREWSTER.
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PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

Tuesday, January 27th.

Sm:
Many thanks for your little volume, the reading of which I have just
finished. It most fully confirms me in the belief that I long since expressed to you, that you had earned the thanks of the nation for your
~onduct on that occasion. The view you have presented of General
Scott's conduct has surprised and grieved me. I had thought better of
him.
Accept, I pray you, the assurance of the respect with which I remain,
my dear Sir,
Yours very truly,
DEAR

HENRY
GENERAL

c.

CAREY.

p .ATTERSON.

WEs'r POINT,

N. Y., February 1st, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I have just received your letter, dated January 27th, 1865; also the
package, which I have disposed of as you desired. Accept my thanks
for the copy you sent me. I have perused it with much interest, and
can only say that it expresses, in writing, exactly what I have always
thought ; that is, it is a full vindication of your conduct as to whether
or not you were responsible for the defeat of our arms at Bull Run, in
1861. I firmly believe that if your plans had been carried out, we
would have had a grand victory instead of a great disaster.
I fully concur with Generals Thomas, Gordon, &c., in their opinions
of the campaign, and I do not think that any other general could have
done better with the army you had under your command than you did,
provided they had the same drawbacks. Hoping that an impartial
people will do you justice, I have tlrn honor to remain,
Very sincerely yours, &c.,
A. K. ARNOLD,
Captain 5th U. S. Cavalry.
To

GENER.AL

R.

PATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 6th, 1865.

lVIY DEAR Srn:
I have read with careful attention your "Narrative of the Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," for which I am under obligation to you:
It is exceedingly clear and distinct, and it cannot fail to produce a
marked impression upon the public mind. In my judgment it com-
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pletely vindicates you from the mistaken impressions which for a time
pervaded the community. I think no one can doubt after reading it,
that you performed all that it was possible for you to do in your circumstances and with your orders. Neither your fidelity nor your ability
will be doubted hereafter by any one who will do you the justice to inform himself. I never doubted, as you know, and am glad to have my
convictions so thoroughly sustained.
I am yours very truly,

w.

STRONG.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

MY

February 8th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

Your " Campaign in the Shenandoah in 1861" (for a copy of which
I have to thank you), ought to satisfy even the most prejudiced, that a
gn~at wrong has been inflicted upon you, and that it was not any neglect
of duty, or mistake of yours, that brought about the defeat of Bull Run.
It was well that you waited a fitting time to publish to the world the
facts and incidents of your campaign, and that you were able to give
them io a manner so clear and convincing that "he who runs may
read," and understand where the blame of our disgraceful repulse should
rest. Having heard from you on your return the leading features of
your campaign, and having read your address at the entertainment given
by the "First Troop of City Cavalry," I never had a doubt as to your
records being clean and clear, and I have always so expre~sed myself
when I have heard your conduct unfairly criticized.
I am, General, yours very respectfully,
SAMUEL WELSH.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

MY

DE.AR

February 9th, 1865

Srn:

For a week or more, I have been intending to do an act of justice,
and that act has not been delayed from any unwillingness on my part
to acknowledge a wrong that I had committed, but has been overlooked
or neglected, as good intentions often are. Your kind attention in sending me a complimentary copy of your " Narrative" brings me at once
and promptly to my duty.
I frankly acknowledge that I was one of those who joined in the
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popular clamor against you in 1861. However, as the war has progressed, I have had discernment enough, and watched military movements with sufficient care, to see that a general with an army facing
an enemy, and that enemy with the country open in his rear, could not
prevent him from going away almost when and where he pleased. Witness Halleck's operations at Corinth. I saw then that that clamor was
not entirely just.
However, it remained for me to read }rour "Narrative," which I did
a week or ten days since, to see and feel yoiir entire and complete justification ; as clear and strong a case as was ever made up by any general of
whom I have ever read.
That you have been willing that you and your family should bear
such a reproach, and that your son should go down to the grave before
that reproach was removed, when you had it in your power to do so, but
would not, because it was not deemed proper on account of the public
weal, seems to me to show you to be a patriot and more than one.
You, your children, and your grandchildren may rest content with
your reputation as it stands vindicated in these pages; and I would
have every one who has formed or expressed an opinion on the subject
read them well. For that reason I was glad of the discussion which
took place in the Legislature yesterday, even though great injustice was
done you. It will attract attention to the subject, and the truth will
most certainly assert its right and make its way.
Permit me to add that I have seen several persons who have read the
book, some at least strongly prejudiced against you, and that I here express the universal opinion when I say what I have said above.
I shall consider it both a solemn duty and a great pleasure to do all
that is in my power to set the public right on the subject.
I am very truly yours,
HENRY

PHILADELPHIA,

c.

BAIRD.

February 9th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have received the copy of your published "Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," which you had the kindness
to send me.
Had your proper request for a military court of inquiry been granted
by the government, in accordance with the long-established custom and
usage of the service-which, for more than forty years, has never been,
to my knowledge, habitually refused until recently-there would have
been no necessity for this publication, as every officer of rank m your
column could have refuted the false charges made against you.
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Allow me to congratulate you, however, on this complete and satisfactory vindication, at last, of your reputation as a commander, and conclusive defence against the calumnies and misrepresentations of which
you have been for so long a period the silent victim. You have cause
for especial gratitude to God that your life has been spared long enough
to place on the record of history such ample and conclusive evidence,
that the terrible disaster at Bull Run was due to quite other and different causes than any act or want of action on your part. No intelligent
person who reads your Narrative will fail to acknowledge this fact.
With sincere hopes that your calumniators and detractors will now
.and henceforth be forced to do you justice, and cease their revilings, I
remain,
Yours respectfully and truly,

G. H.

CROSMAN,

Assistant Quartermaster-General.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

WILLIAMSPORT,

PA., February 10th, 1865.

GENERAL:

Please accept the heartfelt congratulations of an officer of the old
Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, upon reading, in a late issue of
The Pres8, a timely article on the military conduct of the column which
operated in the valley of the Shenandoah during the first three months
of this bitter war, which you had the distinguished honor to command,
and with which I, in the subordinate capacity of First Lieutenant of
Company A, was proud to have been connected.
The editorial referred to, while it must convince the most obdurate of
your maligners, is unspeakably gratifying to many of your companions
in arms, who were ever ready to repel with scorn and defiance the foul.
aspersions that have been heaped upon your patriotism and your generalship. It is said that "time at last sets all things even." May we not
reasonably hope that in the good time coming one other general, under
whom it was also my distinguished privilege to serve during his entire
military career, may evoke from the same calumniators the same ample
but tardy justice.
I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
FREDERICK E. EMBICK,
Late Colonel 106th New York Volunteers, commanding
3d Brigade, 3d Division, 3d Corps, Ai:my of the Potomac.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PA'.rTERSON,

Philadelphia, Pa.
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SPRUCE STREET,
PHIL.A.DELPHI.A,

February 11th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR SIR: I have to return you my sincere thanks for your
pamphlet in regard to the campaign of the Shenandoah Valley in 1861.
As far as I understand the subject, I think that you have fully vindicated yourself from the imputations cast upon you in regard to the military operations of that period and locality. If, as is the fact, it is at
all times a pleasure to me to see a successful vindication made against
unjust aspersion, you may be sure that I do not make your case an exception, cognizant of the fact of how much vituperation has been heaped
upon you in regard to this matter.
Thanking you again for your kindness, I remain,
Respectfully yours,
FERD. J. DREER.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
PHILADELPHIA, P.A..,

February 11th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your volume containing the history of the campaign of 1861 in the Shenandoah Valley. I have read
it with much interei:;t. The scenes are familiar to me, as I reported to
General Banks at Sandy Hook on the 1st of August, 1861, and accompanied his column in the valley campaign of the ensuing year. Before
reading your book I had formed an opinion similar to conclusions at
which you arrive, and such, I think, had been the case with officers generally who were familiar with the leading facts and scenes of the campaign. The full detail which you give has served to confirm that
opinion, and wherever this book is read, the same result will follow, so
that when the history of the Great Rebellion comes to be made up you
may have the satisfaction to feel that justice, though tardy, will be done
to yourself and your command.
I am, sir, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
0. s. FERRY,
Brigadier-General.
GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

February 13th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I thank you for your politeness in sending me a copy of your Narrative
of•the Campaign of 1861 in the Valley of the Shenandoah. I waited to
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acknowledge it till I should be able to read it, which I have done with
great pleasure and satisfaction. It is very well written, and in my judgment entirely conclusive. I only wish your successors in the Valley had
left so fair a record.
With very respectful regard,
Truly yours,

J.

FRANCIS FISHER.

SEN ATE CHAMBER,

February 13th, 1865.

HARRISBURG,

MY DEAR Srn:

I have just returned to this place, having been absent since Friday
last. Allow me to thank you for your "Campaign of 1861." Of course
I have not yet had time to read it, but will do so at my earliest convemence.
In my opinion, your conduct has never needed justification; but from
what I have heard of your statement, it closes forever the mouths of .
your most bitter enemies, and this is surely great gratification to your
friends and admirers, of which number believe me,
Very sincerely,
HIESTER CLYMER.
GE:N"ERAL

p ATTERSON.

NEW YoRK, FebruRry 13th, 1865.
MY DEAR Srn:

I am greatly obliged to you for your kind attention in sending to me
a copy of your Narrative of the operations in the Shenandoah Valley in
the spring of 1861. Your vindication of your action is complete, and
the moderation of your language lends additional force to your statement of facts. It was the fashion, about the time of the Bull Run disaster of 1861., to make a Pennsylvania general the scapegoat for the sins
and bad behavior of some of our New York regiments in the fight, but
time has vindicated the truth, and shown that the blunder was in :fighting the battle of Bull Run when it was fought. The subsequent career of
those officers who formed your council of war at Martinsburg is s~rfficient
evidence of the correctness of their military judgment at the time, and
of your military action.
With kind regards to all your family,
I am very truly and respectfully yours,
SAMUEL BLATCHFORD.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

P .AT'l'ERSON, Philadelphia.
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LOCK HAVEN,

February 13th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p A'l'TERSON.
MY DEAR SIR: Much has been said and written in relation to your
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in the summer of 1861, and a vast
amount of censure and <lisapprobation heaped upon, not only yourself,
but also on those who undertook to defend you. Knowing, as I do, the
gross injustice done you, not only by the great majority at large, but
also by men high in authority at Washington, fills me with indignation.
For the outrageous conduct of the latter, there is no excuse, for they had
evidence before them that should (and no doubt did) convince every
unbiased and honest man among them; their duty was to exculpate you
from all blame. For the former there is some excuse; they were carried
away by the excitement of the times and reading the vile slanders published by a partisan press. One argument against myself, during the
political campaign in 1861, when I was a candidate for the unenviable
position of a seat in our State Legislature, was, that I was a defender of
General Patterson's conduct in Virginia, and, therefore, ought not to be
elected. I often said in public that the time was not far distant when
your services would be acknowledged, not only by the public at large,
but by the authorities at 'N asbington also. That time bas now arrived,
and your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley" is an
able and unanswerable vindication of the eminent services you rendered
to our country in the hour of her greatest need.
The shameful defeat of the Union forces at Bull Run surprised and
appalled the powers at ··washington, and to hide their shame a~d screen
themselves from just and universal censure, they resorted to the cmvardly
expedient of making General Patterson the scapegoat. This was unmanly, ungenerous, and unjust, for they well knew the difficulty you
had to contend with, in organizing our undisciplined volunteer force,
and the great risk you ran in invading Virginia in the face of a powerful and well-appointed army.
How was it possible for you to go into action with the least hope of
success, when it was known that the enemy outnumbered us almost three
to one in infantry and cavalry, and about five to one in artillery?
Look at our artillery; it was a very lame apology for a battery, to
wit, six or eight smooth-bore guns!
It is admitted by all the distinguished regular army officers that
served in your column, that the campaign was conducted in a prudent
and energetic manner, and that you obeyed the orders of the general-inchief strictly; and are in no way responsible for the disaster that befell
our arms at Bull Run.
I read your ''Narrative" with much satisfaction, and cordially agree
in opinion with the distinguished officers who have vindicated your con-
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duct, for many of the facts contained in the "Narrative" came under
my personal observation.
It is gratifying to .contemplate that General Patterson will be remembered by posterity as the saviour of his army from destruction in the
Shenandoah Valley, when that of his calmuniators will be lost in the
vortex of the present rebellion.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P.

JARRETT.

UNITED ST.A.TES ARMY LABORATORY,
PHIL.ADELPHI.A, P.A., February 14th, 1865.
J\'.[y DEAR GENERAL:

Let me thank you for the copy of your book just received. As a
part of the true history of this war at its commencement, it is invaluable.
Allow me to assure you that I have ever considered your part in that
campaign as marked with prudence, sound judgment, and decision.
Yours, very truly,

A. K.

SMITH,
Surgeon, U. S. A.

MAJOR-GENER.AL P .ATTERSON, Philadelphia.

DOYLESTOWN, P.A., February 14th, 1865.
DEAR GENERAL:

Inclosed please find an article from the D emocrat on the subject of
your "Shenandoah Campaign, 1861." The pamphlet fully vindicates
your course, and it affords me pleasure to know that you have sustained
yourself. Your pamphlet shows that you were blameless in the matter,
and that the world censured you without cause. I am glad on account
of the service, the country, and more particularly on your individual
account, that you have so clearly vindicated the truth of history. As
a soldier, I am glad to assist in doing justice to an old commander whom
I have always esteemed.
I remain, truly your friend,

w. w. H. DAVIS.
GENER.AL ROBERT P .A'rTERSON, Phi1ade1 phia, Pa.

2039 GREEN STREET, February 14th, 1865.
DE.AR GENERAL:

I have perused with more than ordinary gratification your "N arrati ve of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861,"
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of which you had the kindness to send me a copy. Little known to
you personally, I had, for a period of twenty-five years, learned to appreciate your worth as a patriotic citizen, your servic.es as a distinguished
soldier, and your character as a high-minded gentleman. When, in
the dark days of 1861, and since then, the tongue of slander and parti.s an hatred strove to detract from your fair fame, I have ever deemed
it a privilege, on proper occasions, zealously and ardently, to plead your
cause and defend the right. Now, 'vhen "the truth of history" and yourself are signally vindicated, I rejoice with thousands of your sincere
friends and adknirers in the achievement of this peaceful victory.
Accept my best thanks for the little volume of so much value, with
my kind wishes for your continued health and prosperity.
Your most obedient servant,
GUSTAvus REMAK.

PITTSBURG,

February 14th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
GENERAL: Many thanks for your volume. It is a complete vindication of your conduct, and I am g1ad the time has come when you could
with propriety publish it. Although not needed among those conversant with the facts, your long silence was construed against you by those
ignorant of the history of the campaign. As one of those who served
with you, I r~joice at its appearance. I have given my opinion more
fully in the Dispatch of this morning, a paper I am interested in, and
forward you a few copies.
I am, General, very respectfu11 y,
Your obedient servant,
J. HERON FOSTER,
Captain and ;provost-Jylarshal 22d District, Pa.

BROOKLYN

w AR

FUND ROOMS,

February 14th, 1865.

!DEAR Srn:
Mr. Joseph Ripley was kind enough to lend me your "Campaign of
the Shenandoah Valley." I read it with great interest. I had joined
with the rest in the how1 against you ; I will not be the last to do you
justice. Inclosed please find an article on the subject.
Most respectfully yours,
w. P. STRICKLAND,
Secretary W. F. Com.
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February 15th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: I am extremely obliged to you for your Narrative of
your campaign. It is, as I supposed it would be, a complete vindication
of your conduct, and indeed much more, for it is very plain that if your
judicious advice had been taken, we might have been spared the disgrace
of Bull Run.
There is but one opinion, so far as I can hear, on the conclusive character of your statements, and I really take a natural pride in finding a
Pennsylvania general fully relieved from an obloquy as undeserved as
any that has befallen a commander in this terrible war.
No one can estimate the consequences of a blunder in a campaign.
If your regular troops had not been withdrawn, or if you had been
ordered to Leesburg, the whole face of the war might have been changed!
Reflections like these are unhappily too late, unless, indeed, the error
may serve as a warning.
Very respectfully and sincerely yours,
JOSEPH A. CLAY.

No. 1311 LocusT

STREET,

February 16th, 1865.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I thank you for the presentation copy of your" Narrative."
I consider it a complete vindication of your conduct of the campaign of
the spring of 1861. It pleased me so much that I have sent several
copies of the "Narrative" to friends in other cities; all of whom will
remember my promises that you would place the matter in the proper
light before the public.
Yours truly,
THOMAS SPARKS.

February 16th, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm:
I have read with great pleasure and satisfaction your "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," for a copy of
which I am under obligations to your kindness. Let me as one of your
fellow-citizens and friends, assure you of my appreciation of your valuable services during the trying scenes of that campaign, and let me add
my thanks as a Pennsylvanian.
I am sincerely,
ISAAC HAZLEHURST.
GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON.
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MY DEAR

Sm:

I have read with great interest the Narrative of the Campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley, with which you have kindly favored me, and am
rejoiced that you have at last consented to place its facts before the
world. It was not needed to strengthen my faith, but it has made that
faith more intelligent. May you be long spared to enjoy the grateful respect to· which you are so richly entitled.
I am very truly yours,
ALEXANDER HENRY.

GENERAL p .A.T'l'ERSON.

CONCORD, N. H., February 16th, 1865.
MY DEAR GENERAL:

I thank you for your note of the 10th instant, and also for "The
Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861."
I have read the "Narrative" with deep interest and with unqualified
satisfaction. It is remarkable in several respects,-concise and clear in
the statement of your own views, motives, and reasons, temperate in tone,
not acrimonious, just to others, and in documentary evidence conclusive
upon every question bearing upon your well-earned reputation as a soldier
and as a patriotic citizen of the Republic.
The patient, manly courage with which you have stood under the
storm that has beaten upon you is admirable, and now gives force and
dignity to a vindication complete and triumphant.
Very trnl y your friend,
FRANKLIN PIERCE.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A., F ebruary 18th, 1865.
GENEHAL PATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I am greatly obliged to you for the copy of "The Shenandoah Campaign of 1861," just received. I had previously procured
and read it, and 'am glad to be able to say, that I consider it perfectly
conclusive as a vindication of your operations from the misapprehensions
which have so long prevailed in the public mind, and in which I acknowledge that I participated in regard to that campaign.
I am with great respect, truly yours,
WILLIAM

A.

INGHAM.
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MAJOR-GENERAL

WALNUT STREET.

R. p ATTERSON,
Thirteen th and Locust Streets.

I return you many thanks for thinking of me
in your distribution of your defence. I bad, however, already procured
a copy and read it.
I was very much pleased, though not at all surprised, to find so perfect a vindication of your conduct from your assailants, and my pleasure
was perhaps enhanced by the fact, that the witnesses confirm a peculiar
theory which I have always held, as to the causes of our disasters at the
opening of the. war, which, if more orthodox in my religious belief, I
should be inclined to regard as providential.
I am with great respect, yours, &c.,
MY DEAR GENERAL :

JOHN

No. 1034 SPRUCE

STREET,

F.

FRAZER.

February 4th, 1865.

Sm:
I thank you for your kindness in sending to me a copy of the history
of your campaign in 1861. I have read it with great interest, and can
assure you that it but confirms the opinion I have held, that your duty
was then faithfully discharged. If censme is to fall on any one for the
sad disaster on another field, it cannot rest on you.
Very truly,
MY DEAR

JOHN WELSH.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

READING,

February 10th, 1865.

p ATTERSON :
DEAR Sm: I am pleased that you rightly numbered me among
those friends who would be gratified to read this long-deferred, but
thorough and conclusive, vindication of your conduct in that earliest and
most trying campaign, in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861. I beg to
congratulate you on the tardy, but sure, justice which must follow this
exposition of the truth of history.

GENER.AL

I am with great respect, your obedient servant,

w ILLIAlVI

M. HIESTER.
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W .A.LNUT
MAJOR-GENERAL

R.

STREET,

February 5th, 1865.

PATTERSON.

MY DEAR Srn: I thank you for the copy of your "Narrative of the
Campaign iu the Valley of the Shenandoah," which you were so good as
to present to me. Your little volume has corrected a gross misapprehension in my mind, regarding the facts connected with that campaign, and
in my opinion is a triumphant vindication of your military character
against the cruel slanders to which your name has been subjected.
I am glad to make this statement, because I was as much astray on
this subject as any man could well be. It happened that I was in
Washington during the time which preceded and followed the battle of
Bull Run, and I therefore heard the first of that clamor which afterwards grew so universal against you. As that which I saw and heard
may be of some interest to you, I shall not apologize for recounting it
briefly.
On Saturday morning, July 20th, 1861, I met in the Senate Chamber
Major - - (your memory will supply the blank*) of the Marine Corps,
who had been sent to you from headquarters, to inquire, as he said, why
you did not attack Johnston. He told me that it was impossible for
you to attack, on account of the almost mutinous condition of some of
the regiments whose time was about to expire. That during his visit,
these regiments were drawn up and addressed by you, without producing
the slightest effect on the discontented. That, under the circumstances,
he considered that an advance on Johnston would be madness. I remember this distinctly, because my spirits were so cast down by the
Major's conclusions.
On Saturday evening, I was for a long time ju the company of General Cameron, who had just returned from the front. He told me that
Johnston had certainly joined Beauregard that afternoon, because while
he (General C.) was at the front, he had throughout the afternoon heard
the whistles of the engines and the cheers of the rebels, a8 their reinforcements arrived. Whether General Cameron was or was not mistaken, as
to the time at which Johnston arrived, he believed it to be a fact as
early as Saturday. From General Cameron's house we walked over to
General Scott's headquarters, when, although many hard things were
said of you which are now not worth mentioning, all hands were sanguine in regard to the coming battle; all except General Cameron, who
remained quiet and almost gloomy during the entire interview. Of
course, I was buoyed up by the high spirits of the military gentlemen,
and on our way home, I jested General Cameron on his despondency,
asking him if he had the Scotch gift of second sight, &c. I shall never

* Maj or Russell.
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forget the words with which we parted at General Cameron's door.
Turning to me with an exclamation of regret, he said," Oh! if I had only
the power to countermand the order for attack to-morrow." "Why, good
God! General," said I, "have you any doubt of the issue?" "Yes," he
replied, thoughtfully; "I always doubt to-morrow. To-morrow is a slippery fellow; you will be convinced of that before you reach my age. Besides, if the battle were postponed, we could bring up Patterson, and
make victory almost certain. He is of no use where he is now." With
this we parted, and henceforth I knew no more of the battle than the
public story.
I thank you, Sir, for having set me right in regard to your indirect
connection with that disgraceful affair, and for enabling me to discharge
my mind of the unjust blame which I attached to you ever since the
memorable night which I spent at headquarters.
With my best wishes for your health and happiness,
I remain, dear Sir, yours sincerely,
GEORGE

H.

BOKER.

February 3d, 1865.
DEAR GENERAL:

I thank you for the copy you have been so kind as to send me of your
"Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shen~ndoah in 1861."
I have read it carefully, and should do violence to my feelings if I did
not at once express to you the satisfaction it has afforded me, in confirming my often-expressed opinion that you had, in that campaign, done
everything that ought to have been expected of you, considering the
character and amount of the means at your disposal, and the circumstances by which you were trammelled. It seems to me, that no candid
man can rise from the perusal of the Narrative and its accompanying
documents, without pronouncing your vindication of your conduct in
the above campaign to be complete and unanswerable.
I think you have done wisely in making this publication, and thus
setting yourself right before your countrymen, for we have all a common
interest in the good name of our defenders.
Yours very truly,
WILLIAM
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERS-ON,

Locust Street.

2

D.

LEWIS.
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BURLINGTON,

N. J., 1865.

DEAR Srn:
I received a few days ago the pamphlet which contains the history of
your campaign in the valley of Virginia in 1861. I don't know when
1 have read a more straightforward statement than it contains.
1ts publication, in my opinion, was hardly necessary, for public opinion, guided by the universal light that this war sheds on its transactions,
had settled in a way to which you and your friends could scarcely object. That opinion was like .what you give as that of our own good
President, and which is so like him.
Nothing has been said upon the subject for some time, because people
thought, as Cameron expressed himself to you, that opening it ( ventilating it, as the popular expression goes), could scarcely help operating
unfavorably to General Scott, and no one wished to embitter a single
moment of that distinguished General's latter days. He has served his
country so well, that we can afford to be to his octogenarian faults " a
little blind," without lowering you in the justly high estimation in which
you have been and are still held.
The admirable article of The Press of to-day is a fair exponent of
present public opinion, and with this you can afford to rest; your laurels
remain as they were before the war, entirely untarnished. This at least
is the opinion of,
Very respectfully and truly your friend,
JAMES WORRALL.
GENERAL RoBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A., February

8th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
My DEAR Sm: I have most carefully read your "Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." I needed not the
Narrative after having read the report of your speech at the banquet of
the First City Troop therein referred to, to satisfy my mind that you were
utterly blameless of every imputation upon your gallantry as a soldier,
and your spotless purity as a man.
The expose, as a pure specimen of clear, consistent, and perspicuous
history, places you beyond the possibility of reproach. I thank you for
this token of your kindness to me personally, but above all other considerations, for the masterly manner in which you have exhibited to the
world, where the responsibility for the disgraceful defeat of our arms at
the battle of Bull Run really and rightly rests.
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With assurances of entire respect, which an acquaintance of almost
forty years has served in no manner to diminish,
I remain, my dear General,
Your most sincere friend,
WM. BADGER.

WESTERN BANK,
PHILADELPHIA,

January 6th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:
Permit me to express the great satisfaction I had, in reading in the
Piiblie Ledger yesterday, the notice of which you were the subject.
This long-delayed act of justice to you attracts much attention and approval, and although it is not a reparation of the wrong done or intended, it proves that "Truth crushed to earth will rise again." Your
friends are gratified that this exposition at last has come, and none more
so than
Truly your friend,
JOS. p ATTERSON.
MAJOR-GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

S1 REETS 1
February 10th, 1865.

THIRTEENTH AND WALNUT

1

To MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I had the honor of serving under you, during the three
months' campaign, as a private in the First City Troop. It is with unfeigned delight that I have heard of the publication of your Narrative,
but more especially of the tardy justice at last rendered to your fair fame
by the press, and by the unanimous voice of the people, since all the facts
of the case have been shown to them. With the proud feelings of one
who has shared your dangers, even in a very subordinate capacity, I have
taken the liberty of writing these lines, and of asking for a copy of your
book.
Believe me, General,
Ever your most obedient servant,
EDWARD w. WHITE.
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ready purchased a copy, and had read it with great interest. I shall
hand the first to one of my friends, and retain the second as a remembrance of yourself.
I remain, my dear sir,
Yours very faithfully,
JOSEPH HARRISON.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 9th, 1865.

p ATTERSON.
Srn: I acknowledge with great pleasure the receipt of a
copy of your "Narrative," for which please accept my thanks.
I made some progress in its perusal last evening, and hope to complete
it soon. In the meantime, so far as I have gone I have derived equal
satisfaction from its apparent truthfulness and corroborative evidence it
affords of the faithfulness of your military services.
As an old friend and neighbor, and as a lover of trut~ and justice, I
congratulate you on the favorable tone of public sentiment which your
vindication has inspired.
Very truly yours,

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

MY

DEAR

c. COPE.

WASHINGTON SQUARE,

DEAR

February 6tb, 1865.

Sm:

I have read your defence attentively, and without qualification affirm
it to be an irrefragable vindication from the unjust censure which has
been heaped upon you. I wish you could have the article in the Sunday Dispatch republished. We know that there is no print in this country of equal talent which is so chary in acknowledging its errors.
The great obstacle in setting public opinion right when a Philadelphian is concerned is the New York press.
I was much struck with the similarity of your case with that of General Ripl~y in the campaign of 1814, and the triumphant manner in
which, after bi.ding his time, he exculpated himself from the charges
brought against him by others who were either ignorant of the truth or
interested in deceiving the public.
Yours truly,

J.
GENERAL

R.

P.A.TTERSOff.

RANDALL.
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February 14th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I received two copies of your "Shenandoah Valley"
pamphlet, and ought to have acknowledged the favor before this, but
business engagements prevented. I was much pleased in the perusal, and
am heartily gratified at the triumphant vindication you have made of
your character and services as a military officer in the campaign of
which you treat in your pamphlet. So far as I can understand, you are
perfectly sustained by every military man, of any knowledge and experience, who knew anything of the circumstances, and even impliedly,
if not directly, by General Scott himself, for he is compelled to resort to
self-justification and evasion. The only source of calumny was the
famous, or rather infamous Committee on the Conduct of the War, and
their course in this instance will pass into history as an evidence of the
unwarrantable extremes to which partisan feeling can carry men who
have happened by accident to attain prominent positions in the councils
of the country. They will be universally condemned and execrated,
while you will be sustained.
I write in haste to send by my daughter, who leaves for your city in
the morning. Please excuse this crude "jumble," and accept my best
wishes for your health.
May we all live to see our unhappy country restored to peace and
prosperity.
With the kindest regards, yours truly,
c. T. BARNUM.

w ASHINGTON

CITY,

February 20th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: Your letter, and the accompanying book detailing the
events of your campaign during 1861, in the Valley of the Shenandoah,
have been received.
Your "Narrative" I have carefully read with much gratification and
information. Having been myself with a portion of your command as
a private, and subsequently as a non-commissioned officer, I had the
opportunity of a clear observation of much that you relate. Your
statements as far as I have knowledge are accurate. I have never entertained any other opinion than that you did all that human power
could accomplish in the cause of your government. In this opinion I
am fully sustained by your review, with the additional testimony which
I had not the proof of before, that you obeyed the " orders" of your
superior (General Scott), as well in spirit as in letter.

24

APPENDIX.

The book is a complete vindication, in my humble judgment, of your
conduct, and disposes of the malignant aspersions heaped upon you by
unscrupulous partisans, and by some military gentlemen who found it
quite convenient to attribute their own errors and mishaps to the actions
of others than themselves, the real parties at fault.
As a Pennsylvanian and as a Philadelphian, I honor you for your
becoming silence until the appropriate time came when you should
speak, and having spoken, I am ·proud that the testimony produced is
so overwhelming in your behalf.
I cannot close without referring to the recent change in the tone of
the press, without regard to their political predilections on the subject.
This expression js not confined to the newspapers of the country, but the
same is observable in the changed convictions of the people.
Justice has at last come to your rescue, and hereafter we shall be
relieved from all unjust criticisms on your military course in the Valley.
I remain, Sir, very truly yours,
8.AMUEL

PHILADELPHIA,

MY

J.

RANDALL.

February 21st, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I am very much obliged to you for a copy of your vindication. I
sat down and read it through carefully, and it fully confirmed the
opinion, which I adopted at the time, and everything which I have reacl
since has strengthened, that yon had most unjustly been made the
scapegoat for the faults of others. I may congrat~late you that public
opinion is rapidly, if it has not already reached the same point. My
judgment in military matters jg indeed worthless: thousands of loyal
"spi!lsters" know more than I do. I never have been able to understand any account I E?ver read in ancient or modern history of any
battle; hence for years before this war broke out my invariable custom
was to skip such accounts; nor have I read a single account of a battle
of this war from Bull Run down. I am certainly unable to form any
opinion as to what caused that disaster, but one thing is very clear, from
documents you have published, that 1no part of the blame is attributable
to either what you did or did not do.
Very truly yours,
GEO. SHARSWOOD.
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PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE,
GETTYSBURG,

February

18th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I have read with much interest your" Narrative of the Campaign in
the Valley of the Shenandoah." It is a most successful and triumphant
vindication of your character, and confirms me in the opinion which I
so firmly maintained at the time when you were so unkindly assailed.
You have done well in gathering the necessary documents together in
this permanent form.
The copy of the work designed for the College Library I presented
this morning, at a meeting of the faculty, and a unanimous resolution
of thanks for your gift was passed, and placed on the minutes.
With sincere regard, I have the honor to remain,
Your obedient servant,
M. L. STOEVER.

SOUTHEAST COR. EIGHTH .AND LOCUST STREETS,

February 20th,

1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I have read the book which you so kindly sent me. It is a complete
answer to the malignant partisan attacks that have been made upon you,
and exhibits on your part patience that I own is marvellous.
Pennsylvania owes it to herself, and to you, to earnestly request the
President or Congress in some way, to place on the national record of
the rebellion, this most thorough vindication of your military career.
E:Kcuse me for adding that differing as we may on political questions,
I have always been proud to subscribe myself as I now do,
With the highest regard, your friend,
DANIEL DOUGHERTY.
GENERAL P .ATTERSON,

Locust

Street.

PHIL.ADELPHIA,

February 22d,

1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: Allow me to thank you most sincerely for your late
publication defending your campaign in Virginia. I did not need it to
convince me of your essential patriotism or of the honest zeal with which
you went into the service of your country. But it has relieved me on
one point. I al ways thought you acted honestly, I now think that in
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fact yon acted wisely, because I do not see bow you could have done
any better in the circumstances.
My position as a decided advocate of the sternest rneasures to put down
this causelesB and bloody rebellion, as well as my old friendship for you,
induces me to say this much.
Truly yours,
THOMAS BRAINARD.

218

SOUTH FOURTH STREET,
February

22d, 1865.

Srn:
Please accept thanks for a copy of your "Narrative." I received and
read it with great interest as a contribution to the history of the war,
and that interest was much enhanced by my acquaintance with so many
who were engaged in the campaign.
In my humble judgment, you have completely refuted all the charges
which were brought against you.
Very respectfully and sincerely yours,
G. M. WHARTON.
DEAR

GENERAL

p ATTERSON, Philadelphia.

1311

MY

SPRUCE STREET, February

22d, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

It is a fitting day for me to say that (after many interruptions) I have
just finished the reading of your "Narrative." As a vindication of your
conduct of that campaign, it is complete and decisive. Your able and
candid analysis of the testimony, written and oral, bearing upon the question, with the concurrent support of so many eminent officers, must satisfy every unprejudiced mind that the responsibility of the. Bull Run
disaster does not lie at yoiir door.
You have done well to put forth this monograph. It was due as well
to the cause of truth and justice as to yourself and the army you commanded.
I am, v-ery truly, your friend,

H. A.
MAJOR-GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

BOARDMAN.
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PHILADELPHIA,

MY

DEAR

February 22d, 1865.

Sm:

Permit me to thank you for the copy of "A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which I have received.
~hen this volume first came into my possession, I determined to give
it a thorough and impartial examination, and to the best of my humble
ability, determine whether the imputations cast upon you had any real
foundation in fact; I was very curious to learn what you had to say, and
this curiosity was more intense because I had read attentively the various accusations which from time to time had appeared in print.
Entertaining these views, I have not only read, but stitdied your book,
and it affords me unspeakable pleasure to say that your vindication is
not only in my judgment ample, but is absolutely complete, and it is
complete because it is based upon facts which can be comprehended by
any citizen of ordinary education.
It is further important to know that the facts are properly attested,
for they are authenticated by evidence of an official character, which
bears upon its very face a refutation of the most unjust and wicked
calumnies.
I do not wonder that the President acquitted you of all blame, but
history will go fiirther, and will record upon its imperishable page these
facts, that you, among the very first, responded to the call of the country,
that your experience as an educated general officer enabled you to devise
the means by which overwhelming difficulties were overcome, and that
you suggested a plan of operations which, had it been adopted and executed, would in all human probability have crowned our efforts with
victory.
As a fellow-citizen, a Philadelphian and a Pennsylvanian, it is not
only a pleasure but a duty to thank you for the vindication, and to offer
to you and yours my warmest congratulations.
Truly yours,
JAMES
GENERAL ROBERT

p ..A.T'l'ERSON.

1816

R.

LUDLOW.

SPRUCE STREET,

Washington's Birthday, 1865.

MY

Sm:
Last night (I concluded it two minutes before midnight) I read your
"Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861"
(every word and figure of it) from cover to cover.
It is full, complete, and conclusive; a more thorough vindication I
DEAR
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never read. The facts are made so clear that he must be dull indeed
who does not feel their overwhelming force. But it is more than a vindication of Major-General Patterson; it is a serious inculpation of Lieutenant-General Scott, Secretary Cameron, and President Lincoln (for
not granting you a court of inquiry), and all who, knowing the facts or
in ignorance of facts, failed to do you justice. Let me add that if the
best style for narrative be a clear, terse, and vigorous unadorned statement of facts (and who can doubt this), then the literary merit of this
book is of a high order. Nor shall I forbear to commend the spirit of
gentlemanly consideration and Christian forbearance which so eminently
distinguishes the "Narrative." One of the ancient writers tells us, that
the noblest spectacle in the world is that of a good man suffering from
undeserved misfortune; to my mind, a nobler still is that of an innocent
man, for his country's sake, patiently enduring obloquy and reproach
when he deserves gratitude; and in the latter case (which is your case),
his praise is the higher if he refuses to free himself from censure by
what he may deem untimely justification. You have "bided your time,"
and you now stand as clear before man as you always did in this matter
before the Great Command.er-in-Chief who "ruleth among the armies of
heaven and the inhabitants of the earth."
I am, dear General, sincerely and cordially yours,

s.

AUSTIN ALLIBONE.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

2004

WEST DE LANCEY PL.A.C.E ,

February 27th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

My time has been so completely engrossed by the sad duties incident
upon my father's declining health and death, that hitherto it has been
out of my power to acknowledge the compliment conveyed by the presentation of your published "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861,"
which I now do with the assurance its history establishes to my mind
not only your entire freedom of accountability for its failure to accomplish that which an ignorant public was led to expect, but the supreme
folly of those with whom the power and responsibility properly resided.
I have never doubted or hesitated to proclaim my full confidence in
your record; all would in proper time be compelled to do you justice.
With sincere regard,
Very faithfully your friend,

J .A.MES

A. McCREA.
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GERMANTOWN,
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February 27th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I return my thanks for the" Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah in 1861," which you were good enough to send to me.
I have read it with attention, and am rejoiced that you have had the
means at hand for so complete a vindication of your conduct during that
campaign.
As an old friend, I may be permitted to express the pleasure I feel at
the successful result of your exposition.
Very truly yours, &c.,
OSWALD THOMPSON.

PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

MY

February 23d, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I beg to tender you my sincere thanks for the copy of the "Campaign
in the Valley in 1861," and to congratulate you on the complete and
entire vindication of your course on that trying occasion.
If the sweetness of justice is enhanced by delay, you must now enjoy
it to the full, and the responsibility is placed where it properly belongs.
It did not need this vindication to satisfy me of the propriety of your
actions, for I bad read attentively the proceedings of that "Star Chamber" the Committee on the War; but there were others, ignorant or
prejudiced, .or both, who needed some light, and I am glad to say that
in no single instance have I seen any one but what now recognizes your
merit and farsightedness on the occasion.
In connection with this matter I will mention that a friend of mine
told me some two years ago that he was, in the summer of 1861, a resident of Washington City, and that about the time that you marched
from Martinsburg on Bunker Hill, a friend of bis, a prominent citizen,
and of noted secession sympathies, offered to bet him at very heavy od~s
"that in ten days those who were not killed in General Patterson's
army would be prisoners in Richmond." My friend declined, partly on
principle, but mainly because he knew that the person bad means of information from Rebeldom.
Again congratulating you, I remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
THOS. P. PARRY.
MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.
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H.A.RRISBURG,

MY

DEAR

February 23d, 1865.

Sm:

I have delayed thanking you for your account of the campaign of
1861 till I should have had an opportunity of reading it. I have now
read it twice with great attention, such as I think is due from every
Pennsylvanian to the subject, and, I must add, with very great pleasure,
as the statements and documents contained in the volume do completely
exonerate you from responsibility for the faults, whatever they were, of
that campaign.
I rejoice at this result, by reason both of my personal regard for yourself and of my love for the noble commonwealth of which we are citizens.
With great esteem, always
Very truly yours,
w. M. MEREDITH.
M.A.JOR-GENER.A..L ROBERT PATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 23d, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I have read with much satisfaction your history of the
Shenandoah campaign, and congratulate you on the complete vindication you have presented of your course during its continuance.
Having been al ways of the opinion, from the little information possessed by me, that you would at the proper time be able to vindicate
yourself and successfully refute all aspersions, I was much gratified by
the Narrative, especially as I could scarcely hope that your vindication
would be so complete and triumphant.
Allow me again to renew my congratulations.
Yours very respectfully,
SAMUEL v. MERRICK.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 24th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:
I have read with deep interest and great satisfaction your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah," and congratulate you on the successful manner in which it disperses the cloud that
ignorance of the facts or interested motives had thrown for awhile over
your soldierly reputation. I don't believe the whole difficulty of your
situation was understood before; it certainly was not by me. It was

LETTERS FROM DISTINGUISHED MEN.

31

extreme. The official orders, dispatches, &c., which you exhibit place
this beyond cavil. The order to attack for which you asked, if it bad
been given, might have led to different results, but with your reduced force
and dissatisfied men it is questionable whether they would have been
better. The full light thrown by your Narrative on the condition of
affairs will enable the present generation and the future historian to do
justice to your patriotism and ability, and I have no doubt it will be
cheerfully accorded.
I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. A. ADAMS, u. s. N.
GENERAL R. P .ATTERSON, Philadelphia.

BLOOMSDALE, March 3d, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: Although I am late in acknowledging the receipt of
your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah,"
my opinion o{it will not have less value from being formed after a more
critical examination than, until the present, I have found time to give it.
You have, I think, fully vindicated yourself, and possessing, as you
did, such conclusive evidence of having discharged your duty, the delay
to present it to the public, so long as there was room to fear injury to
the cause in which we are all so deeply interested, gives additional value
to the Narrative, whilst it affords evidence of your patriotic sentiments.
With great respect,
Yours truly,
D. LANDRETH.

PHILADELPHIA, February 24th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:
I have to thank you most cordially for a copy of your "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah,'' which I had previously
read with the greatest interest. It affords me unfeigned satisfaction to
express to you my sincere conviction of the soldierly manner in which
you performed all those grave and responsible duties intrusted to your
care at that turbulent period of our national existence.
It does not require any military experience, on the part of the unprejudiced reader, to form a correct estimate of so plain a recital of your operations as this Narrative sets forth.
l\'.[y
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A man must be possessed of a very obtuse perception, indeed, if he can
peruee those pages without being assured, that you had entirely vindicated yourself before the country, and forever silenced the malignant
tongues of your base as well as ignorant detractors.
The bosom of every good citizen should swell with indignation, as he
peruses this Narrative, and feels conscious that one who is so justly entitled to the esteem and confidence of the country, should so long have
rested under the most unjust aspersions. Y o~r eminent services, dear
General, in the hour of your country's severest trial, are only excelled
by the patriotic forbearance with which you so long endured the unjustifiable reproaches of many of your fellow-countrymen. Your friends
cannot but feel proud that the hour of your vindication has arrived,
and that your fair name will ever after appear in the calendar of our
country's roll as a patriot and a soldier, sans peur, sans reproche.
I am, dear General, very faithfully,
Your friend and servant,

E. J.

LEWIS,

1332 Chestnut Street.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

"'

MY

CINCINNATI,

February 28th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I had the pleasure of receiving your note of February 11th in due
course of mail, and a day or two afterwards the newspapers and the N arrative.
I have read all attentively, and they agree perfectly with my recollections of the campaign. It is absurd to attribute the defeat at Bull Run
to the fact that Johnston was at liberty to leave Winchester when he
did, in the face of McDowell's report. McDowell says if he had had
thirty minutes more he would have achieved a victory. Now we all
know that he was delayed three hours on the day of the battle by Hunter's failure to put his column in motion at the hour he was ordered to
. do so. Again, who supposes Johnston would not have left Winchester to
its fate under the circumstances, even if you had been thundering at its
gates? I believe if we had moved directly on Winchester from Bunker
Hill, we should have met but a small force to oppose us; that Johnston
would have gone just when he did and with just as many men. But if
Johnston had remained with his whole force, we should have been defeated. In that event the balance-sheet would have looked just as badly,
with the additional disadvantage of a raid at that time into Maryland
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and an attack upon the rear of Washington, at that time wholly unprotected.

*
GENERAL

*

*

*

*

*

Yours faithfully,
CHARLES

R. p ATTERSON' Philadelphia.

BRISTOL, PA.,

*

s.

*
TRIPLER.

February 28th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR SrR: I have carefully examined the Narrative of your
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861. It is a triumphant vindication of your official conduct and management of said campaign.
Embarrassed, as you were, by adverse instructions and requirement
from distant superior authority, compelled to occupy false positions, the
most important and reliable portion of your forces withdrawn from you
early in your operations, want of essential supplies and equipments, and
the term of service of most of your forces rapidly approaching, indeed,
actually arrived with some of them, and their discharge obligatory, it
could only have been the exercise of rare judgment, tact, and ability
that enabled you to maintain your command in front of an enemy vastly
your superior in strength and military equipment.
As to the disgraceful reverse to our arms at Bull Run, erroneously and
unjustly attributed to failure on your part, untimely action and bad
generalship were the prominent and real causes of that disastrous achievement of folly and imbecility.
Truly yours respectfully,
w. R. MONTGOMERY.

PHILADELPHIA,

March 2d, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm:
It is only recently that my engagenients allowed me time to read the
interesting book you were kind enough to present to me, "The Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenan<loah in 1861." A candid judgment, if it
had any doubts before, could not fail to be convinced after reading the
book, that there is not the shadow of a ground for imputing censure to
you, or the gallant army under your command, for the disastrous termination of the battle of Bull Run. Other causes must be sought for upon
3
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which to place the failure of that fat~l day. I think you have discharged
a duty you owed to ·yourself, to the army of the Shenandoah, to your
country, and to the truth of history, in publishing this Narrative, and I
congratulate you upon the sentiments which pervade this community,
amongst whom you are so closely identified, in regard to it.
Believe me, very sincerely yours, &c.,
THOMAS ROBINS.
:MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON,
Locust Street.

1319

WALNUT STREET, March

2d, 1865.

:MY DEAR GENERAL:

I received your pamphlet, have read it with interest and pleasure, and
lent it to many mutual friends. You did right to publish it ; it completely exonerates you from all the false charges that have been made
to screen others.
I am, sincerely and faithfo.lly yours,

J.P.
GENERAL ROBERT

HUTCHINSON.

p ..A.T'.rERSON.

SouTH FOURTH STREET; March 4th,

MY

1865.

DEAR Sm:

Immediately on receiving from your kindness the" Narrative of the
Campaign of the Valley of the Shenan?oah in 1861," I read that document with a clear conviction of its conclusive character. I beg leave
now to express my thanks to you for placing it in my hands. Your
conduct i~ fully explained and vindicated, and your friends and the
country will feel entire satisfaction.
With sincere respect, faithfully yours,

J.

R. INGERSOLL.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

POUGHKEEPSIE,

MY

DEAR SIR:

N. Y.,

February

2d, 1865.

I

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt from you of a copy of
your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in
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1861," for which I thank you. I have perused it with great satisfaction
as a valuable addition to the historical records of the war, and as a perfect vindication, I think, of the good conduct of General Patterson during that campaign. It must be accepted as such by every candid reader.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

With the hope that peace may soon smile upon our dear country,
I remain very truly, your friend,
BENSON J. LOSSING.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A,

March 2d, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: In thanking you for a copy of the ''Campaign in the
Valley," I am the more obliged, as I was one of those who had formed
a hasty opinion, and until I had read this work, had not changed my
views. The mere publication of your orders renders any defence unnecessary, and I am very sure, had you acted contrary to orders and not
have been entirely successful, it would at this day been very difficult to
have found any defonders.
Most respectfully, your most obedient,
WILLIAM STRUTHERS.

HARRISBURG,

F ebruary 26th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
Through some unavoidable delay in our post-office arrangements, I
did not receive your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah" until to-day.
You will please accept my thanks for the same. I have perused it with
much satisfaction, and find it a complete vindication of yourself and the
corps you commanded. It has sounded the death-knell of the slanderers'
tongues that attempted to injure one that has shown his fidelity to his
country in the war of 1812, the war with Mexico, and none more promptly
in tendering ~is services and obeying the commands of his government
to crush this unholy rebellion than yourself. This Narrative has proven
how -careful and guarded the press and people should be in giving opinions as to military men, until facts are made known. I must say that
the press of the country have and are doing you justice. I have met
many persons from the interior of the State since your publication who
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say that great injustice has been done you. It has wrought a wonderful
change in the minds of the people of this city. If all had known you as
well as I did, and served under your command as often as I have, there
would have been little use of this Narrative. With the approval of your
military management in the Valley by that good man and great soldier,
General Thomas, all military men will say you did all a general could
have done.
I am heartily glad that you have given this book with its evidence to
the people. It will wipe out the mist which has hung around this campaign of yours completely, for it may not be very long until you are
summoned to appear before our Great Commander above. You have
lived to see yourself vindicated as a soldier and a patriot.
With my best wishes for my old commander,
I remain yours, with much respect,

E.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A.,

c. WILLIAMS.

February 25th, 1865.

GENERAL:

Accept my thanks for a copy of the "Narrative of the Campaign in
the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which you were kind enough to
send me, and which I have perused with pleasure.
It needed no such testimony to confirm me in the opinion I had long
ago formed, that you were no more responsible for the defeat our army
sustained at Bull Run, than any of our generals then commanding
forces hundreds of miles away from the battle-field.
I had watched your progress with a careful and earnest eye, because
you had long been a cherished commander of mine, and I felt a warm
interest in your career as a soldier. I came to the conclusion that you
had done all that a skilful and brave leader could do with your command, but that you had been selected as a victim to cover up the blunders and mistakes of others in the cabinet and the field, as has been the
case in too many instances, in this most unhappy war.
Your complete vindication, admitted to be so now by even your most
bitter and unscrupulous opponents, can give no greater pleasure to any
of your friends than it does to
Yours very truly,
JAMES PAGE.
M.A.JOR-GE:N ER.AL

R. p .ATTERSON.
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1109

MY

CHESTNUT STREET.

DEAR Sm:

I thank you for your copy of the Shenandoah Campaign of 1861.
It is a complete vindication of yourself and the irresistible correction
of a popular error ; but I cannot commend your forbearance in so long
suffering in silence.
With great respect, yours,
HENRY
GENERAL

M.

PHILLIPS.

R. p .ATTERSON.

247

SOUTH SIXTH STREET,

February 28th, 1865
GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON.

My DEAR GENERAL: I thank you for the Narrative of the Campaign
of 1861. I have read it all carefully and with much interest. I must
congratulate you on the triumphant vindication of your conduct which
this plain, clear, and straightforward narrative presents.
The motives which led you to delay so long this account of your operations in Virginia are most honorable to you, and those which now constrain you to record them are such as your friends and every impartial
person must approve.
I esteem this gift not only for its historic value, which will enable me
to defend you, should this part of your life again be assaHed (though I
do not think it ever will be), but also as a token of your regard.
Permit me to subscribe myself,
Faithfully and sincerely, your friend,
SAMUEL

WILMINGTON, DEL.,

MY

Hoon.

February 18th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I received your note informing me that you had sent me a copy of
your work on your Campaign of the Shenandoah, and a few days afterwards I received the book from Mr. Lammot. I have read it carefully
and with great interest.
I congratulate you upon the ability with which it vindicates you from
every attack which has been made upon you on account of that campaign.
So far as I am concerned, it corroborated the impressions that I had
received from officers of distinction, who had served with you in that
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campaign, and yet I was so firmly convinced that injustice had been
done you, that I did not need, for my own part, any corroboration.
But the book places on record a succinct and clear account of the
whole campaign, and is therefore a valuable addition to the documentary history of the war, and a proper indorsement of your conduct.
I have always thought that the carelessness or want of forethought,
which prevented you from being informed in detail, from day to day, of
every movement of McDowell, was a distinguishing feature of the madness or folly which actuated the authorities in ordering a great movement against the enemy, with troops the greater part of whom would be
entitled to discharge in less than a fortnight after the movement commenced, and the remainder of whom had not been in service. more than
a month, many of them having received muskets not more than a week
before they were obliged to use them in action. We know with whom
the responsibility for this movement rests, but no one can tell, I imagine,
how different the condition and prospects of the counti·y would now be,
had common sense been allowed to guide our deliberations.
But Providence for some wise purpose allowed us to stultify ourselves
at that time, and for this folly you are in no wise responsible.
Very truly your friend,
W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General U. S. Vols.
GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

Philadelphia,

Pa.

BALTIMORE,

MD., MRrch 4th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL :

After carefully reading the evidence brought forward in your Narrative to illustrate the Shenandoah campaign of 1861, I found myself
irresistibly drawn to the conclusions expressed so frequently throughout the narration by oficers whose rank and judgment give to their
opinions so just a weight.
It is to be doubted whether any military man at this day attaches to
yourself the mediate or immediate responsibility of the Bull Run disaster, and the reading public, educated in the course of this war to judge
more correctly of martial events, has, so far as I have had the opportunity to judge, acquiesced in that decision.
I take great pleasure not only in congratulating you upon your complete vindication, but in recognizing the patriotic and soldierly feeling
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which prompted you to defer your defence until this late moment, when
the public interest would receive no detriment.
I remain, General, with great respect,
Very sincerely your friend,
w M. H. FRENCH,
Lieutenant-Colonel, 2d Artillery,
Late Major-General Vols.
MAJOR-GENER.AL ROBERT p .ATTEI~SON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

PHIL.ADELPHI.A, March 9th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON:
DEAR SIR: I thank you for your kind remembrance, in sending me
your complete vindication of your Shenandoah Valley Campaign, with
your autograph.
I do assure you, that it is much valued as a record of the past, having
had a son in the regiment commanded by your noble son.
Remaining yours, with kindest regards,
D. C. McCAMMON.

March 7th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
Let me thank you for the pleasure and satisfaction which the perusal
of your history of the Campaign in the Valley in 1861 has given me.
I read as a friend, a citizen, and one somewhat acquainted with the
force of evidence.
As a friend, it only caused me to regret that malice, ignorance, and
prejudice should, in this day, have had power enough to do you injustice.
As a citizen, that there are yet a few public men who can yet rest on
their characters as .a defence against wrong.
As a lawyer, that you have so triumphantly refuted all the attacks
made on your military character.
These words, containing as they do my convictions, may not be of any
worth to you, but to me it is a cause of sincere rejoicing, that you have
given me the opportunity to express them, in return for the compliment
of numbering me among your friends, as a recipient of a copy of your
book.
Your obliged friend,
RICHARD VAUX.
To MAJOR-GENER.AL P .AT'l'ERSON, Philadelphia.
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PHILADELPHIA,

MY

March 12th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

Permit me to thank you for the copy of your pamphlet relating to
the three months' campaign, you were kind enough to send me. I have
not been at home more than a day since its receipt, which will explain
why it has not been acknowledged earlier.
Before you -sent me a copy, I had borrowed one from General R. 0.
Tyler, and had read it carefully. I regard it as a complete and overwhelming vindication. No answer can be made to it by the most sophistical of your enemies, which can make any impression. In common
with many others, I confess I had entertained the belief that you were
in fault, but no man, after reading your statement, can fail to justify
you, and to admire the magnanimity which has sealed your lips and
restr~ined your pen so many years.
Yours very truly,

0. W.

DAVIS.

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,
HARRISBURG, PA.,

March 13th, 1865.

GENERAL:

I regard it as unnecessary to make any explanation to you of my
apparent neglect to acknowledge the receipt of your recent vindication.
You know how constantly my time is occupied.
Your truthful "Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley
in 1861" affords me much personal gratification. It is the lot of all
men who may occupy prominent positions in public life, whether as soldiers or civilians, to have at one time or other their conduct of affairs
misunderstood; but it seldom occurs that any one, however blameless,
whose policy and acts have received our unfavorable criticism, finds
himself able to present to the public so full and able a vindication as is
shown in your "Narrative."
I had the privilege and honor to testify my confidence in your
patriotism and ability, when I offered you the command of the Pennsylvania volunteer militia at the beginning of the rebellion, and I have
never regretted that I did so. My confidence never wavered, and
although my approving judgment of your management of that campaign may not add much to the testimony of such distinguished and
experienced soldiers as Generals Thomas, Newton, Abercrombie, and
others, who have said it was "able and judicious, and to the best interests of the service," yet I feel ass.ured that for me to say that your
military history now stands before your fellow-citizens strong in truth,
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in patriotism, and in fidelity to your country, may not be unacceptable
to you.
I hope, General, you may live to welcome peace and tranquillity to
our distressed country, and that with the fair record of military service
you give your children, you may leave them in the full enjoyment, that
you have served wherever and when called.
I remain, truly your friend,

A. G.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

113

MY

DEAR

CURTIN.

p ATTERSON.

SOUTH FIFTH STREET, March

14th, 1865.

Srn:

I wish to thank you for the copy of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," you have been so kind
as to send me.
The favorable notices of it I observed in the newspapers, made me
feel the greater desire to read it, because I had been among those who
held you responsible for allowing Johnston to join Beauregard, and thus
contribute to the disaster of Bull Run.
But I am free to say, and I take much satisfaction in saying it, that
to· my mind, the ''Narrative" is a clear and thorough vindication of
yourself, as to any responsibility of the kind, and not only so, but it
appears likewise to establish the fact, pretty clearly, that the battle was
lost from other causes than the arrival of Johnston; and this, independently of the fact, of which there seems little doubt from the evidence
furnished by the "Narrative," that he was upon the ground before the
battle commenced, and known to be there at a time when the attack by
our forces might have been avoided, and McDowell enabled either to
await one from the enemy upon his own ground, or the arrival of reinforcements, had he chosen to do so.
I am no military man, but I may perhaps be permitted to say that
the "Narrative" presents to my mind, that in your movements you
were con trolled by your orders, and that you executed these to the
extent of the means placed _in your hands.
As one of the earliest of our country's defenders in this unhappy and
unholy rebellion, I trust you may yet receive, at the hands of all your
fellow-citizens, full and ample justice.
A very humble one amongst them has attempted, in this feeble way,
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to do something in that direction in his own behalf, and tenders you his
good wishes for your future welfare.
Very truly and respectfully, your friend and fellow-citizen,
c. M. HUSBANDS.
To

GENERAL RoBERT PATTERSON.

420 WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA,
March 14th, 1865.

GENERAL p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: Allow me to thank you for your very interesting
"Narrative," in which you so fully vindicate yourself, and the gallant
men of Pennsylvania, from all blame for the unfortunate campaign of
1861.
I am, dear sir, yours very truly,
J. D. SERGEANT.

PHILADELPHIA, March 15th, 1865.

MY DEAR Srn:
I have read, although with the disadvantage of being an "unmilitary
reader," yet with great interest, your Campaign of 1861, and am extremely gratified at finding so clearly refuted the false and cruel imputation under which the party in power and in fault endeavored to screen
their own misconduct. This calumny of the committee had weight in
proportion to the credit for honesty which the party making it bears.
Still it existed as a bare possibility, even from such a source, and I am
glad that you have presented so clear a demonstration of its untruth,
and I thank you for the opportunity so kindly given me to read it.
I must say, however, that an acquaintance of more than forty years
had not made me an impartial reader.
Very truly and respectfully yours,
JOSEPH H. DULLES.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON.

NEW YORK, March 16th, 1865.

MY DEAR Srn:
Owing to some unaccountable delay, your "Narrative of the Campaign of 1861" failed to reach me until a short time back, which will I
trust explain my seeming remissness in not acknowledging it before.
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I have perused it with great care, and can conscientiously say tl:rat I
consider it a most triumphant vindication of your discharge of the
arduous duty assigned to you, and a signal refutation of the calumnies
and misrepresentations to which you have been subjected.
In connection with this I cannot but congratulate you particularly
upon the admirable tone and temper that pervades it, under circumstances when the manifestation of some acerbity of feeling might easily
have been pardoned. As time gradually brings to light concealed facts
and dissipates the obscurity hanging around the earlier operations of this
unhappy war, the relative position of the actors in the great drama is
getting to be more accurately appreciated, and I feel that I can heartily
congratulate you that the time is already reached when history is making
ample reparation in your case.
With many thanks for your kind attention, and my kind regards to
your family,
I am very truly yours,
NEWBOLD EDGAR.
GENER.AL ROBERT

p .ATTERSON.

916
GENERAL

R.

SPRUCE STREET,

March 16th.

P.ATTERSON.

Sm: I must thank you for your kindness in sending me a copy
of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah."
I have read it with great interest. It is a complete vindication.
Respectfully yours,
DEAR

c.

1714

LOCUST STREET'

WILLING.

March 25th' 1865.

Sm:
I ought sooner to have thanked you for your kind attention in sending me a copy of the "Narrative." I have read it with that interest
and satisfaction which I think every Pennsylvanian ought to feel at
your triumphant rebuttal of the calumnies which the malice of party for
awhile kept alive.
Most men must wait for posterity to vindicate them in such cases, and
I must think you are eminently fortunate in having extorted from so
many organs of the.. dominant party an admission that the lies which
they once gave currency to had no foundation.
So much for a wise forbearance, and then striking at the right time.

DEAR
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Thanking you again for your courteous attention, I am, General, with
sincere respect,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES BIDDLE.
GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

/

No. 702

w ALNUT

STREET, PHILADELPHIA.,

March 21st, 1865.

Sm:
I have delayed acknowledging the receipt of your publication, on the
Campaign in the Valley, until I had read it attentively.
Pray accept my thanks for your kindly remembering me as one
whose opinion you must attach some value to. It gives me pleasure to
assure you that you have been much and unjustly misrepresented, and
that your vindication is complete.
I am, with great respect,
Your most obedient and humble servant,
En. "\VALN.
DEAR

To

GENERAL PATTERSON.

liEADQU ARTERS ARMY OF THE POTO:\IAC,

March 13th, 1865.
DEAR GENERAL:

I have delayed till now acknowledging the receipt of your" N arrative of the Shenandoah Campaign of 1861," in order that I might give
it a careful perusal.
Having done so, I am truly gratified to see how clearly you have vindicated yourself from the unjust aspersions under which you have
hitherto remained, with a silence and resignation highly creditable to
you as a soldier and patriot.
I have never myself had any doubt about your true position, having
at the time received, from officers serving with you, such information as
made the case clear; but I am glad you have prepared this statement
for the public, as hereafter it must with all true and just men silence
every cavil.
With great respect, I remain, truly yours,
GEORGE G. MEADE,

Maj or-General.
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BosToN, Murch 18th 1 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: Your obliging ·favor of the 13th inst. was soon followed by the two copies of your "Narrative." One of them I took
pleasure in presenting to our Historical Society; the other I have read
with great interest, and shall preserve it as a valuable memorial of the
war. It throws new light on your campaign in the Shenandoah Valley,
and cannot fail to relieve you from E?ome false impressions which were
entertained at the time of our fatal repulse at Bull Run. It would be
most happy if all the officers who have succeeded you in the Valley
could exhibit as good a record. When the history of the war shall be
fairly written, there can be no doubt that your patriotic services will
have an honorable and enviable mention.
Accept my best thanks for your kind attention in sending me the
book, and believe me, with the highest regard and respect,
Very faithfully yours,
ROBERT c. WINTHROP.

PHILADELPHIA,

March

~3d,

1865.

DEAR GENERAL :
I had the pleasure of receiving your "Narrative of the Campaign in
the Shenandoah Valley," which I immediately perused with great interest. I thank you for your kindness in sending me what is not only a
valuable contribution to the truth of history, but a complete vindication
of yourself. I admire its temper, its style, and its taste. Every one
must commend you for your magnanimous endurance of undeserved
obloquy while legitimate redress was refused you, and a soldier's honor
forbade you to resort to any other. But the time has come. A simple
narrative of the facts has placed you right in the opinion of every one
whose eyes are not blinded by the poison of political or personal malignity. As for myself, I was convinced before I had the pleasure of reading the "Narrative." My friend, Colonel Longnecker, of Allentown,
had put me in posses:;;ion of the leading facts of the case, and I have had
occasion several times to vindicate you. But of one fact, which is highly
creditable to your military skill, I was ignorant till now, and that is the
plan you suggested of uniting your forces with those of Colonel Stone
at Leesburg. You had every reason to expect all the advantages you
anticipated from such a movement. It is surprising that the "Chief"
did not adopt this suggestion of his "second;" could it have been
''That from Marlborough's eyes the tears of dotage flow?"

I beg you to accept the hearty congratulations of an old friend on this
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ample vindication of your military conduct and character, which, I am
happy to see, is appreciate9- by the public, from the candid retraction
made by those who were misled by falsehoods uttered by others.
Very truly, your friend,
JOHN K. FINDLAY.
GENERAL

p A'l'TERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

March 21st, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." My absence
in West Virginia and Ohio prevented a prompt recognition of your kind
remembrance on my part.
Every unprejudiced mind, after carefully perusing the "Narrative,"
will look upon it as a complete vindication, as far as you are concerned,
of the charge made against you, of being responsible for the defeat of
General McDowell at Manassas.
While a vindication was unnecessary for those who have been favored
and honored with your intimate acquaintance and confidence for a number of years, still the Narrative will prevent the machinations of your
enemies in their efforts to destroy your well-earned reputation, and your
defence will enable you to leave this world with a clean record, and with
the proud satisfaction of knowing that you leave behind you the reputation of being a brave, discreet, and able officer, and discharging faithfully and well all the duties your country ever assigned you, both as a
citizen and a soldier.
With sentiments of high regard and esteem,
I am faithfully yours,
WM. M.

PHILADELPHIA,

To

REILLY.

March 2:Jd, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.

MY DEAR Srn: I am much obliged to you for the copy of the "Campaign of 1861" which you very kindly sent me some days since. I have
read it through very carefully and attentively, and I found it an interesting narrative of that campaign. It is a clear, concise statement of facts,
and must satisfy every candid mind that the censure cast upon you at a
time of great popular excitement was, to say the least of it, most unjust
and u~deserved. The publication of this Narrative was a duty on your
part. It was a simple act of justice to yourself, in vindication of your
conduct as the commanding officer of that department.
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It is also a great satisfaction to your friends who stood by you and
sustained you amidst all the wild clamor that was raised against you by
the unthinking multitude. We have all seen how patiently you bore
this, calmly biding your time, until at length tardy justice is awarded
you.
It may be some consolation to you to know and to feel that during
all this period your many friends have never lost their confidence in you
as a brave officer and soldier, or their high esteem for you as a gentleman and friend.
I remain with great respect,
Yours very truly,
THOMAS

D.

SMITH.

520 Walnut Street.

. OmcAoo, lLLINors, March 23d, 1865.
1\'.[y VERY DEAR GENERAL:

I have your esteemed favor of :M:arch 1st, together with a copy of your
book. There can be but one opinion amongst all fair-minded men. That
you were made the scapegoat for the sins of others, and that there has
been a persistent intention on the part of those in power to degrade you
in the eyes of your countrymen, so as to shield themselves from the just
blame of having committed the greatest and most damning blunder of
the war, there can be no question.
Had the first Bull Run been a victory, as it unquestionably would
have been, had you been permitted to carry out your plan, there would
have been no second Bull Run, and no second fight of any importance after that. The war would have been over long ago, countless millions of treasure, and, more valuable still, countless (almost) valuable
lives would have been· spared, and to-day would have found us a happy
(except the manners) and a united people.
That is, in a few words, my opiIJ.ion of your book, and knowing its
beloved author as I do know him, I feel assured the plan, so well considered and so justly approved by his military genius and skill, would
have been in every detail eminently successful.
I rejoice to see, even away out here on our Western prairies, a great
desire on the part of the people to see the book, and those who have seen
it are not slow to do justice to its distinguished author. The administration have done their best to make your name infamous ; the people will
take care now that it is made famous.
Your sincere friend and comrade,
Is.A.Ao

R.

DILLER.
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No. 504

w .A.LNUT

STREET,

PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

March 25th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR GENERAL: Permit me gratefully to acknowledge your kindness in sending me, under your own signature, a copy of your" Narrative
of the Campaign of 1861." I am pleased to assure you, General, that
to all with whom I have conversed on the subject I have invariably
spoken, as I felt, proudly of the position which you assumed in the outset of this trouble, while I attempted in my unskilful way to vindicate
your services in the field, and now I am happy to be enabled to confirm
my assertions by the record.
Accept the assurances of my high regard, and believe me ever,
Most respectfully and truly yours,
ARTHUR M. BURTON.

155

NORTH TENTH STREET,

March 28th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:
I know of how little value must be the judgment on military movements of a man " who never set a squadron in the field," but there are
points of evidence in the book containing a "Narrative of the Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah" which satisfy civilians that the commander of the United States army there did all that could be done, and
it seems evident that such was and such is the opinion of those who had
then and have now the direction of the military affairs of the country.
I am, with great respect,
Your friend and servant,
JOS. R. CHANDLER.
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

RE.A.DING,

March 29th, 1865.

DEAR Sm:
I received a copy of the "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of
the Shenandoah in the Summer of 1861," for which you will please accept my thanks. I must ask your indulgence for my neglect in not acknowledging the receipt of it sooner.
I read your Narrative with much interest, having been in a position
during that campaign, as cl1ief of Major-General Keim's staff, which
enabled me to be generally informed as to the character of the instruc-
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tions under which you acted, and also the motives and reasons for the
course you pursued. My opinion has always been that your management of that campaign was in every respect able and judicious, and that
you are in no wise responsible for the disaster of Bull Run. On the contrary, my firm belief is, and always was, that had you been permitted to
carry out your views, unfettered by higher powers, not a man of Johnston's force would have reached Bull Run. These convictions I have
frequently expressed, and they were not formed hastily, but are based on
the best information and on personal observation.
I have no doubt your Narrative will remove whatever unjust impressions had been made on the public mind in regard to your campaign, by
misrepresentations made by the ignorant, and by persons whose own
conduct prior to the battle of Bull Run was the cause of the disaster.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
SAMUEL L. y OUNG.
To MAJOR-GENER.AL RoBERT

P .A.'rTERSON.

226 W .A.LNUT
GENERAL

STREET,

3d

March,

1865.

R. p ATTERSON.

MY DEAR Sm: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of your
"Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," for
which please accept my cordial thanks. I have read your statement
with a great deal of interest, as well as a deep feeling of pleasure. I am
rejoiced to know that you have at last been enabled to do yourself the
justice, to which you were long ago entitled at the hands of others.
Your" Narrative" is unanswerable, your evidence is conclusive, and
if the jury to which you appeal does not find a verdict in your favor, I
can only say, General, that I shall then have as little confidence in the
intelligence and honesty of the American people, as I now have in the
integrity of their constitutional form of ~vernment. The latter is fast
melting away.
With feelings of the kindest regard, General, permit me to subscribe
myself,
Your friend,
GEO. BULL.

4
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s. E.

COR. SIXTH AND

w ALNUT STREETS,

PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

April 1st, 1865.

Mr. J. G. Rosengarten begs leave to present his respectful compliments to Major-General Patterson, and to acknowledge the receipt of
the "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in
1861." He had already read it, and put it among the records of the
war for preservation, and was and is glad to be one of the very large
number of persons who join in bearing testimony to the successful
vindication established by it.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

FRANKFORT,

MY

KY.,

March

3d, 1865.

DEAR SrR:

Since my last brief note, I have read very darefully "A Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861, by Robert Patterson, late Major-General of Volunteers," and feel it my duty, as it is
my pleasure, to say that whoever else is responsible for that terrible disaster your vindication fully exonorates you.
Very respectfully, your old friend and attorney,
LESLIE COMBS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p .ATTERSON.

EAS'l'ON, Mn., March

MY

8th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

Mr. Williams yesterday handed me at my office the handsome edition
of your defence, for which accept my acknowledgments. I shall read
it with pleasure as soon as I return from Caroline Court, where I go tomorrow, to remain for ten days. I will then give you my views. But it
is not necessary for me to wait until I read it. The review in The Press
gives extracts enough to satisfy any one. Mr. Williams has read it, and
says it is irresistible and unanswerable.
I will lend it to Captain Hardcastle while I am gone. His judgment,
being a West Point military man, is worth something. I think it will
put you thoroughly right in a matter in which you have been greatly
wronged, and have suffered much. I think you showed wisdom in the
selection of the time of your defence for many reasons.
Yours, &c.,
SAML. HAMBLETON.
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April 4th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: Permit me to return you my sincere and grateful acknowledgments for the history of your campaign, which I shall treasure
among my keepsakes as a memento of personal friendship and kindly
regard. The vindication is full and complete.
With renewed sentiments of esteem,
I remain very respectfully,
F. HAROLD DUFFEE. '

CLEVELAND,

OHIO, April 8th, 1865.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR Srn: Yours of the 31st ult. is received, and also your "Narrative
of the Shenandoah Campaign of 1861."
I was at that time with the Ohio troops on the Cheat River, and my
impression has been till now, that the rebel General Johnston left your
front without your knowledge. Your pamphlet corrects this false opinion, and places your conduct on the Potomac in to me a new and highly
favorable light.
Yours respectfully and truly,
CHARLES WHITTLESEY.

29

SouTH SIXTH STREET,

April 8th, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm :
Please accept my thanks for the copy of your "Narrative of the Shenandoah Campaign in 1861."
Its perusal has dispelled the erroneous view that I hitherto entertained,
that the disasters of the first battle of Bull Run, which produced so many
lamentable consequences, were in a great measure attributable to your
misconduct.
I am greatly obliged to you for the means by which I was undeceived,
and again thank you for the opportunity of making some reparation for
the wrong (though only in thought), of which I was unwittingly guilty
towards you. Doubtless nfany have been erroneously impressed like
myself, and your" Narrative" will afford to them, as it did to me, light,
and conviction of their error.
Truly yours,
MosEs A. DROPSIE.
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.
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272 W.
BALTIMORE,

MY

DEAR

LEXINGTON STREET,

Monday, April 10th, 1865.

Sm:

I received on Saturday a nice pamphlet, entitled Shenandoah Valley
Campaign, 1861, which, from the initials on the envelope, I suppose to
have been addressed by yourself, and for which, therefore, I make at
once my acknowledgments.
Some of us here were pretty well informed as to the circumstances of
your command in the Valley, and I do not think that you were generally, in this community, misjudged or held responsible for things over
which you had not the control. General Scott, to be sure, spoke of you
subsequently as the chief. Such an ungenerous fling was probably natural in the midst of his own bitter mortification; but it was well understood at the time, even without access to the dispatches, that you did
not hold such plenary powers, either in form or substance.
At first, some persons, under the influence of traditional admiration of
the General-in-chief, regarded the movements in the Valley as steps in a
profound strategy. I confess that I could not share in this opinion, but
looked upon the manmuvring as quite unsystematic, and as contrasting
unfavorably with that of the rebels. Both parties had divided their
forces, but the rebel troops radiated, so to speak, while we were acting
tangentially to a large arc, and in the faculty of speedy concentration,
were always on the average thirty hours behind our enemy. So Jo.
Johnston retreats before you, knowing that he was thus coming nearer
his centre, .and a junction with Beauregard, whenever necessary, and
knowing moreover that Harper's Ferry, being a totally untenable place,
Winchester was for all intents and purposes Harper's Ferry. He had
no intention of coming over into Maryland at that time; a movement
in Maryland was believed to be shivering in the wind; would have
only damaged their prospect. Johnston's was therefore an army of observation more emphatically than your own. If you were there to
amuse him, he was also there to amuse you;· while at any moment he
could get back to where he might be wanted, as at Bull Run or Manassas, sooner by a day than you could, if you started at the same moment.
Johnston staid there longer than he need have done, for he was deceived
as to the amount of your force; when he spoke of your thirty thousand
men, he thought you had them. If he had known your actual numbers
and your utter deficiency in artillery, he wi>uld have attacked you instead of falling back. Such mistakes of theirs were, I thought and
think, a blindness inflicted by Providence. Thus, when, about the middle of May, the first rebel demonstration was made at the Long Bridge,
and instead of coming on when they could readily have occupied the
town, they withdrew. I being in vVashington at the time said to my
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friend Prof. Bache, "They are judged and condemned; they will never
recover the game." General Scott was under the instinctive domain of
this exclusive idea, viz., that the rebs would seize Washington, as of course
ought to have been technically their first step. Indeed, I heard him say
about that period that he was thinking of nothing else, and was virtually leaving other things to take care of themselves. Hence came his
failure to prescribe any plan for your operations, and his interfering only
so far as to prevent your own .Plans from being carried out. In fact .I
came at that time reluctantly to the conviction of his entire incompetency; a conviction which his resignation not long after served to show he
shared in himself.
Not however to prolong these remarks, into which I have been quite
unintentionally drawn, when my duty was simply to acknowledge a
courtesy, I will only add that the pamphlet abundantly exculpates you
from any blame in the premises, and ought to contribute to the establishment of that truth and justice which, unfortunately, republics are not
proverbial for recognizing and rendering at the right time. In the calm
which I trust is approaching, many of us will, or all should, remember
and honor those citizens who distinguished themselves as among the first
to step forward in a season of doubt and peril; among those you have
an indefeasible place.
I remain, dear sir,
"\Vith great respect, &c.,
J. H. ALEXANDER.

ERIE, April 10th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR Sm: You will please accept my thanks for your kindness
in sending me the "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah in 1861." I have read it with care and interest, and am
highly pleased to see how triumphantly the evidence vindicates you, and
so completely exonerates you from any shadow of blame in that campaign. I always felt confident such was the truth of the matter, but
never before was able to see the evidence.
It is as I supposed you wei:e not a supporter of Mr. Lincoln's measures
right or wrong, consequently must be sacrificed.
Respectfully your obedient servant,
JAMES C. MARSHALL.
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ELKTON,

Mn., April 1lth, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
. . . The Narrative was received, though not until the lapse of one or
two weeks after you left it with my daughter. I was at first too unwell
to read it, but as I grew better I took it up and perused it with very
great pleasure. It is a most admirably written document, and presents
a very strong, lucid, and satisfactory vindication of your military career
in the Shenandoah Valley, and points unmistakably to the true source
of the defeat at Bull Run, if that disaster lies at the door of any one
individual. You have exposed, too, the base conduct of certain partisan
members of Congress in a way which should make it a reproach to them
while they live.
Very truly yours,
JOHN c. GROOME.

EASTON,

April 11th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of
the 7th inst.; also the "Narrative of the Campaign of 1861 in the Valley of the Shenandoah," which I have perused, and find it a very correct
statement of the events, as far as they came to my knowledge. I often
refer to that campaign with lively reflections, and I am pleased to say
that my associations were of the most pleasant character, and particularly with the attention I received at your hands.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
. A. M. YOHE.

PHILADELPHIA,

April 12th, 1865.

To MAJOR-GENERAL RoBERT PATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I have read with care and great satisfaction the" Narrative" of your campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring and
summer of 1861. I was prepared to expect, from what I had heard
from other sources, that if the official documents, containing the orders,
correspondence, &c., between the General-in-chief and yourself should
ever be made public, the character of certain important incidents of that
campaign would appear in a very different light from that in which,
owing to the blunders of some and the malevolence of others, it was desired it should appear. The anticipation proves to have been true; but
I was scarcely prepared for so full and ample a vindication of your course
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as is presented in the "Narrative." The evidence being mainly from
the public archives, the War Department and Senate Chamber, is incontrovertible and without doubt, and leaves the blame of the "Bull Run"
disaster on those immediately concerned in precipitating the conflict, and
those who controlled our forces when it came on. The usual apology for
this defeat has been, that they were misled in supposing that up to the
hour of battle, Johnston was held in check at 'Vin chester by your forces,
instead of which he suddenly appeared on the field with powerful reinforcements, and changed the fortunes of the day. It is now put beyond
dispute that you did hold him in check for a considerable period beyond
the time when you were bound to suppose, from the dispatch of the General-in-chief, the battle at Bull Run had been fought, and when he
moved from Winchester towards Manassas, you informed the Generalin-chief of that fact, which he received the day before the battle. The
battle offered next day, in the afternoon, after the information had been
received, was not in ignorance, therefore, of the possibility of Johnston's
co-operation with the enemy, although it was impossible for you to know
it, but it was in disregard of it by those who ordered it. If, indeed,
Johnston's arrival had any material influence on the result, a matter
which the officers examined before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War seem to negative, you were not to blame. You had accomplished
with your inferior forces what you were ordered to do, and when Johnston moved, gave timely warning, so that the battle might have been
postponed until your arrival, or indefinitely, if deemed best, as at that
time the rebels did not design to attack our forces in position, as all subsequent accounts go to show. I rejoice that you have vindicated the
truth of history and yourself in this particular. Not only did you owe
it to yourself and your companions in arms, but to the State, most particularly sensitive and anxious for the honor of her soldiers, from which
you served. I am far from being a competent military critic, but I profess some experience in deducing from plain facts what they tend to prove,
and that the facts alluded to do most clearly establish the conclusions I
have drawn, greatly increases the pleasure with which I subscribe myself,
Most truly, your friend,
JAMES THOMPSON.

PITTSBURG,

April 12th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL :

Absence from home prevented an earlier perusal of your virtuous and
complete defence.
I sincerely trust public opinion, which, from ignorance of the facts, has
been most uncharitable in your case, will be corrected by your statement.
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Your situation at Martinsburg, in July, 1861, was extremely embarrassing. A superior force of the enemy intrenched in your front, with
railroad communications direct to Richmond, also one to Harper's Ferry,
covering your left flank, having no cavalry to cut these communications
or keep you informed of the movements of the enemy, no reserve either
at Williamsport, Hagerstown, or Harrisburg, and only limited supplies
at either point, and worse than all, ambiguous instructions, I cannot
comprehend the justice of expecting you to hold Johnston at Winchester.
If he was unable or unwilling (?) to fight you in bis works, be would
have done just as be did do, otherwise there might have been two defeated armies.
While Winchester was your objective point, I questioned then the propriety of attacking Johnston in Winchester; subsequent events have
sustained this opinion. Our movement should have been to the left,
threatening the enemy's lines of communication, or compelling him to
fight us on ground of our own choosing. But to do this judiciously, you
required a garrison or reserve at both Williamsport and Harper's Ferry,
otherwise your limited supplies would soon be exhausted.
I shall take occasion to refer more fully, if acceptable to you, on this
point hereafter.
The rapid change of public sentiment and public policy contributed
largely to the prejudices in your case, and left you no arbiter but history.
There must be a Ney and a Grouchy in every Waterloo, and it is the
opportunity of those highest in authority to name them.
In haste, yours very truly,
JAMES

PHILADELPHIA,

s.

NEGLEY.

April 12th, 1865.

p ATTERSON.
Sm: Many thanks for the "Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah in 1861," just received. I at first thought it was sent me
as secretary, &c., 'but now take it as a kindness to myself personally,
which I appreciate highly. On every occasion when necessary, and they
have been few, I have been invariably on your side of the question, and
contended that whatever the result of that campaign, the superior officer,
and not yourself, was responsible for it; that you performed your whole
duty by obeying faithfully and promptly the orders of your superior
officer; that you had not, as Blucher had, the power of acting independently, according to the dictates of your own judgment, &c. I will take
the earliest opportunity of giving your kind present a careful perusal.
I remain, very respectfully, &c.,

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT
DEAR

H. L.

SPROAT.
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April 17th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I thank you for a copy of your able and conclusive
"Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," the
perusal of which has afforded me great satisfaction and instruction.
Whatever errors may remain in the public mind, they must be dispelled by so clear an exposition of historical truth.
I remain, very respectfully yours, &c.,
THOMAS A. BUDD.

,
FRANKLIN, PA.,

April 19th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have delayed acknowledging the receipt of your" Narrative" until
I could have time to read it carefully through. You have placed me
under obligation to you, by sending it to me, as I consider it a very
important and valuable contribution to the history of the war. After a
perusal of it, and I had no doubts before that you were wronged, I think
nothing further is needed to clear your record before the country, unless,
indeed, as we have reason to fear, truth and justice no longer sway the
popular judgment.
One's indignation and amazement are excited at reading the reasons
advanced by some of General Scott's friends, against granting you a
court of inquiry, lest blame or censure would attach to his shoulders,
after being removed from yours by the investigation. "Let justice be
done though the heavens fall," is a very trite saying, but seems to have
been forgotten in your case. The fear expressed by Secretary Cameron,
that General Scott might be censured as a result of the investigation,
should have been a convincing argument for granting it at once. One
is almost induced to believe that all desire of doing justice to our generals by the administration has been lost, if there was ever such a desire.
Your "Narrative," giving the plain, unvarnished facts in the case,
must convince the public that you have been cruelly wronged. It is
said that time at last sets all things even, and I believe will persuade all
reasonable men, that you acted the part of a good and true soldier, in
not exposing your little force against overwhelming odds, without a
prospect of success; in obeying orders to the letter when no discretion
was allowed; of reporting for the information of the commander-inchief all the circumstances; an·d, finally, when his words were ambiguous, in asking him directly, whether or not, situated as you were, you
" should attack."
No one can fail to see now, that General Scott advanced his army to
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Bull Run, and ordered McDowell to attack, when he knew that the
enemy had been reinforced by Johnston. Had Bull Run been a victory
nothing would have been said about it, but as it proved a disastrous
reverse, some one must bear the blame, and that one must not be
General Scott.
In waiting so long as you hate, when no possible harm could arise
from the publication of your book, you have done well. To bear so
long the undeserved rebuke and censure you have received, in calm confidence in the return of reason, and trusting that rectitude of conduct
and principle will come out clear at last, you have shown a remarkable
degree of patience and forbearance.
Not for the purpose of clearing away doubts, for I entertained none,
but for giving me a clearer and more intelligent opinion on the matter,
I am indebted to your "Narrative." Your numerous friends through
the country will rejoice that you have treated the subject so dignifiedly,
so ably, and so clearly. Henceforth to charge you with dereliction of
duty in the campaign of the Shenandoah, will be to stamp upon the
author of the charge, both ignorance and bigotry.
Your obedient servant,
GEORGE
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

R.

SNOWDEN.

p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY

April 24th, 1865.
DEAR GENERAL:

The sad event that has recently transpired, is, I am confident, a sufficient excuse for not replying to your very kind communication before
this. The " Shenandoah Valley Campaign," shall al ways be cherished
by me and mine, and I am ·proud that my General has dedicated so
valuable a work to the men of his command. Their interest in this
case has not been overlooked, and it is, as no doubt you intended it to
be, a beautiful evidence of the simplicity of our noble form of government. Well may the aristocracy of foreign lands fail to understand
that this country can send out general officers and soldiers, who can perform their parts as brave men should, and subsequently return to their
abodes, and continue their civil pursuits, as only those who live under
this great republic know bow to do.
I am, General, your obedient servant,

Lours M.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

CHASTEAU.
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April 26th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have received, through our mutual friend, Mr. Daniel Lammot, Jr.,
of this city, a copy of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah in 1861."
It has been my opinion that great injustice was done you by the
press, and some military men, in regard to your conduct in that campaign, and it needed not an attentive perusal of your "Narrative" to
convince me that my opinion was well-founded.
I believe that a correct judgment will be hereafter pronounced by our
people, so soon as the history of operations in the Valley subsequent to
yours, and a knowledge of the geography of the area of country embraced in your book, are made known to them.
Sincerely wishing you continued health, happiness, and prosperity,
I remain, General, very truly and respectfully,
Your friend,
JOHN R. KENLY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,

Philadelphia, Pa.

Bos'l'ON, April 27th, 1865.

To MAJOR-GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I have had much pleasure in reading your" Campaign
in the Shenandoah," and can easily realize how unpleasantly you have
been situated. Compelled to bear the uncharitable opinions of the public,
who have gotten their information through the medium of the presstoo often partisan-this brief account will do much towards regulating
those opinions.
At the beginning of this war, too much of the political influence that
swayed the masses in civil affairs was incorporated in the army, and
these principles have raised up and crushed down, regardless of merit
and service, while in the place of support and encouragement, not a few
of our civil officers have used their positions to detract from the claims
of those who have come forward to serve their country.
While we trust that some impartial historian of a future generation
will give each " hero of the hour" his true status, placing each name on
the page with the just award of his services, we all pray and labor for
the restoration of our government and country.
I am sir, your obedient servant,
J.B. BROWN.

•

60

APPENDIX.

PHILADELPHIA,

April 28th, 1865.

p ATTERSON.
Sm; I found your "Narrative of the Campaign of 1861 " on
E!Y desk, which I have perused with much pleasure, and thank you for
sending me. I always believed that you had been foully slandered, and
had been basely made the scapegoat to bear the sins of others, whose
senility and imbecility had brought that disgrace on our arms.
The political inquisition of Congress was carried on with all the fairness
and 1·egard for tru,th that adorns the history of ecclesiastical inquisitions
by the disciples of St. Dominic. I now have proof that the opinion I
had formed was correct.
With highest respect and esteem, I am yours truly,
MA.TOR-GENERAL
DEAR

R.

c. GRIER.

MEADVILLE, May

•

MY

4th, 1865 .

Sm:
I received not long since through the post-office "A Narrative of the
Campaign of 1861 in the Valley of the Shenandoah," and judging from
the handwriting on the envelope, I supposed it to have been sent by you.
I read the "Narrative" with more than ordinary interest and attention
to the details of facts it purports to give; and this from the simple consideration that, with the multitude, I have been unfavorably impressed
with the management and results of that campaign. The vindication,
however, of yourself, and of the course pursued by you on that occasion,
is in my judgment most perfectly demonstrated by the "Narrative," and
it was no less due to yourself than it was to the public and the cause of
truth that it should be published as early as it was.
Mr. Greeley's" American Conflict" speaks of that campaign in accordance with the public sentiment of it at the time; but there can be no
doubt that his honesty and candor will prompt him to a cqrrection of the
error, and thus spare a worthy citizen and able commander from the
odium which the present edition of the " Conflict" is well d·esigned to
inflict upon him.
·with- my best wishes for your greatest tranquillity of heart and of
mind, in the declining years of an already protracted and useful life,
I remain your obedient servant,
DEAR

DAVID DERICKSON.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.
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May 4th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I had the honor a short time since of acknowledging
receipt of your " Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah."
Since then I have read it carefully, and now do myself the pleasure of
expressing to you my congratulations on the complete vindication it presents of your official course.
Your book rises however above a mere personal defence. In itself it
forms an interesting and valuable chapter in the history of the "Great
Rebellion," and gives to yourself, and the gallant officers and men under
you, the place they so well deserve in the affections of the republic.
With best wishes for your continued health and happiness,
I remain, yours truly,
·wrLLI.A.M c. BAKER.

ALEXANDRIA, VA.,

May 5th, 1865.

GENERAL:
Permit me to convey to you my sincere thanks for the copy of the
Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah you so
kindly sent me by my esteemed friend, Mrs. Abercrombie.
I have read with no ordinary gratification the details you have presented, the official documents you have published, and the history of
that campaign you have made public.
It seems to me a most triumphant vindication of your administration
of affairs while in command of that department.
But more than that, it adds materially to the history of the times, and
will correct in the minds of many a prejudice that may have been entertained against you.
I am familiar with a portion of the operations under your direction,
through Colonel Seward, with whom I have talked on the subject of
your campaig~, and you may rely that those who served with you bear
testimony in your favor.
Again thanking you for your consideration,
I am, General, with much respect,
Very truly yours,
J. G. c. LEE.
GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

Philadelphia, Pa.
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May 10th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your" Narrative of
the Campaign of 1861 in the Shenandoah Valley."
Its perusal has confirmed the favorable judgment I had previously
formed of your military character and conduct, for the misrepresentations of a party press could not altogether hide the truth from a diligent,
and I may add an unprejudiced, inquirer.
With many thanks for the gift, I remain,
Your obliged and obedient servant,
J. K. ARMSTRONG.
GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

WEST PHILADELPHIA,

May 12th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: I received yesterday the volume on the "Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah," which you did me the honor to send
me, and I beg you to accept my grateful acknowledgments for it.
My knowledge of military matters is, of course, extremely limited,
but I shall embrace the earliest opportunity to read this volume, as relating to an interesting part of the history of our country, and as illustrating your agency and services in the war connected with the existence
of our Union, and in defence of the government of our country, and I
shall ever cherish a grateful sense of your kindness in sending it to me.
I am, with great respect,
Sincerely and truly yours,
ALBERT BARNES.

1226

SPRUCE STREET,

May 13th, 1865.

DEAR Sm:
I thank you for the copy of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley
you have been so kind as to send me, and which only came to my notice
a day or two since.
I have heard from more than one quarter (and that without regard to
the political opinions of the speaker) that it is a most thorough vindication of your military skill, and the gallantry and conduct of your command during the arduous service you were engaged in, and that you
have most completely refuted the slanders of those who, partly no doubt
from ignorance, but chiefly from malevolent feeling, undertook to question your ability.
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I need scarcely add, that while I rejoice you have made this public
exposition of the matter no such proof was needed by me to be satisfied
you had entirely done your duty throughout the whole campajgn.
I remain, very sincerely yours,
GEORGE w. BIDDLE~
GENER.AL ROBERT

p ATTERSON.

WASHINGTON,

D. C., May 15th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have read with much interest and pleasure
your "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861." It is a complete vindi"
cation from the charges so industriously circulated against you soon after
the first Bull Run.
There were other sufficient causes for our defeat without accusing you
of mismanagement.
·
I remain, General,
Very truly yours,

s. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Major-General.

NEW YORK,

May 19th, 1865.

DEAR MAJOR-GENERAL R. p ATTERSON :
Thanks for copy of Shenandoah Campaign. Your argument is clear,
terse, crushing. I wish the defence had as wide a circulation as the
attack.
Republics demand heroes for victims. You were standing on the
doorstep of the war, hence all saw you, and fired without regard to
sense or reason. Away from the country I caught up the cry and called
you traitor. None regret more than I do the cry that went the rounds,
and I am glad to see by your well-written statement that the official
documents jndorse all your positions.
I shall be glad to meet you when again in your city.
Sincerely,
GEO. FRANCIS TRAIN.
May 19th, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm :
I am much obliged by your present of a copy of the" Campaign in
the Shenandoah."
I am very glad you assumed the task of leaving to posterity so clean
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and enduring a monument of your faithful services in the line of duty
and the cause of your country.
With high regard,
STEPHEN BENTON.
To MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT P AT'l'ERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

May 23d, 1865.

Ro BERT PATTERSON~ EsQ.
DEAR Sm: I herewith acknowledge the receipt of your" Narrative
of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861."
Please accept my thanks for your kind remembrance. At an early
date I was placed in a proper knowledge of the facts from a friend who
received his information from General Negley, who had b_een under
your command, since which I have never hesitated to endeavor to correct misrepresentations, when made in my presence . .
You could not be censured by any one but for the general ignorance
of your persecutors of the geography of that part of Virginia, and their
strict adherence to party discipline at the sacrifice of justice, which for
the last few years has been of such vindictive character.
With my best wishes for your good health and happiness, I remain,
Respectfully your friend,
MICHAEL

NEW YORK,

v.

BAKER.

May 24th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have read with much attention and interest
the defensive Narrative of your Campaign in 1861 on the Potomac. It
seems an unanswerable vindication of the able performance of your duty,
and the accomplishment, too, with a force really inadequate, of the object of the government, so long and so far as specifically rnade known to
you. My military opinion is now of no consequence to you. I merely
write to assure you of the sympathy and high regard of an old companion in arms and friend.
P. ST. GEO. COOKE,
Brigadier-General, U.S. A.

HARTFORD,

May 27th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have read your Narrative, and it appears to me to be a complete
vindication of yourself. I thank you for sending me a copy, for it is
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much more agreeable to have a good opinion of those who have been
defenders of our country in her hour of peril, than to suspect them of
being in any degree influenced by unworthy motives.
Trusting that you may receive ample justice, not only in the page Of
history, but during your own lifetime, I have the honor to be, with high
respect,
Your obedient servant,
CHARLES J. HoADLY.
MAJOR-GENERAL

P .A.'rTERSON, Philadelphia.

HEADQUARTERS

u. s.

TROOPS, CITY .A.ND HARBOR,

NEW YoRK, June 2d, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

MY DEAR Srn: I duly received your "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861," and was glad to read a formal and extended narrative
of facts which had before been partially understood by me and by the
public at large. I think "Truth lies hid in a well," General, but it is
pretty certain to be discovered at last. Now that the war is about
. over, people will have the leisure to write and to read the memoirs of
its actors, to sift evidence, and arrive at •just conclusions, and it is evident that you and your command need nothing more.
With many thanks I remain, General,
Yours, most respectfully,
L. c. HUNT,
:Major Fourteenth Infantry, Brigadier-General Volunteers.

LEWISTOWN,

p A., June 2d, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: The notice of your Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley,
as published in the Presbyterian, received to-day, pleased me much, although late, and reminded me of my own negligence in not acknowledging your kind remembrance relative to the copy I received from you, of
the first one thousand published, I suppose.
Your friends in this Juniata County understood the affair very well
immediately after the defeat; officers and men were in it, and with you.
Cameron, to do you justice, would not plant thorns in the pillow of
5
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General Scott! He forgot the wise and appropriate saying, "Let justice be done, &c."
Very truly yours,

E.

PHILADELPHIA,

To

BANKS.

June 10th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENER.AL ROBERT PATTERSON.

Srn: The volume upon the Shenandoah campaign you kindly
sent me about the time of my setting out for the General Assembly, and
I have just found time to finish its perusal.
This volume cannot fail to remove false impressions, so natural in a
time of feverish excitement and profound anxiety. In the cooler moments of the present hour I doubt not there will be every disposition to
see and acknowledge the truth, and to do honor to all the heroic men
who have aided in saving our country from the most formidable insur-_
rection of all history.
Your case seems to be a very clear one. It is amazing that you were
kept in ignorance of the fact that the battle at Manassas had not yet
been fought, when you had every reason to believe that it was triumphantly over.
But the thing is now past, and I trust you may live many years to
enjoy, not only the consciousi1ess of having done your duty, but the
grateful approval of those who through years of misapprehension looked
upon your course with disapproval.
~espectfully and truly yours,
DEAR

w.

NEW

MAJOR-GENERAL

MY

P.

BREED.

YoRK, June 13th, 1865.

p ATTERSON.

Srn: I had the honor some weeks since of receiving your
account of the campaign of 1861.
I did not at the time acknowledge such receipt, as I go every evening
to Tarrytown, some twenty-seven miles from this city. I could only
look at it on my return home at that place.
My nephew, Captain Windle, now living at Tarrytown (and who, I
believe, took you and your command to Mexico when we were at war
with that power), expressed a desire to look at your book, with which I
complied, and I believe it met the usual fate of borrowed books, and
went the rounds of his neighbors. It has now, however, been returned,
and js before me.

\

DEAR
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Your exposition convinces me of what I fully believed to be facts at
the dates referred to, but not being well versed in military or other
strategy, I did not then clearly understand. The truth is, and I so contended at the time, that in the late outbreak our people did not comprehend its enormous proportions, and consequences of the questions involved in it; the would-be statesmen· (but mere politicians), and all men
of single ideas, had not the mental or moral capacity, and the radicals
and fanatics would not comprehend it; true statesmen and patriots at
home and abroad foresaw and lamented the inevitable results of measures tending to such a conflict of arms, and labored in advance to avert
them, but they were powerless, an epidemic, moral or political madness,
ruled the hour, and the devastations inseparable from such an event now
exist, and are being felt throughout the land. God grant that further
a:ffiictions from such a cause may be spared us.
I am greatly obliged to you, my dear sir, for your consideration m
sending me the book referred to; I highly appreciate it.
With great regard, I am, sir,
Your friend and obedient servant,
JOHN BISSELL.

PHILADELPHIA,

June 15th, 1865.

GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I was yesterday the recipient, by your partiality, of your
Shenandoah Campaign of 1861.
I need not tell you how highly I appreciate your favor. "Stand by
the friends of your father" has always been a home motto; I did so, and
I knew I would come out justified. I am more than amazed how you
bore yourself during the time, that apparently you were unarmed. Of
one thing all must give you credit for, if nothing else: prudent silence
until the right time. That time came, and I can exultingly, and with
heartfelt satisfaction, congratulate you upon your complete refutation of
the mean slanders of those who did not dare to meet you openly.
Hoping that your life may be prolonged, and that you may always
deal with your enemies and detractors as you have in time past,
I remain, yours sincerely,

J.
PHILADELPHIA,

L. LUDLOW.

June 19th, 1865.

DEAR Srn:
I am obliged to you for the favor of sending me a copy of your "N arrative," so well written, and issued with so much taste by the printer.
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With regard to myself, however, there was no occasion for any vindication of the sort, as I had no wrong impressions to be removed, even
before I had read it. Every man in public life is a target, and to be
shot at is a certain penalty that he must pay for his notoriety.
All the notices which I have seen of your "Narrative" are favorable,
nor have I met with one disparaging criticism.
."\Vhat a contrast in your position, as well as in your reflections, with
those of many who have taken part in the late unhappy conflict!
May the God of nations cause that this bitter national experience
shall ultimately prove salutary by its severe lessons. And may the
sword hereafter sleep in its scabbard until the day of millennial light
shall have come, when "swords shall be beaten into ploughshares," spears
into pruning-hooks, and men shall love and learn and practice the art of
war no more.
With sincere regard, I am truly yours,
JOSEPH

MINERAL POINT,

MY

DEAR

H.

JONES.

Wis., June 21st, 1865.

Sm:

I thank you for having sent me a copy of your "Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." I have read it
with attention, and have derived much satisfaction from its perusal.
Not that I required this strong testimony as regards the value of your
military services there; my own opinion of these services had been
formed at the time the several occurrences took place, from the accounts
of them as allowed to be published in the newspapers of the day. I had
al ways considered you as an ill-used, wrongly judged, and in fact persecuted officer and patriot.
You have now combined facts and published statements, which altogether form a complete justification of your military conduct in the
campaign of 1861. Such, I believe, will be the public opinion, when it is
unbiased by prejudice and uncontrolled by political hostility; although
justice may be tardy, yet it is sure.
Hitherto you have experienced much injustice, not only from crude
and hastily formed opinions publicly disseminated by partisan writers,
but from studied and intentional attacks made by men high in place
and power, whose ends could only be achieved by assertions of falsehood,
suppressions of truth, and ideal conclusions drawn from a misrepresentation of existing facts. But Truth is the daughter of Time; and although
you may regret that your fellow-citizens have been for a moment (carelessly on their own part, or intentionally by others) led into error in judg-
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ing of your military conduct in the Valley of the Shenandoah, yet your
proud consolation should be found in the reliance that the truth of history will carry down your honorable vindication to future times, when
personal enmity and political persecution shall alike be consigned to deserved oblivion.
With friendship and esteem,
I am your obedient servant,
WILLIAM

R.

SMITH.

To MAJOR-GENERAL RoBERT PATTERSON,
·

Philadelphia.

NEW YoRK, ,June

28th, 1865.

Srn:
A painful and debilitating illness for the last two months has put it
out of my power to send you an earlier acknowledgment of your note
and the Narrative of your Campaign in 1861. Since I have in a measure
recovered my strength, I have read the latter with much interest, and I
beg you to accept my thanks for it, with the assurance that in my bumble
judgment it is a complete vindication of your course, both as it rngards
obedience of orders and the exercise of sound judgment under difficulties
incident to the commencement of war. I have not allowed my mind to
be influenced by public clamor in regard to either men or measures,
during the late rebellion, and in your case it only required a clear statement of the facts to satisfy me on two points, viz., that no blame lay at
your door for our reverses at Bull Bun, and where any blame (so far as
your conduct is involved) really does lie for that day's disaster. On this
latter point it would not become me to say more, so again thanking you
for the honor you have done me in specially submitting the "Narrative"
to my perusal, I beg leave to subscribe myself, with sincere respect and
esteem,
Your friend, &c.,
DEAR

R.

EMMET.

MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA, June

29th, 1865.

p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: I thank you for copy of" The Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." I shall read it with pleasure. I am happy to
say our late President Lincoln named to a personal friend he considered
you had been unjustly censured by the growlers, but that he had always
MAJOR-GENERAL
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had the fullest confidence in you, and that, in his opinion, you had done
all that man could do; for myself, I have only had one opinion, that
is, no one under the circumstances could have done better.
Very truly yours, &c.,
A. R. McHENRY.

WEST POINT,

N. Y., July 2d, 1865.

l\1y DEAR Sm:
I received your "Narrative of the Shenandoah Campaign," and have
carefully perused it. I was aware of all the prominent points you make
before, having heard them from Generals Porter and Newton. Hoping
at this late day the country will award you the credit that has always
been conceded by officers who knew your situation, I will thank you for
your attention in sending me your book.
I remain, General,
Very respectfulLy, your obedient servant,
J. B. CAMPBELL,
Captain U. S. A.

629

WALNUT STREET,

July 3d, 1865.

GENERAL:
Permit me to thank you for your lucid and brilliant account of the
campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861.
It is beyond all doubt an irrefragable refutation of all that has or can
he said as to your course and strategical movements; and if political
motives and other influences had not been exercise<l, as I believe, to your
prejudice, the lines of circumvallation would have inevitably been drawn
around the foe.
I am truly yours,
LUCAS HIRST.
GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON.

Co.,
July 12th, 1865.

EMPIRE RANCH, YuBA

CAL.,

GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: Your favor, together with your pamphlet, has come to
hand. I have looked over your defence, carefully examining every
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order, and feel proud that you have so nobly sustained yourself, and the
impartial historian must do you justice. I have placed the work in the
hands of some of our most radical men, those who were the firmest in
denouncing you; their mouths are now completely closed.
General, I expect to visit Philadelphia during the next year, when I
shall call on you, for it will be such a relief to me to shake the hand of
one of my old townsmen, who has been so vilely abused, a.nd came out
of the fire so pure as you have done. Excuse the familiarity of a
stranger to you, but my heart is in the matter and I must express my
feelings.
With many prayers for your future success,
I hope to ever remain your admiring friend,
LYMAN ACKLEY.
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,

Philadelphia.

PHILADELPHIA,

July 14th, 1865.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm : Please accept my thanks for the copy of your " N arrati ve of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," kindly
sent to me a few days since. I have read the same with much interest.
But clear and strong as this narrative is in your vindication as the commander of the Army of the Shenandoah, I must be permitted to say it
was not needed for your .complete vindication. Time and the progress
of events had, in the judgment of all impartial men, already vindicated
you from charges which were originated and fostered to screen others.
You have suffered great injustice, but the liability to such treatment,
for a time at least, must be incurred by all who assume great responsibilities.
With great respect,
Your friend and obedient servant,
H. R. LINDERMAN.

204

SOUTH FIFTH STREET,
PHILADELPHIA,

July 22d, 1865.

MY DEAR Sm:
Absence from the city has prevented me from earlier acknow I edging
the compliment you have been so kind as to pay me in sending me a
copy of your most interesting book on the "Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah."
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I am greatly obliged to you for it, and consider that you have completely vindicated yourself against the assaults of your enemies, and
wost successfully justified your whole course in that memorable military
era of 1861.
I am very faithfully and truly yours,
JAMES H. HORN.
MAJOR-GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA,

July 24th, 1865.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: Better late than never. I ought long since thankfully to
have acknowledged your kindness in sending for Mrs. Harris, as well as
for myself, a copy of your " Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." I waited long in expectation of an opportunity of thanking
you m person.
It gives me much pleasure to say to you that I consider the book a
complete vindication of your conduct as a military man, during that
trying period in our struggle for the preservation of our nationality.
I was the more willing to arrive at this conclusion from a consideration of the kindly terms in which you spoke of our then revered, but no~
. lamented, President, Abraham Lincoln.
Your obedient servant,
JORN HARRIS.

HILLSBOROUGH,

N.

H.,

July 25th, 1865.

l\1y DEAR GENERAL:

I can hardly find words to express the pleasure I have had in reading
your triumphant defence, contained in the pamphlet entitled "The
. Shenandoah Valley," and which some kind friend sent me. You were
to have been sacrificed to shield the blunders of General Scott and others,
3ind he could have the audacity to indorse the attempt in his autobiography! I can have no patience with the vain old man. His vanity in his
old age may b.e excused, but his studied misrepresentations can have no
excuse. He has ever been unjust to his officers. He never has reported
the doings of his brigade at the battle of" Lundy's Lane," and assumed
all the credit of the same in that action, treating his under officers,
Leavenworth, Brady, Jessup, and McNeil with the greatest injustice,
and now they are dead, in his autobiography he assumes to himself acts
performed by them at "Chippewa" and" Lundy's Lane," even to the
giving of certain orders, given by McNeil alone when Scott was in
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another part of the field, but which contributed largely to the victory at
Chippewa. At that time, in the flush of victory, he spoke of the gallantry of l\foN eil's movement to his staff, and complimented his bravery
in his report; but now he is dead he takes the credit of the affair to himself, thus taking from the fame of a brave man and misrepresenting history.
In your case, thanks to the telegraph and your own patriotic efforts
and just action, you have the means of setting yourself right before the
public, and have used them most adroitly. General Scott, Messrs. Covode and Gooch must wince under your exposure of their duplicity and
misrepresentation like so many patients of a skilful physician under the
application of a blister or cauterization. They deserve it; I hope they
may benefit by the application.
I have "noticed" the pamphlet in The New Hampshire Journal of
.Agricultiire, which I edit, and inclose a copy to you. It will meet the
eyes of fifty thousand readers, and I hope will open them so much that
they may see that injustice has been done to a meritorious officer of the
Union army.
Yours respectfully,
GENERAL RommT PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa.

c. E. POTTER.

TRENTON, N. J., July 27th, 1865.
GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON.

Srn: I am much indebted to you for a copy of your very full
and complete defence of the part taken by you and your command in
the Shenandoah campaign of 1861. It must be perfectly convincing to
any unprejudiced mind, while all will unite in commending the patriotic
motives which controlled your conduct, in quietly submitting to unjust
censure until such time as the interests of the country could no way be
affected by an exposition of the truth.
The tender regard I ever felt for your son, in return for wonderful
kindness and courtesy on his part, has made me feel an unusual interest
in your reputation, which is now so clearly vindicated.
Very tmly yours,
DEAR

CALDWELL

K.

HALL.
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PHILADELPHIA,

July 31st, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
My DEAR SIR: I thank you for the little volume you sent me, in
regard to the" Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861."
It is my duty as a gentleman to say, that your simple, modest "Narrative," backed by official statements, and reliable military te:Stimorry,
appears to me to be conclusive as to the facts therein recited.
I never believed for a moment the absurd accusations against you of
cowardice and treachery; and I am extremely glad to express my conviction that your whole course at that critical and anxious time was such,
as m1der other circumstances, would have won for you the laurels you
deserved, as a brave, skilful, and cautious leader.
With great respect I am, yours truly,
EDW. MILLER.

GETTYSBURG, PA.,

August 13th, 1865.

MY DEAR COLONEL:
Until to-day I have not had leisure to read the "Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah."
I have gone through it with care, and it has impressed me as very
clear, direct, and conclusive. I never read the testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, or that part of the report. I
remember Mr. Blair's remarks in the House, though not the special
details of it. The "Narrative" has refreshed my memory, and brought
all the facts distinctly before me.
I do not see how any one can fail to reach the conclusion of that
eminently just man, President Lincoln, whose testi~ony was so frankly
given.
I am glad to have been able to obtain an insight into the movements
of that campaign; and your brother deserves the thanks of the truthloving public for preparing this work so well, as well as the congratulations of the same class, for the handsome manner of his vindication.
There is no danger of further question respecting the efficiency of his
services.
With great respect, I am, very truly yours,
EDw. McPHERSON.
COLONEL

W.

C.

p ATTERSON.
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514
DEAR

WALNUT STREET,

August 4th, 1865.

Sm:

I received this morning a copy of "The Shenandoah Valley Campaign," for which I thank you. I had previously read the work with
much interest. The copy which you sent to my father reached him at
a time when he was prevented by illness (still continuing), from reading
anything. He expressed his pleasure on receiving it, and remarked to
me that he believed that you had been unjustly treated with regard to
that campaign.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
To

vvrLLIAM

DuANE.

GnNERAL RoBERT PATTERSON.

August 4tb, 1865.

1v.fy DEAR GENERAL:
Within a week I have found leisure to read carefully your "Valley
Campaign." You seem to me to have made out a case so perfect as to
be beyond cavil ; in fact I believe it has remained unanswered-nor do
I see how a reply ever can be made. My own opinion is of so little
value that it would be scarcely worth while to state it, were it not that
the book itself seems to be an appeal to the great jury of general public
opm10n.
I have the honor to remain, with great respect and esteem,
Very sincerely yours,
S. WEIR MITCHELL.
GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

CoL UMBIA HALI,, NEW LEBANON SPRINGS,
COLUMBIA

Co., N. Y., August 10th, 1865.

1v.fy DEAR GENERAL:
Several weeks ago I sent your " Narrative of the Campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley in 1861," to the binders. It was returned in handsome shape, and reached me a week since at this place, where I am
passing the summer. I have lent the book to a number of persons in
the hotel, and in every instance it has made a most favorable impression.
It seems to me that you have succeeded in showing most conclusively
that the blame did not belong to you.
I am, with entire sincerity, your friend,
JORN MEREDITH REED, JR.
GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON'

Philade1 pbia.
I
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NEW ORLEANS,

August 10th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

GENERAL: I have had the honor to receive from you recently a copy
of your volume on the campaign of the troops under your command in
the Valley of the Shenandoah.
I beg leave to return you my sincere thanks for this compliment. I
have looked carefully over the "Narrative" and proofs, and have found
in them, what in my judgment is a complete vindication of your
patriotism, skill, and honor; to all of which I am sure your countrymen will not fail to do justice.
I am with great respect,
Your most obedient servant,
THOMAS J. DURANT.

510 W .A.LNUT

STREET,

August 11th, 1865.

GENERAL p ATTERSON:
DEAR Sm: I received yesterday a copy of the "Narrative" of your
campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, for which I beg you to
accept my sincere thanks. I had already borrowed and read the book,
and am very glad to own it, as well as much gratified by the compliment.
When the bitterness of party rancor dies away, and facts are viewed
in fhe light of history, the one, that you were, as you assert and demonstrate, hampered with restrictions, left with inadequate forces, and then
burdened with the responsibility of a catastronhe, which you were rendered powerless to prevent, will be very prominent.
The defeat at Bull Run was caused by the impatience of the politicians at Washington, and they ungenerously endeavored to transfor the
blame.
Another fact will show why you were singled out. Whatever else
may be said, no one can charge you with having lost a battle, or your
supplies. Your successor, General Banks, who earned for himself the
soubriquet of" Stonewall Jackson's Commissary," was not only retained
in command in the Shenandoah Valley, after repeated defeats, but sent
to the Southwest, where he again signalized himself in the same manner,
and is yet in command at New Orleans.
To be perfectly frank, and to express an opinion by no means confined
to myself, or to any small number, your Democracy was in fault, not
your strategy, and the time will come, when both will be amply vindicated.
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It is very strange that Philadelphians should be so ready to abandon
the defence of two of their fellow-citizens, who have done so much to
enhance their municipal reputation. That you and General McClellan
are under no ban but that of a party, which is of its own nature
ephemeral.
I ha.d no intention qf inflicting upon you so long a letter of thanks,
but I have been led away by the subject.
My hand is quite tremulous, as I am just recovering from severe sickness, but I was unwilling to appear even insensible to your kind remembrance by delaying my very cordial acknowledgments.
I am, dear sir,
Very respectfully and sincerely yours,
c. w. LITTELL.

BALTIMORE,

August 16th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
GENERAL: lam very much obliged for your kindness in sending me,
through our friend Lieutenant-Colonel Etting, a copy of your " Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." I had already read it, but was
very anxious to possess a copy in my library, and am therefore much
flattered by your personal gift of the volume.
The future historian of this war will be largely indebted to you for the
valuable materials you supply, and especially for those private details
and motives, which rest only in the memories of the chiefs, who perform
the chief parts in these great national events.
This extremely interesting memoir will place the campaign in its true
historical aspect before the world, and add to the well-deserved fame you
have so long enjoyed.
I am, General, with great respect,
Yours truly,
BRANTZ MA YER.

425

FRANKLIN STREET,

August 23d, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
You will please accept my kind regards, for placing me in possession
of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah."
It fully vindicates and justifies the course pursued by you upon that
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occasion, and places those who were disposed to reflect upon your action
hors de combat.
I have the honor of remaining very truly yours,
w. H. KEICHLINE.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A.,

]_\fay 12th, 1865.

GENERAL:
I have read with great interest and much care your late work entitled
"AN arrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861,"
and permit me to say that, in my judgment, a more complete vindication
of your whole conduct, under circumstances which at times were very
trying, if not exceedingly annoying, could not have been compiled.
No reflecting or unprejudiced mind could expect or desire .a more
lucid or comprehensive history of your honorable service, and that of
your gallant command.
I congratulate you, General, in having so thoroughly and successfully
refuted every attempt to disparage your judgment, courage, and ability
as an officer.
I am, with high regard,
Your friend and obedient servant,
P. c. ELLMAKER.
:M.A.JOR-GENERA.L

R. p ATTERSON.

1200

w .A.LNUT STREET'

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A.,

March 10th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENER.AL p ATTERSON.
lVIY DEAR Sm: I hasten to acknowledge and thank you for the copy
of the "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah,"
which I received from you a. day or two since. I have read it with much
interest and pleasure, and feel assured that no impartial mind can (after
a perusal of its contents) arrive at any other conclusion than that so
forcibly expressed by Major-General G. H. Thomas, in his letter addressed to you, dated before Atlanta, Ga., August 8th, 1864, viz.: "I have
always believed, and have frequently so expressed myself, that your
management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious, and
was to the best interests of the service, considering the means at your
disposal,- and the nature of the troops under your command." This
opinjon, from an officer who has made his name illustrious by heroic
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patriotism, great generalship, and pre-eminent purity of character, who
at Chickamauga saved the army of the Cumberland, and at Franklin
and Nash ville gave the finishing blows to the Confederate army of the
West, and established his reputation as one of the world's great soldiers,
sh~uld be authority on a military subject, especially as he was actively
engaged in the campaign of which he writes.
I am reminded, in reading your letter to Governor Curtin, requesting
an increase of the force under your command, of a conversation I had the
honor of having with you a few days after President Lincoln's first call
for seventy-five thousand troops. You then remarked, "that the men
called out should be used solely for the defence of the National Capital
and for guarding our borders, and that a call should be made without
delay for four hundred thousand men, who should be well officered and
placed in camps of instruction, ready to take the offensive in Sep tern her
or October. With such a force at our command, a quick and decisive
campaign would follow, ending the so-called Confederacy, and restoring
the supremacy of the National Government." At the time I confess I
thought your estimate of the number of men required too high; after
events have, however, established the correctness of the vim.vs you entertained at that early day.
In conclusion, my dear General, permit me to congratulate you on the
complete refutation your book contains, of the unjust and bitter charges
made against your patriotism and ability, by many from ignorance of the
facts, by others from motives entirely beneath the manhood of our
country, and the age we live in.
Your" Narrative" will be an important chapter in the history of the
last four memorable years, and will contain in itself not only a complete
vindication against calumnies, but establish for yourself and the gallant
men who served under you, a just claim upon the love and gratitude of
your countrymen.
vVith much respect, I am,
Truly yours,
A. LOUDON SNOWDEN.

THIRTEENTH AND

W .ALNUT

STREETS,

February 16th, 1865.

Mr. "\Vhite presents his thanks to General Patterson for the copy of
his "Nanative" which he kindly sent him, and will ever prize it, both
on account of its being a complete vindication of unjust charges and of
being the author's gift.
To MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.
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N. J., March 24th, 1865.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

GENERAL: I rise from a very careful reading of your" Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," with the smne
conclusion so tersely and well expressed by his Excellency President Lincoln, and by the light of more than twenty-five years' experience and
active service in the United States .Army, am unable to see that you
could have done (as a good and intelligent commander), anything else
than you <lid do; your hands were tied by the orders of your superior
officer, you obeyed those orders and did your duty.
With great respect,
I am your obedient servant,

c. F. RUFF,
Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A.

FREEHOLD,

May 1st, 1865.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I have just finished reading the pamphlet you had the
kindness to send me. I have perused it with much interest, and am glad
to find that your conduct is so cordially approved by so many of your
fellow-officers, and I greatly regret that any officer who has so faithfully
and ably served his country, should be so driven to vindicate his own
honor and character.
The correspondents of the daily papers are chiefly to blame. The
Congressional Committee did you great injustice, in not permitting you to
exculpate yourself at that time, but I think you can safely fall back on
your honorable discharge by the War Department, and rely upon that
alone as a complete justification of your conduct.
With kind regards, I remain,
Yours truly,
.A. C. McLEAN.
Thursday, July, 1865.

GENERAL PATTERSON, .
Locust Street.

MY DEAR Sm: I have to thank you for a copy of your" Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which I :received this morning. I have read it very attentively and with much interest. It is written with great clearness, and the facts are stated with
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such admirable order and sequence of arrangement, that non-professional
.
readers may easily comprehend all the details.
As an historical narrative, the publi~ation is fraught with great interest, and bearing as it does on th.e early incidents qf the war, its value
will be recognjzed in years to come. As an argument it is cogent and
irresistible. As a justification of your conduct it is ample and satisfactory, as it is eloquent and free from asperity.
The long-suffering and patience, under misrepresentation and malevolent feelings engendered by ignorance and partisanship, which you have
displayed, are as conspicuous in these pages as they have been in your
personal deportment, since the unreasoning and uncandid traducers who
have accused you commenced their unjust career.
I am happy in being able to state to you, that I have ample reason to
believe that ·wherever your "Narrative" has been read in the army, it
has carried conviction to every mind of those officers, whose position enabled them to form a judgment respecting the duties of a General, in·
vested with the responsibilities of command.
Under these circumstances, I feel much gratified at the thought, that I
had the honor to be the first person, I believe, in the country whose writings as editorials in a widely circulated daily paper, attempted to do you
justice, and to stem the current of prejudiced opposition, ~hich for a time
threatened to carry everything headlong before it.
I am, my dear sir,
Most truly yours,

WM.

PHILADELPHIA,

MY

BLACKWOOD.

July 15th, 1865.

Sm:
Please accept my hearty thanks for yovr "Narrative of the Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which you have kindly sent
to me.
Interesting in its subject, your production has in addition to that fortunate element, the rare merit of being well and fairly written. And it
has done more than is often accomplished by authors,-it has silenced the
tongue of slander.
Permit me to compliment you upon an unusual success, and to subscribe myself,
Very respectfully,
Your obliged friend,
DEAR

TOWNSEND WARD.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON.
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ST. Lou1s, August 25th, 1865.
DEAR

Sm:

I have to thank you very sincerely for the copy sent me of your
"Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," which
I have read most carefully and with the greatest interest. I cannot but
regard it as a complete and altogether satisfactory vindication of your
conduct of that campaign. Allow me to add, however, that, having
read at the time your speech in Philadelphia on the same subject some
two years ago, I was then convinced that you had been shamefully
maligned for the results of that campaign, results for which you could
not in fairness be held responsible, so that I was consequently well disposed to receive favorably the more full and complete justification of
yourself, which the present "Narrative" contains.
Again thanking you for your kind favor, I remain, dear sir,
Very respectfully and truly,
Your obliged and obedient,
L. J. CrsT.
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Phi lad el phia.

PHIL.ADELPHI.A, August 25th, 1865.

MY

DEAR GENERAL:

I thank you for the interesting "Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah," which you have kindly sent me.
Absence from the city during the past month prevented that careful
perusal of the book which latterly I have been enabled to give, and I
must congratulate you on the complete vindication of your military fame
which the Narrative supplies.
I have known you intimately for upwards of thirty years, and never
had the slightest doubt of your exalted patriotism and military capacity.
Had such doubt existed, the present publication would effectually remove
it, feeling, as I do, that the testimony now presented by you silences at
once and forever the malignant slanderers of your military fame.
Very respectfully and truly,
Your friend,
DANL. P. BussrnR.
GENER.AL R. P .ATTERSON, Philadelphia.
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September 14th, 1865.

PHILADELPHIA,

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I am greatly obliged to you for your kindness in sending
me a copy of your book, detailing the acts of the army while under
your command, during the campaign of 1861.
I have been extremely gratified in the reading, the more so, as it conclusively proves beyond cavil all that I previously believed to be the
facts of the case.
A candid perusal must convince even the most prejudiced, that you
have been most unjustly dealt with. However, history will settle yours,
with other cases. The wheat will be garnered and the chaff blown away.
With great respect, I subscribe myself,
Your obedient servant,
P. F. ROTHERMEL.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE,

N ASHVfLLE,

TENN.,

September 26th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR Srn: Your favor of August 30th has been received, as
also the presentation copy of a "Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah in the Summer of 1861," for which please
accept my thanks, and for the copies sent the other members of the
staff. I am delegated by them to return their thanks.
I have read the book with much pleasure and satisfaction to myself,
because it so clearly and satisfactorily puts to rest the uncharitable misstatements made by the newspaper press, subsequent to the first battle of
Bull Run, and at the same time presenting a truthful and deeply interesting account of the early operations of the war.
With kindest regards, and wishes for your enjoyment of good health,
I am, Sir, with much respect, very truly,
Your obedient servant,
ROBERT H. RAMSEY,
Colonel and A. A. G.

1112

WALNUT STREET,

September 5th, 1865.

DEAR Sm:
On my recent return to the city, after several weeks' absence, I found
on my table your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah," forwarded to me with your compliments.
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In acknowledging your very polite attention, permit me to say, that
I had read it several weeks since, in the house of a friend, and was most
favorably impressed with the statements presented. Since then, in
numerous instances, I have heard warm opinions in your favor, and do
not doubt that history will do you ample justice.
Very respectfully and truly yours,
HENRY H. SMITH.
MAJOR-GENER.AL

R.

PATTERSON.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE,
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
NASHVILLE, TENN.,

Sept. 26th, 1865.

GENERAL:

I have just read the "Narrative" of your campaign against Johnston, which you were so kind as to send me ; and must say that I think
it is a complete vindication of your operations. It seems to me, if they
expected you to hold Johnston at Winchester, they should have given
you at least as many men and guns as he had, or else drawn you to a
point where you could have reinforced McDowell as soon as Johnston
could have reinforced Beauregard.
Very truly and respectfully yours,
J. L. DONALDSON,
Brevet Major-General, &c.
GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

Phil ad el phia.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE,
MuRFREES:SORo', TENN.,

MY

September 3d, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

I have received the "Shenandoah Campaign of 1861," for which I
am indebted to your kind remembrance. Having been well acquainted
with many of the officers of your staff, I long since had an inside view
of your campaign, and I have often thought how magnanimous, how
self-sacrificing you were to allow yourself to be vilified and abused by
the press, when a statement of the case before an impartial public would
have relieved you, and placed the blame for failure, if any, upon others,
upon whom it naturally fell.
Knowing the facts, I have often defended you, and now that you have
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made your connection with that army public, I hope justice will be done
you, as it doubtless will.
Thanking you kindly for your remembrance of me,
I am, dear General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. w. JOHNSON,
Brevet Major-General.

o,

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
DEPARTMENT

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,

NORMAL SCHOOL, TRENTON, September

2d,

1865.

DEAR GENERAL:
I have at length found the time to read your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah," and I hasten to thank you most cordially for
the opportunity you have given me of correcting the erroneous opinions,
which I am free to say I had formed on that subject. Like thousands
of others, who had no special means of information, I had been misled
by the newspaper accounts, and never until now have I had any clear
apprehension of the true state of the facts. You have done but a sheer
act of justice, not only to yourself, but to the truth of history, in publishing this clear, calm, and decisive statement.
I do not see how any one, with a particle of candor, can read attentively the official correspondence here given, without exonerating you
entirely from censure for your share in the work of that campaign. Nor
is it every one who, out of patriotic regard for the exigencies of the
public service, would have had the magnanimity to wait so long and so
patiently as you have done, under such a weight of obloquy as you have
borne, having all the while in his possession the means of so completely
vindicating his good name.
I thank you once more, most sincerely, for the pleasure and satisfaction your book has given me.
Most respectfully and truly yours,
JOHN s. HART.
To MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DrvISION OF THE TENNESSE.If,
OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY OF MUSTERS,
NASHVILLE, TENN., October 14th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: It is with great pleasure I acknowledge the receipt from
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you, of your little volume, entitled the "Shenandoah Valley Campaign
of 1861." I had previously read the book, having sent to your and my
friend, and my old company commander, Captain Thomas P. Parry, of
the "Washington Grays," for it.
After looking up to you as my respected and revered chief, through
seven years of my connection with the "V{ ashington Grays" of Philadelphia, and knowing through my friends in Philadelphia the real history of your campaign, it has been a sore trial to me, during four years'
service in this military department, among those who were prejudiced
by false statements of the public press, to hear you slandered. I have
stood alone on many occasions as your defender, among my companions
when the subject has been discussed, and I must now congratulate you
upoi+ the success your book has proved; many officers with whom I have
contended have hastened to admit to me their error since its appearance,
and now no one is heard to say aught against you, but on the contrary
your forbearance elicits admiration.
The receipt of your autograph, forwarding the book, I hope warrants
me in taking the liberty of adding my personal congratulations, especially
as I sat some years near you in Dr. Boardman's church, accustomed to
look upon .you almost as an acquaintance, and having originally entered
the United States service as a private in the regiment led by your
lamented son Frank, my personal friend.
It bas been my fortune to have served on the staff of two of your
firm friends, through good and evil report; first with Major-General
Negley, and then with Major-General Thomas, .and with the latter I now
have the honor of serving.
Permit me, General, to subscribe myself,
Very truly your sincere friend,
ALFRED

L. HOUGH,

Capt. 19th U. S. Inf., and Brevet Major U.S. A.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

RECRUITING RENDEZVOUS,
DAYTON,

MY

OHIO, October 20th, 1865.

DEAR GENERAL.

Yours of the 17th inst. I have just received; also of 29th ult. came
duly to hand, and your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah
Valley" I have received, and carefully and with great interest read it
over, and in my humble opinion your reputation as a military commander
is yet untarnished before the Americ~n people, notwithstanding you had
to answer for the sins or blunde1· of others at that time. From the

LETTERS FROM DISTINGUISHED MEN.

87

many statements of general officers, and your correspondence contained
therein, it is clearly shown you did all that could have been done, and
it was a very great piece of injustice to charge you with the failure of a
campaign that took place in another section of the country, and over
which you had no control. History will yet put this matter in its proper
light before the country, and lay the charge at the door of those to whom
it properly belongs.
I am, my dear General,
Very truly yours,
ROBERT NUGENT,
Brevet Colonel U. S. A.

M.AJOR-G EN ER.AL R. p .ATTERSON'
Philadelphia.

liE.ADQU.ARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE,
N .ASHVILLE, November 11th, 1865.
GENERAL:

A chance copy of your memoir of the Shenandoah Campaign fell in
my way some· time since, and after an interesting perusal of part of it,
was returned to the owner before I could have time to finish ·it. All endeavors since have failed to find a copy at any of the bookstores, and I
do not know the publishers.
I write to express my personal interest in your effort to wipe out an
injustice done you, and which you have exhibited much long-suffering
patience in bearing for the sake of the cause, and to ask you to do me
the kindness to send me a copy of the work, should you chance to have
one left.
I only feel at liberty thus to trouble you, General, from the fact that
finding no copies on sale, I infer it was printed for private distribution.
With kind remembrances to your son, should he chance to be with
you, and high regard for yourself,
Believe me, General,
Yours truly and respectfully,
LEWIS MERRILL,
Col. U. S. Vols., and Brevet. Lt.-Col. U. S. A.

To M .A.JOR-GENER.AL

P A'rTERSON.

PHIL.ADELPHI.A, December 30th, 1865.
DEAR GENERAL:

I duly received some months since, the "Narrative of the Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," for which I am very much
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obliged to you, and request that you excuse the delay in my acknowledging it, which has arisen from its being overlooked.
Knowing personally some of the gentlemen who served under you, and
having learned from them some of the facts connected with that cam. paign, I was fully prepared for the complete vindication of yourself
(which you have so clearly made out in the "Narrative"), whenever you
might see fit to bring the facts before the public. Your delay in doing
' so, for the reasons stated, would not have been considered, but by a true
patriot.
Wishing you, my dear General, a happy New Year, and hoping that
you will long be spared to receive the grateful acknowledgments of your
countrymen,
I remain very truly yours,
ALFRED D. JESSUP.
To MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

1125 GIRARD STREET, December 8th, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR GENERAL : I have to thank you for a copy of your " Narrative
of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which I
have read with much interest.
The "Narrative" establishes beyond question, that you did everything
in your power, with the force under your command, to carry out the
orders and instructions controlling your movements.
Very truly yours,
A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General.

11..,RANKFORD ARSENAL'
PHILADELPHIA, PA., December 18th, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I have read with great interest your "Narrative of the Campaign in
the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which is, in my judgment, a
complete vindication of your course in that campaign.
1st. Johnston, in his report, says: that in Winchester "the army was
in position to oppose either McClellan from the west, Patterson from the
northeast, and to form a junction with Beauregard when necessary."
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His object then was, to hold you beyond Winchester, and be himself
free to move on Manassas "when necessary." Being in a false position
at Martinsburg, you could not force him to accept battle, nor to remain
quiescent at Winchester, and he knew it.
2d. It is a curious and important fact that on the 18th, the affair at
Blackburn's Ford took place, giving evidence of an approaching conflict, and that on the instant Johnston started in hot haste to join Beauregard. Had you remained in full force at Bunker Hill, or offered
battle, or attempted a flank movement by your left, he could have
avoided battle, and led you only so much farther from your base and
endangering your long communicatjons. He staid at Winchester until
either you made a move to join McDowell, or Beauregard required his
presence at Manassas. You had not the force nor the strategic position
to prevent his doing so at his pleasure.
3d. The great error committed was in not transferring your army to
Leesburg, as recommended by you on the 21st of June. As it was you
were acting on exterior lines, and Beauregard and Johnston could have
concentrated against you (as they did at Bull Run), without the possibility of receiving any aesistance from McDowell. You were certainly
not responsible, as you acted under instructions, and, indeed, made the
recommendation, which, if approved, would have entirely changed the
condition of things in that field of operations.
Believe me, dear General,
Yours very truly,
s. v. BENET,
Brevet Lt.-Col. and Captain of Ordnance.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

Philadelphia.

ST. Lours, .January 23d, 1866.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

MY DEAR Srn: I had the honor some weeks ago, to receive a pamphlet from you, containing a Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of
the Shenandoah in the Summer of 1861, preceding the battle of Bull
Run. I read it with exceeding interest, and comparing the details with
what I already knew of the history of that period, I remained convinced
of the sufficiency of your vindication; I say, I remained convinced: for
indeed, I did not need this Narrative to convince me that you had done
everything in your power to secure the success of the campaign, and
that no fair-minded man dreamed of imputing to you the disasters that
then attended our arms. · The necessary severity with whic~ you repelled
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the reflections of Lieutenant-General Scott forms the best part of your
pamphlet, in one sense. There are many who, hearing that he condemned you, would seek .no further for proof or argument. You acted
wisely then in demonstrating that his strictures upon your conduct were,
to speak of them with all possible indulgence, utterly withoid foundation.
This, in my opinion, you have done triumphantly. My respect for the
services which General Scott had rendered to the country, made me
regret that the claims of justice required that this exposure should be
so unsparing.
I am, with very great respect and regard,
Your friend and obedient servant,
THOS. T. GANTT.

ST. Lours, January 6th, 1866.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR SrR: Your kind letter of the 1st, with the " Shenandoah
., Valley Campaign of 1861," was received on the 4th. I have looked
over the latter with much interest; because of my old friendship, and of
the "criticisms" to which I knew you had been subject. From my earliest recollections of Philadelphia (now thirty-six years) I had regarded
you as by nature a military man, and when the rebellion broke out,
was glad to see you,, as I have steadily been, on the side of the Union
and Constitution. I am no military man, but know enough to know
that, when a subordinate obeys orders strictly, he is not accountable
(or rather should not be) if he is not at more than one place at the same
moment. It seems to me you did obey orders, and therefore stand acquitted for the disaster alluded to. The fact is, I looked for disasters tu
our army at the beginning, for the reason that our side was made up of
fresh volunteers, and had to learn how to fight. The Southern people
knew more about the business, and were more rash and impulsive. It
was natural that they should whip us at the start, but quite as natural
(and this I always contended for) that they were not so long-winded, and
hadn't the numbers, or the gift of strategy, as well as "our folks." I
rejoice that the war is over, that the States remain intact, and trust every
man will "strive for the things that make for peace," that we will have
a real Union of hearts and hands, and let " bygones be bygones." There
is no use stirring up the old embers. With my best wishes for your
health and long life, and great peace of mind,
I remain as ever, your friend,
EDWARD M. SAMUEL.
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FORT ONTARIO, OSWEGO,

N. Y.,

January 10th, 1866.
SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the "Campaign in the Shenandoah," received through the politeness of General
Abercrombie. I am pleased to learn the truth in regard to that campaign, as the newspaper accounts published at the time had given me an
incorrect idea of it.
The account you give, backed by the copies of the orders and correspondence, certainly justifies your conduct throughout the campaign.
The patriotism you di8played, in not publishing this book at the time
your honor was questioned, all military men can appreciate, though fow
would have the self-control to imitate it.
Very respectfully,

c. H.

CARLTON,

Captain Fourth Infantry.

To

GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

Philade1 phia.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 9th, 1866.

Srn:
I am exceedingly obliged to you for your kindness in sending me your
account of the "Valley Campaign of 1861." I have always regarded
the outcry about the campaign in that locality as due to. ignorance on
the part of the public, then uninstructed as to true military principles,
and to no fault on the part of· the commander. Your book is very acceptable, and I am obliged for the attention.
'Vith great respect, I am yours truly,

DEAR

CECIL CLAY.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

MANCHESTER,

N. H., February 24th, 1866.

DEAR SIR:

I thank you for a copy of General Patterson's report of his operations
in 1861. I read carefully the reports of the time, and was never able to
see that General Patterson was deserving of censure. It was not in his
power to prevent the misfortunes resulting from inexperience and the
mad pressure at Washington for a forward movement. Somebody has
to be made the scapegoat in every such case. It was very convenient to
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throw on General Patterson the blame, which really belonged in higher
quarters.
Very respectfully yours, &c., ·
SAML. D. BELL ..
HoN.

S. J.

RANDALL.

PHIL.A.DELPHIA, March 8th,

1866.

DEAR Sm:
I have received and read with great pleasure, your "Narrative of the
Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861."
Permit me, General, to say that whilst this work completely vindicates
the official administration of the Major-General commanding the Department of Pennsylvania during the period in question, it adds another
laurel leaf to the chaplet he has so long and so deservedly worn.
As a contribution to the early history of the war, it is inyaluable.
Thanking you for your kind remembrance in sending me the copy, I
am, my dear General, with sentiments of profound respect,
Your obedient servant,
SAML. B. WYLIE MITCHELL.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R.

PATTERSON,

1300 Locust Street.

No. 530 W .A.LNUT STREET, March 24th, 1866.
DEAR Sm:
I have received to-day a copy of your "Narrative of the Campaign of
1861 in the Shenandoah Valley," for which I beg you will accept ·my
thanks.
I have already read it, and have always considered it an entire vindication, if you will allow me to use the expression, of the course pursued
by you at that momentous time.
Very respectfully yours,

HENRY WHARTON.
MAJOR-GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA, March 7th,

1866.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.
MY DEAR GENERAL: I have thanked you in person for your kind
remembrance of me, in the presentation of your much-valued Narrative,
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"The Campaign of the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," and having
perused it carefully, I feel as though something more on my part is
due you.
I congratulate you on your perfect vindication therein made. It is
conclusive, and so judged by all officers whom I have heard speak of it.
At a later date in the rebellion, it was my province to be much over
the Shenandoah Valley under the gallant General Shields, my regiment
forming part of his division. After the first battle of ~Vinchester, I was
left in command of the post, where I remained for some time. It was
then my province in various ways, both in the line of duty and from
curiosity to know something of the defences of ".Winchester," and those
made by the rebels to receive any Federal force that might have been
brought against that city in the 1861 campaign. My conclusions were,
that had you attacked Johnston, strongly entrenched as he was with a
formidable army, and you with an army crippled by orders from Washington, depriving you of artillery, regulars, and volunteers, you would
then have met with a defeat, or at least a check which would at that
time have been disastroiis. Your suggestion of a change of operations
was well timed, and has proved the one that should have been adopted.
This is now well known at hettdquarters.
It was in my opinion Johnston's strategy to lead you to the attack on
Winchester, leaving a comparatively small force there, whilst having
drawn you on sufficiently, and having shown you battle, he would hold
you in check, withdraw his main force to the support of Beauregard
(easily and quickly done by the fransportation at his disposal) ; you
would certainly be beyond all hope, unable to reinforce McDowell in
time, and left, with a crippled and perhaps demoralized command, in the
lurch. Especially do I know that from the nature of the country, you
could have done nothing without artillery at least equal to that of the
enemy.
I fear that my letter is already too long, yet I could not refrain, my dear
General, to write these few lines, even though they may come from one of
limited experience, expressing at the same time my belief, that after the
defeat of McDowell by the blunders at Washington, it became necessary
to shift a responsibility, properly belongjng there, on your shoulders, to
save them from the reproach they deserved from the country. This
belief is strengthened by the constant refusals made you for an investigation; had they not feared its results, it would have cheerfully been
given.
I am, General, your obedient servant,

WM. D.

LEWIS, JR.,

Late Colonel, llOth

R~gt.

P. V.
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RISING

SuN, April 4th, 1866.

DEAR GENERAL:

I have your note of the 27th, and the little volume you were good
enough to send me. I read it last night with interest and pleasure, for
irrespective of its relations to you, it is an agreeable narrative of an
important transaction of the war.
I have no military knowledge or judgment, but it seems to me that
neither is necessary to enable any one to be convinced that you have
conclusively made out your case.
Temporary injustice is almost always done to persons connected with
disastrous events affecting vast interests, creating therefore great excitement, and which involve numerous details, and all influenced by many
causes. This is peculiarly true of military operations. It is only when
passion subsides, and time is afforded to investigate particulars, that the
truth can be discovered.
You have judiciously waited for that period, and in my judgment,
have shown in a clear and satisfactory manner, that you did all that you
could do under the circumstances in which you were placed, and more
than you were ordered to do, and that the unfortunate result was not
attributable to your failure to accomplish all that you intended and
attempted.
Yours very truly,
SIDNEY G. FISHER.
To

GE::N"ERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

ST. Louis, Mo., April 2d, 1866.

l\rfy DEAR GENERAL:

Your note of the 17th of March was received several days since. I
am much obliged to you for your kind recollection.
Last fall I received a copy of your pamphlet, and I intended to have
mentioned it to you when I was in your city in the winter, but want of
time prevented me from doing so, and also from saying a good many
things that I would like to have said.
I read the "Narrative" at the time of receiving it, and it appeared
to me a most full and complete vindication of your course, while you
commanded that portion of the army of the United States stationed on
the borders of Virginia. To one who has known you so long and so
well as I have, no defence was at all necessary, for I never for a moment
doubted that you would in any situation that you might be placed,
civil or military, do your duty ; but then, I suppose, that sometimes it
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is necessary to say something for the public at large. Please make my
kind regards to Mrs. Patterson, and accept for yourself my best wishes.
Very truly and sincerely yours,
GEORGE G.
GENERAL ROBERT

MENO KIN'

MY

\VAGGAMAN.

p ATTERSON,
Philade1 phia, Pa.

v A.' January 29th,

1865.

DEAR GENERAL:

Yours of the 25th has been received; also your "Narrative," which
is a plain and telling statement of facts, without any flourish of trumpets, and must convince any one of its truthfulness whose prejudices are
not past conviction.
Yours truly,

J. J.

ABERCROMBIE,

Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A.
GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

No. 829

ARCH STREET,

PHILADELPHIA,

DEAR

March 1st, 1865.

Srn:

You have honored me in sending me a copy of your "Narrative."
It is exceedingly interesting in itself, and had you not possessed less
vanity than some of your contemporaries, you would have made a large
volume of that which you modestly comprise in 118 pages.
I never judged you, much less did I condemn you, for I was without
evidence; yet you were sadly censured, and your "Narrative" shows
how unfairly that censure was bestowed.
In the fact that you waited for the proper time ~o speak, is your true
courage shown.
Your book furnishes a complete vindication of your character as a
soldier, and a full defence against the charges so cruelly made against
you. Every proposition in it is thoroughly demonstrated.
It was due to yourself, and still more was it due to your fellow-citizens,
that you should make such a valuable contribution to the history of the
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war; and coming from one who has reached your period of life, it is
peculiarly acceptable to your friends residing in Philadelphia.
With very kind wishes, I am,
Very respectfully yours,
EDWARD HOPPER.
To

GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

LONDON,

June 28th, 1865.

DEAR Sm:
I beg pardon for not earlier acknowledging the reception of your
"Narrative of the Campaign of 1861 in the Shenandoah Valley."
As a contribution to the history of this memorable war, I shall be
very glad to have this account from such authority, to add to the other
materials of the same kind which make the foundation of correct annals.
I am your obedient servant,
c. F. ADAMS.

NASHVILLE,

October 24th, 1865.

GENERAL p ATTERSON.
MY OLD AND GOOD FRIEND : Most happy was I to receive your
very kind letter of 29th August; to see that old familiar handwriting,
not one particle of change in it for the last thirty years. . . . . .
But to the campaign; just as I expected, only more so. It's as clear
to me as sunshine, that you acted nobly, with that energy and promptness which has characterized your whole life; no sooner conceived than
executed. More could not have been done during your whole tour, to
serve your country. You showed your generalship in an eminent degree,
as well as love of country. Show me the general that has acted a better
or more faithful part than yourself during the war. I defy any one to
do so. . . . . . At the time of the occurrence referred to, communications being mostly cut off: we heard but little on the subject; if any
complained, I al ways told them it was a subterfuge by those in fault,
shifting it from their own shoulders upon those who did their whole
duty. I have scarce heard the subject mentioned in years. When I
heard one word said, I told them the whole matter of charges was false;
that you acted the part of a great general ; that they were afraid to investigate the matter as you demanded, lest they be found wanti~
themselves.
I did regret to hear of the death of that noble son of yours. You
have my deep sympathy. . . . . .
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We shall be most happy to welcome you to our city, should you ever
visit the South again; to renew old friendships is very pleasant to me
indeed: the older I grow, the more I esteem old friends.
Please present me in great kinqness to your good wife, and to all your
home-family, and may God ever have you and them in His keeping, is
the prayer of
Your faithful friend,
R.H. McEWEN.

No. 9 OouRT STREET,
BROOKLYN,

MY DEAR

N. Y., December 29th, 1865.

Srn:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th
ult., and to thank you for your kindness in forwarding me a copy of
your" Narrative." I have read it carefully, and am satisfied, if indeed
that were necessary, that the first great disaster of the war, was caused
by the incompetency of the then military authorities at Washington,
and the same thing worse of the general who commanded at Bull Run.
Looking back with the experience of four years, it seems almost incredible that a soldier of Brevet Lieutenant-General Scott's experience and
reputation, should have been so ignorant of the strength and dispositions
of the enemy, and so vacillating in his movements.
I have taken the liberty of writing for the .New York Tablet, a very
respectable and widely-circulated weekly paper of New York, a short
review of your work, a few copies of which I forward you by this mail.
I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES E. McGEE,

Late Lt.-Ool., 69th N. Y. Volunteers.

SAVANNAH, GA.,

*

*

*

*

*

January 24th, 1866.

*

*

I thank the General for his pamphlet, which is a thorough refutation
of all the slanders against him, and a complete vindication of his military operations on the Shenandoah.
Yours very truly,

w.
7

R.

FLEMING.
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PHIL.ADELPHI.A,

MY

May 28th, 1866.

DEAR GENERAL:

I feel greatly indebted to you for the publication of your "Narrative
of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." You owed this
complete defence of yourself to the officers and men who served under
you.
We have been much harassed by statements made semi-officially,
which reflected upon the honor of your division, but felt assured in our
own minds, that these were erroneous, but we had no means of refuting
them. Having had confidence in your military capacity and perfect
loyalty to the government, we looked forward to your final vindication,
as well of yourself as of those who served under you.
Of course, I knew but little of your plan of operations, and nothing
at all of your orders from Washington. But as a regimental commander, I was cognizant of your difficulties in organizing and projecting
a column of green troops across a great river into a hostile country.
Your publication sheds a flood of light upon our campaign in the
Valley. I here learn why Johnston was threatened upon his rear rather
than upon his flank (at Leesburg). I never could comprehend how a
general could be expected to hold an antagonist, who was retreating before him, except by the use of an overwhelming cavalry force, which
you did not have.
Permit me, my dear General, to renew my expression of sincere regard for you personally and officially, and to express my gratification at
your ability to so completely refute all the slanders of your enemies as
you do in this pamphlet.
Yours very truly,
JOSHUA

T.

OWEN,

Late Brigadier-General Volunteers.

'
No. 1304
GENERAL ROBERT

'.1

GREEN 8'rREET,

June 7th, 1866.

p ATTERSON.

Srn: I am pleased to acknowledge the receipt of your book,
"The Campaign of 1861," and am free to say that I consider it a candid
statement and complete vindication of your military conduct, and am,
Very truly yours,
DEAR

HENRY Sn-IPSON.
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August 22d, 1866.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: I have received and read with much pleasure your
"Narrative of the Campaign of 1861 in the Valley of the Shenandoah,"
and I think that no unprejudiced man can deny that you have effectually
and triumphantly refuted all the unfair criticisms which were made of
your military conduct. The vague, confused, and sometimes conflicting
orders of the General-in-chief must be referred to his advanced age and
the disturbed condition of his mind.
It so happened that, when your publication was received, Dr. Hunter
Maguire, who was medical director of General Jackson's command from
the commencement of the war until the General's death, was on a visit
to me. He read your "Narrative" with great interest, as he was acquainted with many of the persons, scenes, and.movements to which you
refer. He concurred with me in thinking that your defence was conclusive.
It may not be uninteresting to you to hear, coming from so intelligent
and well-informed a gentleman, that you interpreted correctly the policy
of General Johnston when you supposed he was seeking to draw you
further from your base line, with a view to defeat and capture your command. The Confederate generals were informed of the fact that most of
your troops were to leave, and they desired to entice you as far as possible into the country, hoping that the three months' men would not fight.
The object of the demonstration near Hainesville 'was to induce you to
follow in pursuit. Dr. Maguire says, four regiments were there for the
purpose of feeling your force, and with instructions if they found your
army in force, to retreat, and thus draw you further into the interior,
when you would have been overwhelmed by superior numbers and
artillery.
Dr. Maguire says if you had been allowed to advance when you first
crossed the river you would have found the Confederates almost destitute
of ammunition. They could not, therefore, have resisted your progress.
But that deficiency was afterwards supplied, and he is very certain that
if you had attacked ~ ohnston, either near Darksville or at Winchester,
you must have met a bloody repulse.
A long time must elapse before a full and accurate report of the
recent unfortunate war can be written. Prejudice, passions, and personal
interests will obscure the truth for years to come. But facts will come
to light, from time to time, until the whole story is revealed. I regard
your "Narrative" as a valuable contribution to the great mass of truth
which is, sooner or later, to be disclosed.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ALEXANDER H. H. STUART.

/
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- - - - NEAR MARTINSBURG,
July 31st, 1865.
DEAR

Srn:

I read with great interest your pamphlet entitled "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861." Your vindication is perfect. It covers every
aspect of the case. I think it would puzzle General Joe E. Johnston to
make one equally satisfactory to the authorities from whom he derived
his commission. I beg to return you my thanks for the pleasure and
instruction which I derived from the perusal of your defence.
I am, very truly yours,

--- ---*

WEST CHESTER, PA., August 29th, 1866.

My

DE.AR GENER.AL :

With many thanks I acknowledge your kindness in sending me "The
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." It was my privilege and honor to serve in your army during that campai~n.
The fact that the officers and men of your command, with scarcely an
exception, "believed" in you then and "believe" in you NOW, is your
great vindication.
The people of Pennsylvania are proud of your patriotic service in the
late, and in another war. Your record is before them; it is a proof
against the malignant assaults of all political and military demagogues.
Be pleased to accept, sir, assurance of my great respect and esteem.
Most sincerely and truly,
G. PENNYPACKER.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. p .ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

•
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11th, 1866.

To

GENERAL

R. P .ATTERSON,

Late Major-General U. S. Vo1unteers, Philadelphia.

GENERAL: Having had the honor to serve under you aud on the staff of
Major-Gene.r al W. H. Keim during the campaign of 1861, I have ever
taken the deepest interest in the correct understanding of your campaign,

* From a distinguished Virginian, resident in the Valley, whose name, for
obvious reasons, is not given here.
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and that it should be truthfully explained to the people of the United
States.
Through the kindness of my friends, the Misses Campbell, of Martinsburg, Va., I have been favored with the perusal of your exposition. of
the circumstances which controlled your movements.
It was notorious at the time that the authorities at Washington had
informed you that the 16th July was the day selected for the battle of
Bull Run. Also that you protested against operating on the false line
of the Shenandoah Valley, instead of the correct line, passing near Leesburg along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge.
As a lover of truth and justice, I am glad to read your full justification to the world.
As an officer of your command, I am happy to have it in my power to
adduce your own irrefutable arguments in justification of the brave army
which was so unjustly oensured although so ably led.
I am, General, with high respect, your most obedient servant,
JAMES w. ABERT,
Late Major U. S. Engineers.

CHESTER,

PA., October 23d, 1866.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I have read with great care your "Shenandoah Valley
Campaign of 1861," and am glad that my former opinion l;ias now become
a firm conviction, viz., that your course in that campaign was not only
wise and patriotic, but the best that could possibly have been pursued.
I thank you for the copy of the work you sent me, and shall prize it
highly as containing a true history of an important period in the war,
and as setting right before the people a patriotic gentleman and true
soldier.
Yours, very truly,
J. B. HINKSON.

WrLLLA.MSPOR'l',

November 21st, 1866.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ..\TTERSON.
DEAR Sm: I acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah." It is a
complete vindication of your plans of action in that campaign, and it
certainly must have been very trying to your feelings to so long remain
quiet under the misrepresentations widely circulated against you. But
at the same time the public now appreciate the course you took, and
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your friends here congratulate you upon the clear and ample manner in
which you have presented the facts, placing you not only right with
military men, but with the country generally.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HEPBURN McCLURE.

215 E. TENTH STREET, N. Y., February 6th, 1867.
MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have received your book, and read it with a great deal of attention
and interest. I think it is a most complete vindication of your military
reputation, and shows a state of facts as much to the discredit of others
connected with management of military affairs as to your everlasting
honor. Republics may be ungrateful, sir, but the day has gone by· when
"red tape" can win reputation without exposure.
Very truly,
J. ALEXANDER PATTEN.
GENER.AL ROBERT P .ATTERSON, Phi1adelphia.

GREENSBURG, PA., February 23d, 1867.

Sm:
I received your "Narrative of the Shenandoah Campaign," and have
it bound for future reference.
It contains just what I always understood to be the true state of facts,
and its publication was alike due to yourself as well as to your command.
If it is charged that this army effected less than was expected, it is no
more than justice that the responsibility be placed upon the proper
shoulders, and they are most decidedly not yours. The magnitude of
the rebel movements were not at that time credited, and the attempt
to manreuvre an army and conduct a campaign from a washington
City headquarters, proved in that case as in many later ones to be
utterly ridiculous. I think the subsequent experiences and disasters of
the Army of the Potomac fully demonstrated this, and entirely justify
you charging any failure to that quarter.
As to the course of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, you are
entirely sustained in the charge of its partisan character and purposes.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. COULTER,
DEAR

Late Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols.

To GENER.AL ROBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa.
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March 8th, 1867.

DEAR GENERAL:
Thanks for your note of the 6th instant, with the two newspapers sent
to me.
This development of Beauregard's strategy, which all must admit to
be able, shows clearly that from the first, as most of us declared at the
time, your operations weTe directed upon a wrong line; and I am now
convinced that either General Scott did not truly understand the relative
position of our column and that of the enemy, or else through erroneous
information, he was led into the gross mistake of directing your movements on a distant exterior line, on which every day's march separated
you further and further from your base of supplies, and rendered it impossible for you to receive or give reinforcements to the army of McDowell.
The whole thing was a military blunder, for which not you but your chief
commander was responsible. This was the general opinion amongst
many of us at the time, and now since all the main facts are exposed by
Beauregard, it must necessarily become the unanimous opinion of all old
soldiers who know anything of warlike movements like those referred to.
Yours very truly,
G. H. CROSMAN,
U.S.A.
GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

NEWCASTLE,

DEL., March 12th, 1867.

GENERAL p ATTERSON,
Thirteenth and Locust Streets, Philadelphia.

GENERAL: My friend, Captain R. Ritchie, U.S. N., has several times
spoken to me relative to the campaign of 1861, and the part taken
therein by you. As I was at that time on General Joseph Johnston's staff,
and familiar with all the incidents, I was perfectly aware that gross injustice had been done to you, and would be happy at any time to give
you such details as might be serviceable to you in the future. I have
no doubt that Joseph Johnston, with whom I am very intimate, would be
glad also, at my request, to give you such a statement as will thoroughly
vindicate the wisdom of your movements, and your failure to be mashed
up by superior forces, which could not have delayed our march more
than twenty-four hours, and would, in my judgment, have resulted more
disastrously for McDowell, as our victorious troops would then have
fallen upon his rear and caused the capture of Washington.
Very respectfully,
BLANTON DUNCAN.
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LUTHERSBURG, p ..A..' June 28th, 1867.
GENERAL R. p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: A few days after writing to you, ad vising you that the
book did not reach me, I had the good fortune and pleasure combined,
of receiving a copy, which I carefully read, and now am prepared to say,
in all candor, that never in the whole course of my life have I read anything that gave me so much satisfaction as did this great little book. It
is in my opinion the most stunning rebuke that could possibly be administered to those who, cowardly and meanly,.tried by foul means to rob
you of the great' reputation and character, which you have so nobly
earned from the American people, while it completely .extinguishes the
last feeble taper of that immensely puffed-up luminary, Lieute:r;rnntGeneral Winfield Scott.
You have done American history a great and enduring service in
compiling these records. The military student will find in it an important and useful lesson, while the honest, fair, and candid political reader
will not, cannot fail to render his grateful acknowledgments for the
comments you have given in the work.
I have it read by hundreds, and beg you to accept my thanks not only
for the book, but for the certainty with which it will correct the history,
now so prevalent, of the first three months of the war in the Shenandoah
Valley.
I am, dear General, with profound regard,
Verx truly yours,
T. J. BOYER.

RICHMOND,

July 3d, 1867.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
My DEAR Srn : " The little book " reached me last week. Owing to
great press of professional engagements, I did not get time till yesterday
to give it the considerate perusal it merited coming from the source it did.
Allow me, my dear sir, in the frankness of a true friend, to congratulate you, on the complete success of the objects and purposes in view, in
writing the exposition. It bears all the high elements of candor, truth,
and irresistible conviction, plain and ornate in style, manly and truthful
in narration, demonstrative in illustration and citations of concurring
facts and attendant circumstances. It leaves nothing to speculate about.
It is complete in itself.
The necessity for such a production is but another evidence of the
degeneracy of the times, the obtuseness of popular comprehension, and
the utter profligacy of public men in high places. It is, however, a
proud and abiding consolation to the virtuous and patriotic, to feel the

LETTERS FROM DISTINGUISHED MEN.

105

inward consolation of truth, rectitude, bravery, and high-toned motives;
all these your exposition fully sustains.
Remember us to our friends, and particularly to the ladies.
To-morrow is the 4th. Could Washington look down upon this distracted, unhappy people, would he not shed a tear, though an angel in
heaven? God bless you, and all yours.
Truly,
JOHN

SAN M.A.Rcos, TEXAS,

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

H.

GILMER.

August 9th, 1867.

p ATTERSON.

DEAR Srn: I was truly gratified at receiving your" Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah," which I have read with
great interest. I was pleased to see you were able to vindicate yourself
so clearly from any aspersions against you as an officer, and to place the
matter in its proper light before the public.
Respectfully yours,
L. LAROSHE.

LONG BR.A.NCH,

August 17th, 1867.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have read with great interest the "History of the Campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley in 1861," and its perusal has confirmed my previous
impressions. I must say that your vindication is complete, and is sustained
by facts and documents which ca11not be impeached. It seems extraordinary that your suggestion for the occupation of Leesburg was not
acceded to. An unmilitary man can see that at this point, you could
equally have kept Johnston in check, and what was equally important,
would at the same time have been supporting McDowell.
Yon have established beyond all controversy, that the disaster at Bull
Run could with no propriety be attributed to you.
It is now curious to see what a series of blunders caused that catastrophe, and one is almost forced to the conclusion that it was so to be.
Any ordinary sagacity would have led to a different result. I have long
been satisfied, though feeling at the time most keenly the disgrace of
our defeat, that on the whole, it was a fortunate result for the country.
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It taught us the strength and determination of the foe, and aroused and
nerved our people for the contest.
I am, with great respect, General,
Yours sincerely,
. HENRY E. DA VIES.
GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

ST.

PAUL,

December 26th, 1866.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR Srn: Your book on the "Shenandoah Campaign," which you
were kind enough to send me, was duly received and read with much
interest. Permit me to thank you, and say that those of my friends
who have read it coincide with me in opinion, that the facts there stated
and proven furnish a complete and unanswerable vindication of the able
and patriotic conduct of the commanding general.
Yours truly,
H. THOMPSON.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A.,

February 19th, 1868.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: I returned this afternoon from Washington, my fourth
trip there this month, and have to be absent again to-morrow at Havrede-Grace, to meet a Committee of the Maryland Legislature.
Allow me to thank you for your little book, and to express the interest with which it has been read by me, and the entirely satisfactory im•
pression which the perusal has left upon my mind.
With most friendly regard, yours truly,
ISAAC HINCKLEY.

/
BosTON,

May 10th, 1868.

DEAR GENERAL:
I have read with much interest and satisfaction your "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," and I have
risen from its perusal with the perfect conviction, that your exculpation
from all blame in the management of the "corps d'armee," then under
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your command, is as clear as the sun at noonday. I am equally convinced that great injustice was done you at the time, by the suppression
of the facts of the case.
Thanking you for the courtesy in sending me the book, I have only
to add that it affords me much pleasure to inclose a favorable review of
it, which appeared in this morning's Courier.
I have the honor to be, Sir,
Yours very respectfully,
HENRY

v. w A.RD.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia.

ST. GABRIEL P.

o.,

IBERVILLE PARISH, LA.

HoN. SAMUEL J. RANDA.LL,
Washington.

DEAR SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from you of
an interesting work, entitled "Shenandoah Valley," written by General
Patterson to vindicate his conduct during the late war against the malicious slanders of his enemies.
No sane man can rise from the perusal of the said work without the
firm conviction that it is a complete vindication of the General's course,
and I am truly glad that you were kind enough to forward me a copy of
the book.
With great regard,
I am your obedient servant,
CHARLES A. BRUSLE.

MOBILE, ALA., May 27th, 1868.

GENERAL R. p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR Sm : I am in receipt of a copy of "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861," for which please accept my thanks. It has afforded me
much satisfaction, and the public are under many obligations to you for
this valuable contribution to history. It bas been well understood in
this section of the country that General Scott was from age incapacitated
for the command of the great army called into service in the late war,
and while his former services to the nation would induce us to judge with

108

APPENDIX.

great kindness the errors of declining intellect, it should not be done at
the expense of the well-earned reputation of others.
Yours, with great respect,
ABM. MURDOCH.

BOSTON, May 28th, 1868.

DEAR Srn:
I thank you for the "Narrative of the Campaign of 1861," which is a
model of go0d writing, and of clear and conclusive statements. We had
pretty much made up our minds about that failure at Bull Run before
the close of the war. There are some other matters which have never
yet been placed in their true light; perhaps they will be hereafter. On
the whole we must admit that the public estimation of men who were
prominent during the war has been far from correct. War makes history and time corrects it.
Respectfully and truly yours,
AMOS A. LAWRENCE.
GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia.

ST. Lours, Mo., July 15th, 1868.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR Srn: The "Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1861" came
duly to hand. I have perused it with much interest, and while it was
not at all necessary to satisfy my mind, I am yet rejoiced that in so
compact and conclusive a form the truth of history is vindicated. I
send the pamphlet to the bookbinder to-day to secure its preservation.
In this region but few, if any, failed to place the responsibility of Bull
Run where it belonged. No intelligent man ever doubted that you did
all your duty, and that the fault was with others.
Having been honored by a personal acquaintance with you, my dear
sir, it adds much to the interest of the events and scenes in which you
were an actor.
With best wishes for long life and happiness to you and yours,
I am, with esteem and respect,
Your obedient servant,
R. s. ELLIOTT.
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July 21st, 1868.

DEAR GENERAL :
I am in the receipt of your "Campaign of the Shenandoah," and have
perused it carefully. I have read it as a lawyer would his brief. I have
scrutinized the same more carefully, as I was at the time the matte1·s were
transacted, a member of the Committee on Military Affairs, and heard much
discussion on the generalship of that campaign at the time. In fact,
after the terrible blunder at Bull Run, the question of your command
was the theme in the mouth of the cabinet and Congress. From the
good opinion I had of your character as a military man, and the distinguished service you had rendered your country in Mexico, I refrained
from joining in the clamor at the time; nay, more than this, I had visited
your camp at Chambersburg, and was aware of the raw, discordant material of which your army was composed. I do you and myself wrong
in saying I refrained from joining in the clamor; I defended you, although
I knew none of the facts, from my own knowledge of your previous character. But after the Congressional inquiry into the cause of the defeat
at Bull Run, I saw in a moment where the pinch was, and this relieved
me as to the truth of the charges against you. I was entirely satisfied.
Since reading your defence, I am not more so. You have, however,
added additional information (to me at least) which puts your position
beyond a cavil. I am glad of it. Justice, though sometimes slow, is
always sure. If it is my fortune to survive you,. I will try to bear it
in mind to add what I can to disabuse the public mind. You have beyond all doubt been grievously wronged. The Secretary of War ought
not, in my opinion, to have denied you a court of inquiry because you
had been honorably discharged. Matters for or against might have
come to light subsequent to the discharge. The excuse lacked merit.
The denial took your weapons of defence out of your hands. A public
appeal and defence does not go into the national archives.
To me your book is a complete and perfect defence, and so must the
public regard it.
Yours truly,
HENDRICK B. WRIGHT.
GENERAL

R. P .ATTERSON, Philadelphia.

CINCINNATI,

July 31st, 1868.

GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR Sm: On my return home, I find, indorsed with your compliments, "A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenan-

110

APPENDIX.

doah." I have read it with much interest. It is a perfect refutation of
the popular newspaper and partisan clamor that sought to make you the
victim for the Bull Run disaster.
I have sent the book to my father, Major Butler, now quite venerable;
but whose interest in the incidents and movements of the war is as keen
as ever.
With much respect, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH C. BUTLER.

COLUMBUS,

Mrss., August 28th, 1868.

_MEssRs. R. PATTERSON & Co.,
Phil ad el ph ia.

GENTLEMEN : This morning we had the pleasure of a letter from your
General Patterson, of date 24th inst. The writer, to whom be kindly
presented his campaign book, opened it after bis arrival home, and was
so much interested that he read it thr<?ugh, notwithstanding it required
until two o'clock at night to accomplish the work. The facts, proofs,
and circumstances (many of which were familiar to him), is the clearest,
most perfect; and unanswerable compilation of facts which he has ever
read, and must convince all unprejudiced minds, he not only acted
strictly in accordance with orders from the General-in-chief, but was
forced on a line of operations from which he could not, without a probable
chance of defeat, attack General Johnston, or prevent him from joining
General Beauregard at Manassas. The investigation by the Congressional Committee was exceedingly unfair, and must in time reflect discredit upon the authors, and leave the fair fame of General Patterson
untarnished.
Yours very respectfully,
HuMPHRrns, HuDsoN & Co.

PHIL.A.DELPHI.A.,

August 6th, 1868.

DEAR Srn:
I thank you for a copy of the "Shenandoah Campaign," the perusal
of which bas afforded me much pleasure. No man misrepresented and
unjustly assailed as you have been, ever succeeded more completely than
you have done, in expunging every trace of blemish from his reputation.
No matter how ingeniously falsehood may be woven, the tissue vanished
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in the light of truth; and only that was needed in your case to restore
the lustre of your name.
With great respect, I am very truly,
Your friend and obedient servant,

W. S. N.

RuscHENBERGER.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,

Philadel p~ia.

AUBURN,

MY

N. Y., April 3d, 1869.

Srn :
I am very grateful for the copy of the "Narrative," which was
received in good time. I have read it carefully, and need scarcely tell
you what a revelation it has been to me. I knew that your operations
were hampered by the lack of troops during the Shenandoah campaign,
but I had no idea of the circumstances of the case until your book
arrived. I am now glad to find the errors and mistakes fastened upon
the proper persons, and I am sure it could not have been done with
more discretion and accuracy than by one so well acquainted with the
subject as General Patterson. Your letter to the Secretary of \Var
(p. 12), I am particularly pleased with, while the summing up of the
whole case is admirable. Accept once more my thanks, and believe
me, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
w ILLI.A.M A. BAKER.
DEAR

233

S. FORTY-SECOND STREET,

November 16th, 1868.

GENERAL:

I read with interest your true "Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." This accurate and ''well-attested
contribution to the earlier history of the war," will impress every reader
with the fact that the honor and valor which a gallant soldier discovers
in the face of the enemy are entirely his own, and cannot be taken from
him, and that in peace as in war they can be well exhibited and happily
defended whenever occasion demands it on his part. I beg that my absence from the city will be received as my excuse for not acknowledging
promptly the honor you extended me in sending your interesting
"Narrative."
I have the honor, General, to be
Your obedient servant and former fellow-soldier,

W ILLI.A.M S.

FORBES,

Formerly Medical Director 13th .Army Corps.
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W .A.SHINGTON, April 3d, 1869.

DEAR GENERAL:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

I read your pamphlet with great care. For an outsider, ignorant of
the war, it has one fault, namely, the map. On it there ought to be the
names of all the places mentioned in the " Narrative." This is not the ·
case. I like ·the tone and temper with which it is written, and I consider your statement as most convincing. You· had the misfortune to
have the blunders of others thrust upon you, and then the impatient
ignorance of the public (who will form an opinion, with .or without correct premises), turned upon you,- because you were exactly the only man
that had nothing whatever to do with their defeat. Your General appears to have been as slow in putting you in the right place, in communication with :M:cDowell, as he was quick in putting McDowell in the
wrong. But I suppose it would be high treason to avow this. My
compliments to General Meade, and believe me,
Yours very truly,
c. ·A. WINDHAM,
Lien tenant-General.

JACKSON COUNTY,

Mo., April 15th, 1869.

MA.TOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
DEAR SrR: I had intended before this to have ackuowledged the
receipt of your book, that you have been so kind and complimentary to
send me, entitled a "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah in 1861." I was glad to receive it, have read it carefully,
and have loaned it to a number of gentlemen of culture, taste, and
sense, all of whom, in addition to being much pleased with the literary
style of the work, regard it as a complete and overwhelming vindication
of yourself while in command in the Valley. We tolerably well understood the trick, General, of the Congressional Committee, before seeing
your defence. It would not have done to acknowledge the defeat at
Bull Run as the fault of General Scott. It would have been too depressing and discouraging to the Yankee nation, who regarded him as
an invincible and unparalleled ·general. They reasoned in this wise: If
we confess Scott defeated, and his stratagem too weak for the "rebels,"
the country will not hope to succeed with any other commander, and
consequently the war spirit will cease. Some patriotic lie had to be
told; somebody sacrificed under the peculiar circumstances, and you,
General, they basely selected as the man. The responsibility of that
defeat to the Federal arms, I am well satisfied ought to rest solely with
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Scott and his abolition advisers. He displayed as great ignorance at
that time of the physical power and resources necessary to crush and
ruin his former friends of the South, as thousands of the ordinary and
low order of abolitionists could possibly have done. Do you remember
a dinner party at the White House reported after that battle? Scott
complained that certain men did not take to themselves the responsibility of the defeat. He gave his plan, which would have been, if let
alone, to marshal seventy-five or eighty thousand men in some healthy
locality on the Ohio River, and drilled them until autumn, then moved
them to the Mississippi, and commenced at once the march down that
stream to the Gulf. He thought perhaps he would have met with opposition at five or six places, but doubtless would soon have overcome
all of them, and reached the Gulf in triumph, and then the rebellion, as
it is termed, would have been over. After events, perhaps, have proved
the weakness, ignorance, and vanity of his conclusion. The fact is
plain, that Scott, Lincoln, and the whole abolition party were sanguine
of victory at Bull Run, and were most poignantly mortified when they
discovered their mistake. If they had followed up strictly the policy of
sacrificing a general for every defeat sustained by their arms, they certainly would have victimized all that the North could possibly have
afforded, long before the war closed.
Whatever Scott's virtues might have been in the· eyes and heart of an
abolitionist, undeniably envy, jealousy, and vanity were prominent
traits in his character, and to this add, he fought against the State that
gave him birth. Had the British nation succeeded in the subjugation
of the colonies, Benedict Arnold would doubtless now be applauded by
them as a great patriot; perhaps the polished marble or brass reared
in monumental form to his memory. There could be nothing, I would
suppose, too base or perfidious for an abolition Congress, or its committee
to resort to, when necessary to accomplish a purpose...
I remain your obedient servant,
ISAAC p ATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

MY

April 27th, 1869.

DEAR GENERAL:

The " Narrative of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign," you so kindly
sent me, was received late last week on my return to this place from
Washington.
Please accept my thanks for this book. I have read it carefully. No
one can justly blame you for the disaster at Bull Run, for you certainly
did all, and even more than the part assigned you by Lieutenant-General
8
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Scott. My own opm1on has always been that we underestimated the
rebel strength, and that we fought the Bull Run affair without any
attempt at a unity of action among the various commands. My judgment has always censured General Scott for the failure.
Faithfully yours,
CLIFFORD STANLEY SIMS.
To

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

BOSTON,

April 29th, 1869.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR GENERAL: On my return to Boston, I have tbe pleasure
of finding on my table your very interesting Narrative of the Campaign
of 1861.
As a contribution to history, it is of great value of course. But as a
gallant remonstrance against the hardest thing that a brave and soldierly
man has to bear, it makes a deep and lasting impression upon me.
I have read the volume with great interest and with full sympathy
in your defence, and my thanks to you for the opportunity to place this
work in my library.
I am, General, very respectfully ·and truly,
Your obliged obedient servant,
HORACE BINNEY SARGENT.

VVILMINGTON, DEL .•,

April 29th, 1869.

GENERAL:
Thanks for your book," A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah in 1861." I have :read it attentively, and consider it
a triumphant vindic~tion of your course and service.
"The purest treasure mortal times afford,
Is spotless reputation."

Yet who attains it? envy, malice, jealousy, and selfishness prevail,
and it seems sometimes only necessary that one should render good and
faithful service to his country to become the object of calumny and misrepresentation ; even our great and good " Pater Patrire" was not exempt. Many suffer from vile, cowardly, and secret insinuations, which
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never reach the car of the calumniated ; therefore, General, you may
thank God that you were made acquainted with the points of attack on
your reputation, which the evidence in the case so fully exonerates you
from all censure.
I am respectfully and very truly yours,
JOHN P. GILLIS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON,
Philadelphia, Pa.

JUDGES' LOBBY, SUPERIOR COURT,
BOSTON,

May 3d, 1869.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
GENERAL: I have read with the greatest interest your "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," which you were kind
enough to send me, and for which I am much obliged to you.
If any vindication was ever complete and thorough yours is, and I
cannot understand how any fairmin<led man can rise from its perusal with
any other feeling than that you did everything that a skilful and accomplished soldier could do to carry out the plans of the Commander-inchief, and that wherever the blame of the failure may rest, it is not on
your shoulders. The two facts, first, that you were not expected to hold
Johnston beyond the 17th; second, that the Commander-in-chief was apprised by you before the battle of Bull Run on the 21st that Johnston
had moved to join Beauregard, settle to my mind beyond question that
you·have been much wronged by those who have attempted to, or been
willing to throw upon you the blame of that disaster.
Whatever the injustice of contemporaries may have been, your N arrative must secure you justice in history, for no impartial man can read it
without feeling it demonstrates the propositions it undertakes to maintain.
I am, dear General, your obedient servant,
CHARLES DEVANT, JR.

AUGUSTA,

May 20th, 1869.

DEAR Srn:
I recelved this morning the "book" you promised me in Savannah,
and have just (5 o'clock P. M.) :finished reading it. This complies with
your first request; as to your second, I am hardly capable of forming an
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opinion to which any value can be attached. I know nothing of strategy,
and am therefore unable to judge of the military character of your
movements in the Shenandoah Valley. I have no recollection of the
controversy which rendered your publication necessary for your defence.
Northern papers did not then reach us. McDowell's defeat on the 21st of
July, 1861, was an event which made us at the South forget those of
less importance which preceded it, and I confess I never attempted to
investigate the reasons why he was defeated, nor was I aware (if I was, I
have forgotten it), that any attempt has been made to throw the responsibility ou you. It is no new thing for a government or a high official
to seek for a scapegoat, in order to throw the blame of a miserable
failure on other shoulders. Poor Admiral Byng was victimized to relieve the imbecile ministry of the day from the "roaring of the British
lion," which broke out on his failure at Minorca, and the same game
had been played before and has been since. The men whose weakness
yielded to the claptrap of " On to Richmond," raised by a mob whose
hallucination led them to suppose that the Confederates had only to be
attacked in order to be swept from the face of the earth, were, of course,
anxious to throw the responsibility of their failure on other shoulders,
and it seems to me, as far as I am competent to judge of the matter, that
they have selected as the person to bear the blame one whose only fault
was that he obeyed orders, which he could not disobey~ without risking
his commission, his reputation, and perhaps, considering the importance
of the crisis, his life.
This seems to me the sum and substance of the whole matter, though,
as I said before, my want of information as to the wisdom of military
movements, renders my opinion of little value.
I am, dear sir, very respectfully yours,
'VILLIAM T. GOULD.
To

GENERAL PATTERSON.

PRINCETON,

May 31st, 1869.

To GENERAL RoBERT PATTERSON.
MY DEAR GENERAL: When I saw you at your house on Saturday
evening, you did me the honor to request that you might hear from me,
after I had read your monograph on the first campaign of the Shenandoah Valley. I have read it, every word, documents and all. In fact,
I was more than half through it before breakfast this morning. I mention this, that you may not think you are the only man in this degenerate age who can get up early to his work. I frankly confess that after
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I had read a few pages I got completely stuck in it, and could not think
of laying it aside before I had finished it. It gives me great pleasure
also to tell you the impression it has made upon my mind.
Of course, I am no .military critic, although I have read Jomini and
other military writers with great pleasure. But your little work leaves
not a doubt in my mind, if any ever existed, but that, if others had done
their duty as faithfully and patriotically a~ you did in that affair, we
should never have lost the disastrous battle of Bull Run. It appears to
me that your inferior force was handled in a masterly manner, to hold
in check, as you did, a superior force, under the command of him who
was beyond comparison, as I think, the ablest general that the South
produced during the whole war. I have no doubt at all but that your
reputation in that whole affair will stand before the country where you,
as a soldier and a patriot, wish it to stand.
There is one thing in your vindication of yourself which I particularly
admire, and that is its temperateness. Smarting, as you must have been,
under a sense of the gross injustice which had been done you, you have
not used an expression in the book which a Christian ought not to have
used. I would not dare to say this for the sake of your soul's welfare,
if I did not feel it to be the truth, beyond any doubt in my mind.
Believe me, my dear General,
I am truly yours,

J. H.

ATLANTA, GA.,

McILVAINE.

May 31st, 1869.

DEAR GENERAL:

I tender you my acknowledgments for the copy of "A Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." I have read
it with satisfaction, and gained from its perusal, I hope, much historical
information on the military operations during the early part of the rebellion.
I admit my almost total ignorance on matters appertaining to military
science and strategy. But it seems to me that the mind of any man of
general and ordinary comprehension, cannot read that simple and plain
narration, and the appended proofs, without coming at once to the conclusion that General Patterson's entire conduct was that of a soldier who
thoroughly understood his business, and a soldier too who was ever
ready and willing to fight.
In reading the ''Narrative" the thought intrudes upon the mind, and
there impresses itself, that there was, to say the least, an indirectness on
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the part of the General-in-chief. I have perused all the orders with
care. General Scott was a great soldier, and it would not become me to
be h ypercri ti cal.
With sincere and high respect, I remain, dear General,
. Truly your obedient servant,
JOHN ERSKINE.
To MA.roR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,

Philadelphia, Pa.

SAVANNAH,

MY

May 31st, 1869.

DEAR GENERAL;

I have had the pleasure to receive your very kind note of the 17th,
and the copy of the "Narrative of your Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah," brought by the same mail, and thank you cordially for
both.
I shall always value the volume, but assure you that I have not waited
until now to learn the truth jn regard to those operations. Your "N arrative" was the first historical publication concerning events of the war
that I read, and in "that way I was convinced, in 1865, of what I had
before suspected, that you had been bearing the weight of the General-inchief, as well as of the Committee of Congress. I hope with you, at no
distant day, we may have an opportunity to talk over such matters. l.
confess to the having been greatly deceived at the time as to your strength,.
first by scouts, then by newspapers of Hagerstown, and last by people of
Martinsburg.
I was much disappointed after learning that you were in Savannah,
not to have the pleasure of meeting you. The hotel clerk told me then
that your time was so occupied, that he could not say at what time of
the day you might probably be found in the house. It would be so
ag'r eeable to me to meet you, that I shall never neglect an opportunity
to do so, nor fail, when I visit Philadelphia, to report the fact to you.
Very truly yours,
J.
GENERAL

E.

BOSTON,

MY

DEAR

JOHNSTON.

p ATTERSON.

Srn

August 3d, 1869.

=

The first leisure moments I could command after my return from
Lancaster I have devoted to the reading of your "Narrative," and
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certainly no unprejudiced person can fail to pronounce jt a complete
and triumphant vindication. You prove everything as you go along,
leaving nothing to rest upon bare assertion or unsupported statement.
And I a.m struck with the moderation of your tone, smarting as you
must have been under the burning sense of unmerited indignity. The.
tenderness especially with which you treat General Scott does you very
great honor, and returns good for evil, in the full measure demanded
by christianity.
It is a melancholy fact, that a man like you, with a military record
like yours, should. be obliged to vindicate yourself as you have done.
But you have yourself indicated the reason. The battle of Bull Run
was a deep wound to our self-esteem. 'Ve would not admit the true
causes of the disaster, which you have so clearly stated, but we cast
about to find a victim, a scapegoat; and the lot fell upon you, and you
know what Bacon says sympathetically in his own case: "When from
private appetite it is resolved that a creature shall be sacrificed, it is
easy to pick up sticks enough from any thicket whither it hath strayed,
to make a fire to offer it with."
Your case, and those of Generals McClellan, Stone, and F. J. Porter,
aTe illustrations of a truth which all history confirms, that no lot is so
hard as that of the man who incurs the hostility of the majority in countries ruled by popular institutions. The party that came into power
with the election of President Lincoln have wielded, and are still wielding, a power unprecedented in the history of free countries. They control all the organs and sources of public opinion, and public opinion
really governs this country. Had you been persecuted by a monarch,
you would have bad support and sympathy in popular feeling, expressed
or suppressed ; but woe to him who is persecuted by a relentless majority,
for him there is no castle of defence, no altar of security.
And there is yet another untoward element in your case. The charges
against you are statements, positive assertions, made by persons whose
official position gives weight to every word uttered by them. They are
taken in trust, not for their own sake, but because they are uttered by
men in authority. But you cannot meet them by counter-statements;
you must argue your case, you must cite letters, documents, telegrams,
you must tax the time and attention of your readers. But most men are
either indolent or preoccupied, ~nd indolence and preoccupation are alike
hostile to the calm investigation of truth. But time is on your side;
sooner or later truth prevails and wrongs are righted. You know how
long it was before justice was done to the military character of V{ellington,
and how Washington's capacity was disparaged. To you also justice will
be done, if it is not now.
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I mark with a white stone the day on which I made the acquaintance
of yourself and your associates of the club, and should esteem myself
most fortunate could I have the pleasure of meeting you again.
Yours faithfully,
G. s. HILLARD.

BosTON,

September 6th, 1869.

MY DEAR Srn:
I received your memoir on the eve of my departure for an excursion
to the Upper Mississippi, from which I have just returned. I read on
my journey, and with great pleasure, your very interesting "Narrative."
It lifts the veil from the obscure military operations, or rather their
origin and design, during the early part of the war. The true history
of the war is yet to be written, and this will form an important contribution to it, and vindicate your reputation as a prominent actor in it.
It is a pity there are not more of such spirited and clear narratives, but
it is not often that the pen and sword go together.
It gave' me great pleasure to meet you upon the pleasant hillsides of
Lancaster, and to enjoy in your company Mr. Parker's abundant hospitality.
Thank you for your kind invitation to call upon you, in Philadelphia,
which I hope some day to accept.
Very sincerely and cordially yours~
WILLIAM MINOT, JR.
GENERAL PATTERSON,

Philadelphia.

OJi~FICE OF THE NEW YORK ASSOCIATED PRESS,

NEW YoRK,

September 21st, 1869.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR Srn: I have received and read your "Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," and thank you
for your kindness in sending me the same.
I have perused it with great care and surpassing interest. It turns a
flood of light on what history will characterize as the pivotal point in
the war for the Union, which determined the duration of the struggle,
and made it a conflict of weary years for the preservation of the
national life, instead of a brief contest for the suppression of insurrection.
No thoughtful and loyal man doubts, that a decisive triumph of the
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national arms at the first battle of Manassas (or Bull Run), would
have discouraged the Southern masses, and deprived the i-ebel leaders of
the victorious prestige, which enabled them to commit a whole people to
a death-struggle from which there was no retreat. You have shown
conclusively, I think, that our defeat at that important crisis was the
result chiefly of erroneous judgment, prompting to ill-timed military
movements in front of Washington. How any one can rise from the
perusal of your paper without the conviction that you were in no way
responsible for the disastrous result, I confess is a mystery which I am
not meta physician enough to fathom or understand.
Such is my unprofessional verdict, but I am glad to see it and your
campaign so thoroughly sustained by many gentlemen, whose soldierly
reputations are second to none in the land.
Hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you socially again, at some
time in the early future,
I am very truly yours,

J. ,V.
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s.

SnWNTON.

BROAD STREET,

PHILADELPHIA,

November 5th, 1869.

GENERAL:

I have read with personal satisfaction your interesting "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," and think the
statement, and evidence adduced in corroboration, prove a complete vindication of your military conduct, aspersed as it has been.
It is delightful to your friends in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania to
know that the young captain in the war of 1812, and the major-general
in the war with Mexico, have not been found deficient in either patriotism, wisdom, skill, or bravery, in the late uncivil and fratricidal war
with our misguided countrymen.
Time, that allays the selfish passions and ambitions of struggling men,
has already effaced from the public mind the impressions left by the
calumnies, that made you the victim of the ignominious defeat of our
raw and undisciplined officers and men upon the memorable field of
Manassas.
That you have outlived the scandal of the day, and may continue a
long and happy life, is the sincere desire of one who has the honor to be
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

vv ATTs.
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BUREAU COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
PRINCETON,

N overnber 15th, 1869.

GENERAL ROBERT p .ATTERSON.
Philallelphia.

DE.AR Sm: Your favor of the 14th October last was duly received,
as were the copies of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah in 1861," sent to us for ourselves, and for distribution, as requested by you, and we thank you for the copy of the "Narrative" sent to us. Our Mr. Henderson has read it with a great deal of
interest, and regards it, so far as he is capable of judging, as being a
complete vindication of your conduct while in command in the Shenandoah Valley. 'Ve hardly see bow any one can read your '' Narrative,"
without coming to the conclusion, that you did your duty under all the
circumstances in which you were placed, faithfully, ably, and patriotically ; and that you were in no manner responsible for the disaster at
Bull Run. It is very evident that you could not hazard a battle with
Johnston at "'\Vinchester, in the condition your army was in ; and that
under your orders, you ought not to have done so; and having detained
Johnston until long after the battle of Bull Run should have been
fought, as you were advised it would be, and having notified General
Scott that Johnston had moved his army before the battle was actually
fought, it is equally evident, that if they wanted you with your command, they ought to have delayed the engagement until your arrival.
And that as they did not do this, you should not be held responsible for
the result.
"'\Ve did not know before, that you were the ranking officer of the
army next to General Scott, and that it would have been your duty to
have taken command, if present, ·at the battle of Bull Run; but the
fact affords an easy solution of the question, as it seems to us, of why
the battle of Bull Run was not delayed until your arrival, or rather
why you were not ordered to join McDowell with your command before
delivering battle.
Believing as we now do, after reading your statement, that very great
injustice has been done you, we sincerely trust that time will vindicate
your conduct and patriotism, and place them, with your valuable military services, before the country in their true light.
We would have answered your letter before but for our engagements
in court, and our desire to read your "Narrative" before replying.
We are, General, with great respect,
Very truly, your obedient servants,
TAYLOR & HENDERSON.
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GA., January 2d, 1870.

p ATTERSON.
Sm: Allow me to say now, what I have long intended to

GENERAL ROBERT

MY

DEAR

say at some day, which I have all along meant to be an early one, but
which has turned out to be a very late one.
I received your book in good time, and read it through immediately,
with great interest and instruction. Its revelation of facts was very interesting indeed. Can you blame me for wishing that I had known
these facts when they were taking place, as you have placed them before
me now? I should certainly feel the wish, if I thought the use which
my side could have made of them, would not have merely prolonged the
struggle, but have changed the general result of the war ; for the result
which has come to us is bad enough, and growing worse and worse.
But what I intended to say is that the evidence produced by you in this
book, completely exempts yoii from all responsibility for the results
which were charged to you, and vindicates and establishes your generalship, by proving that if your counsel had been followed, the results
would have been very different. It is unanswerable.
Most respectfully yours,
LINTON STEPHENS.

LEON, CATTARAUGUS COUNTY,

N. Y.,

June 22d, 1870.

MY

DEAR

Sm:

I had the honor and pleasure of receiving your kind and valued
favor of 11th of June, together with a copy of your able work on the
"Campaign of the Shenandoah Valley," for both of which I beg that
you will accept my sincere thanks. I read your work with much interest (almost the only book which I have perused, among the numerous
ones received this season), and it confirms the general impression I had
before taken of that campaign, reached in opposition to current rumor.
As some slight return, I beg to niail you herewith a c·opy of the hurried
edition of preliminary part of my "Historical Sketch of the Cheney
Valley," &c.
I am with great regard, truly yours,

T.
GENERAL

R. p ATTERSON.

APOLEON CHENEY.
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1030

SPRUCE STREET,

PHILADELPHIA,

MY

March 14th, 1870.

DEAR GENERAL:

Many thanks for your history of your campaign of 1861. Its clear,
plain, and unvarnished story must carry conviction to every mind not
steeped in ultra partisanship, and who are "blind leaders of the blind."
I needed no conviction; my conversations with General Fitz John
Porter had long ago given me the truth, and a subsequent visit to the
fields you mention, made me familiar with the ground. Take comfort
in the fact that you have company with many other noble men, unjustly
treated for doing their duty but too well, and with whom in days to
come, a nation awakened from besotted African orgies will yet be proud
to render justice.
With regard and respect,
I am, 0-eneral, your friend,
H.
LANSING.

s.

:MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

BANKSIDE, DEDHAM, MAss.,

MY

February 27th, 1870.

DEAR GENERAL:

I have just finished reading your Narrative, which I have done with
great care, having delayed doing so until I had despatched the affairs
which will accumulate during an absence of three weeks, even for one
so little a man of affairs as myself. You have certainly done your work
extremely well and dispassionately, quite as if it were another person
that you were defending. Your readers, if not your assailants, can
hardly fail to mark "how a plain tale has put them down." I think
there can be no doubt that the future historians of the war will follow
your account of the passages in which you were engaged, rather than
the partisan rumors of those days of darkness and uncertainty. I congratulate you too on having lived to vindicate yourself so effectually, as
it seems to me you have done in this narrative of your doings, so well
supported as it is at every point by extrinsic evidence. . . . .
I shall always consider it as one of the chief features of my very
pleasant visit to Philadelphia, that it afforded me an opportunity of
making the acquaintance of a veteran who has acted so considerable a
part in the service of his country, and to whose merits history will not
fail to do justice.
I am, my dear General, with great respect,
Very faithfully yours,
EDMUND QUINCEY.
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March 7th, 1870.

GENERAL:

In acknowledging the receipt of your "Narrative of the Campaign in
the Va11ey of the Shenandoah," permit me to express the pleasure I have
derived from a careful perusal of its contents. I entertain the highest
appreciation of the important and valuable services rendered by you to
the government under most peculiar and trying circumstances, and the
self-sacrificing spirit of patriotism that prompted you to endure in silence
the false and malicious accusations of unscrupulous partisans.
Sympathizing with you for the wrongs which have been heaped upon
an old and tried veteran, and rejoicing in the knowledge of the hold you
have upon the affections of the people,
I have the honor to be, General, with much respect and esteem,
Your obedient servant,
c. L. COMFORT.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

1701

WALNUT STREET,

PHILADELPHIA,

MY

DEAR

April 14th, 1870.

Srn:

I have to thank you for your kindness in sending me a copy of "A
Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861,"
which I have read with great care and interest.
Not only is it a complete vindication of the unjust aspersion cast upon
your actions in that campaign, but a most gratifying record of the very
arduous and valuable services rendered by you in that critical and trying
period, and which should greatly add to the renown your eminent career
in former wars had so deservedly won.
I remain, General, very sincerely yours,
ROBERT B. POTTER,
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

Late Major-General Volunteers.
p ATTERSON,
Locust Street.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

MY

w ASHINGTON, February 21st, 1870.

Srn:
Having read the "Narrative" you were kind enough to send me, I
take pleasure in giving you my impressions of the case presented in it.
DEAR
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1st. As to the campaign in the Shenandoah, I think it is clear that
whatever might have been done with veteran troops, the peculiar demoralization which we all know in fact existed among the three months'
men, whose term was just expiring, would have made a more aggressive
policy very rash and probably disastrous.
The "three months' men," as I had occasion to know from experience,
were just long enough in the field to be homesick and disgusted with
camp life, without having acquired the soldierly habits, or esprit de corps,
which would in a few more months have made them reliable troops.
They had little wish to acquire such qualities, because most of them
were then in such a frame of mind as to be determined not to become
soldiers, and were impatient of everything which looked like holding
them to a work they regarded themselves as by right i-eleased from. I
know that many, even of those whose patriotism revived after a little
visit home, and who went into the army again and did good service,
were at that time in a state bordering on mutiny, and no pruden~ commander could undertake with them operations requiring vigor, discipline,
and a plornb. I think, therefore, that whilst you would probably have
gone directly to 'Vinchester from Martinsburg, if your troops had been
such as were in General Thomas's command before Atlanta in 1864, his
judgment and y6urs, that no such movement was judicious in 1861, was
sound.
2d. As to the influence of all this upon the first battle of Bull Run, it
seems to me that the documents you adduce show that General Scott so
far appreciated the actual state of your command as to be unwilling to
order a more venturesome policy than that you pursued; that he ex. pected to have pushed McDowell's attack whilst Johnston was still at
Winchester, but finding that impracticable, on the 18th of July, he
probably concluded to drop your command out of his combinations as
having done all that was fairly within its power, and treat it as in process of muster-out, whilst he gave battle to the rebel forces with full
knowledge that part at least of Johnston's command had joined Beauregard.
I think his silence and total cessation of communication with you
from the 18th till after the battle is only explicable on the hypothesis
stated, and that the battle of Bull Run must be judged as a military event
entfrely disconnected with your campaign from the time you sent your
dispatch announcing Johnston's march from Winchester. It seems to
me that what General Scott himself says, of the growth of his confidence
in the result and his sanguine expectations of success, after the preliminary movements preceding the battle, shows that he bad said to himself,
"We can handle Beauregard and Johnston together, and can afford to
drop Patterson's command out of the account," and that only in this
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way can we understand why he sent no new orders to you after receiving
your dispatch, and did not even inform you of the time fixed at last
for giving battle.
Such is the impression made upon me by reading the Narrative and
the documents quoted in it, but without a careful re-examination of the
"Report on Conduct of the War." One of the great peculiarities of a
great civil war is that a calm judgment of current events is almost impossible, and that disasters are often visited upon an innocent victim,
who, from motives of assumed public policy, is not allowed to exonerate
himself.
The patriotism that is shown in patiently bearing the odium till the
time for vindication comes, I am quite free to admit, is of a higher kind
than that which we were called upon to exhibit against an enemy in the
field.
Thanking you again for your kindness in sending me the book,
I remain, very truly yours,

J. D. Cox.
GENER.AL

R.

PAT'l'ERSON, Philadelphia.

HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON,

DEAR

D. 0., May

~5th,

1870.

SIR:

I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your "History of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah," in which you have very
clearly stated your case, and shown that injustice has been done you.
Very respectfully,
JOHN

R.

A.

LOGAN.

EsQ.,
1300 Locust Street, Philadelphia.

PATTERSON,

BALTIMORE,

August 10th, 1870.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

I have the honor of receiving your "Narrative of the
Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1861," also four copies for the
use of the reading-room of the Fifth Regiment, M. N. G. These latter
will be read with pleasure, I doubt not, by many who served in the army
GENERAL:
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of General Johnston, opposed to you, and who will be glad to learn the
facts and reasons of the movements they took part in.
I have read your book with care, and the perusal has afforded me much
gratification.
I thank you heartily for the--opportunity thus given me of learning from
the copies of the official documents, the truth relative to the movements
of the army under your command in 1861, exhibiting as it does, your
strict obedience to the orders of the General-in-chief, and his want of candor and unfairness, in endeavoring to make you the scapegoat for the
Manassas disaster, by charging that you failed to carry out his commands
to keep General Johnston at Winchester, when he knew, through you,
the day before the battle was delivered, that Geueral Johnston had left
Winchester for Manassas on the 18th July, or three days before the
battle took place.
You had the right to expect fairer treatment from an old soldier,
but from Gooch and Honest (God save the mark) John Covode, you
could look for nothing honest or of good report, if in conflict with their
personal or political interests or ends.
The papers you quote, and the evidence you have collected, show conclusively that the causes of defeat were, First. Overweening confidence
on the part of the commanding officer; Secondly. The failure to attack
before 21st July; Thirdly. The delay after the m0vement commenced;
Fourthly. The failure to give efficient support to the. artillery; Fifthly.
The want of discipline in both officers and men; Sixthly. And the failure
to use the troops at the command of the general.
It is presumptuous in me to attempt to criticize a large military movement, but it strikes me the foregoing are the inevitable conclusions of
any reasonable man, whether he is a soldier or not.
Excuse, General, the length of this letter.
I remain, your obliged and
Very obedient servant,

H. D.

HousE

LONEY.

OF REPRESENTATIVES,

WASHINGTON,

D. C., June 27th, 1871.

DEAR GENERAL:

Please accept my thanks for a copy of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." I have read the book
with interest, and do not hesitate to say, that it is a complete vindication
of your conduct in that campaign, and silences forever your calumniators.
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In the light of the facts therein set forth, evidenced by documentary
testimony not to be questioned, it is clear that at the req nest of General
Scott, on the 21st of June, 1861, a month before the battle of Bull Run,
you furnished to him a plan of operations, which if you had been permitted by him to follow out, would have enabled you to have rendered
such service in that battle as might have changed its result from disaster
to victory.
Denied as you were the privilege of following out your plan as proposed, no just man can attribute your failure to cut off Johnston from
communication with and joining Beauregard, to any neglect or want of
skill on your part.
The correspondence of the 17th and 18th July with headquarters at
Washington, while Johnston still lay at Winchester, fully acquits you
of any blame for his advance after that day on Bull Run.
Your telegram of 18th July sent at 1.30 A.M., twelve hours before any
part of Johnston's command left Winchester for Manassas, stating the
probable result of an attack by you, and asking if you should attack,
was entitled to an answer. Until the answer came, you were bound not
to risk a battle against Johnston's superior force, on the 18th July, when
you had before you the telegram of General Scott of the 17th July, in
which he said, "McDowell has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax ; the
junction will probably be carried to-morrow, the 18th." Your order was
to delay Johnston so that he might not reinforce the junction with his
main body. You did delay him so that he did not reinforce the junction
until the 21st July, three days after the 18th, on which day, the 18th,
General Scott informed you the junction would probably be carried.
Surely under such circumstances no blame can attach to you for the
subsequent. advance of Johnston on Manassas.
Upon reading the record, fair-minded men will concur in the judgment pronounced upon your conduct by that lamented hero of the war,
Major-General George H. Thomas, who said in his letter of August 8th,
1864, "writing to you and of your campaign: "I have always believed,
and have frequently so expressed myself, that your management of the
three months' campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests of the service, considering the means at your disposal, and the
nature of the troops under your command."
With sincere respect,
I am very truly yours, &c.,
JNO. A. BINGHAM.
MAJOR-GENERAL

R. P ATTimsoN,
Philadelphia, Pa.

9
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BALTIMORE, August 13th, 1871.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON,
Philadelphia.

DEAR Srn: Yesterday I had the pleasure of receiving a copy of your
Campaign in the Valley in 1861, which has been carefully read with
great gratification. It is certainly a most complete vindication of yourself, and must satisfy every impartial mind. The day for gross misrepresentation has passed, and people view with calmer judgment, actions
that in the early heat of the contest they were unwilling dispassionately
to comment upon.
Our regiment returned safely, all in good condition, and with a lively
recollection of your kind, genial, and generous welcome.
We feel you have done much to kindle a kindly spirit of brotherly
fellowship between the people of the two cities. Pray accept my thanks,
and believe me,
Yours truly,
J. 8TRICHER JENKINS.

PHILADELPHIA, May 19th, 1871.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I have read with much pleasure, the very interesting "Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley" which you have so kindly sent to me.
A more decisive refutation of the senseless charges made upon you at
the time it would be difficult to conceive of, and while it cannot but be
gratifying to you to reflect that the more intelligent of your follow-citizens did not then join in the popular clamor, they must have since better
appreciated the dignified magnanimity which prompted you to suffer in
silence, for so long a time, under such undeserved reproach.
Again thanking you, General, and assuring you that your little book
has to me an additional value, because it contains the autograph of its
distinguished author,
I am, very sincerely and respectfully,
Your friend,
SAMUEL L. SHOBER.
GENERAL R. p ATTERSON, Philadelphia.

PHILADELPHIA, June 9th, 1871.

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.
DEAR Srn: I beg that you will accept my best thanks for the privi-
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lege afforded me in the perusal of your "Campaign of 1861," which I
have read most carefully.
That in your recital of this important historical event you ·have not
only justified in the fullest manner your own action, but have faithfully
· protected the interests and integrity of our country, is the humble but
sincere opinion of
Your obliged and obedient servant,
JOHN EISENBREY, JR.

1007

w .ALNUT

PHIL.A.DELPHIA,

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT

STRE:hlT,

February 5th, 187:?.

p ATTERSON.

I thank you sincerely for your kindness in sending
me a copy of your "Shenandoah Valley Campaign." I have read parts,
and looked over the whole, with exceediug interest. In common with the
whole country, I was abused at the time with the imputations which were
cast upon you. I rejoice greatly that you have so honorably vindicated
yourself. Your book is a most valuable contribution to the truth of
history. You were made the scapegoat for the sins of others. I now
see also that you did not get the credit which was due you for large
views and wise plans in regard to the war generally, aside from your
doing all you could, and the best you could, in the special charge intrusted to you.
I am the more gratified to have made your acquaintance, and to have
read your book, and to have my mind cleared of the falsehoods with
which it was abused, becau~e I myself was a resident of Washington
during all those days ; I was personally acquainted with the President,
several members of the Cabinet, and many mem hers of Congress; and
very often came in possession of facts 'vhich were the master-key to history, and which yet ·were never ·written and may never be printed. So
closely did I study men and events at that time, and so full of falsehoods
are all hitherto published accounts of the war, that I have frequently
meditated an "Inside History of the 'Var." Many distinguished patriots have repeatedly said they wished I would, and several very eminent actors in these scenes have offered to give me material.
If I were to write such a book, it would be a pleasure to me, among
other pleasant duties, to represent you as being entirely unworthy of the
blame which was cast upon you; that you merited instead great praise;
that you were sacrificed merely to save those who were truly at fault;
DEAR GENERAL:
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that your superiors were vastly incompetent; that General Scott himself (perhaps solely from age), was unable to grasp and manage the war;
that General McDowell was unequal to so grave a command ; and that
the Bull Run disaster, so universally believed to be thei fault of General
Patterson, was not his fault at all, but was the result of general and
fatal disqualification and incapacity in higher quarters.
It affords me, as one who has studied the rebellion matters thus closely,
the highest gratification to have read your calmly stated report of the
facts, and the purest and most vivid pleasure to have had my own mind
so thoroughly purged of error.
To this I must add the additional pleasure it affords me to add yourself to the long list of distinguished actors in the war with whom I have
become personally acquainted.
I deem it an honor, General, to sign myself,
Your friend and servant,
A. McCoY.

OFFICE

NEw

ORLEANS AND CARROLLTON RAILROAD Co.,

NEW

ORLEANS,

November 4th, 1872.

::MY DEAR GENERAL:

On my return from Virginia, I found at my house your Narrative of
the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, which you were kind
enough to send me by Mr. Ogden, of this city. I read it with much
pleasure, and have no hesitation in saying that, in my humble opinion,
you have exculpated yourself from the unjust charges brought against
you by yom commanding general, who left you in ignorance of his plan
of operations, and who, being in constant telegraphic communication
with you, did not advise you when to form a junction with General
McDowell. ·
Your proposition from Hagerstown, of June 21st, 1861, to change
your base to Leesburg, was perfectly correct ; and General Halleck's
criticism (pages 40 and 41), of the exterior positions occupied by yourself and General McDowell, relative to General Johnston and myself,
is uuanswerable.
You certainly kept Johnston's forces at 'Vinchester long enough to
have insured tny defeat at Manassas, if I had been properly attacked on
the 18th July, 1861. I had then along the Bull Run but about 17,000
men of all arms (badly disciplined and armed), of which only about one
regiment of infantry guarded, for want of troops, the crossing at the
stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike. McDowell's forces, about
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45,000 or 50,000 strong, were then immediately in my front, while Johnston's army was still at or about 'Vinchester, over 60 miles to my left,
and Holmes about half that distance to my right and rear. It is probable that if McDowell did not handle more successfully his greatly superior numbers on the 18th July, he would not have done much better
with your forces added to his own, after Johnston had joined me with a
part of his forces on the 21st.
I will remark here that the latter's first troops commenced arriving
at Manassas on the morning of the 20th, and the remainder only reached
there about noon on the 21st, while the battle was being fought with
great slaughter near the stone bridge, about four and a half miles from
Manassas. The total force brought by him was about 8000 men of all
arms. General Holmes, from Acquia Creek, joined me on the 19th with
about 3000 men, and I received from Richmond, between the 18th and
21st, about 2000 more, making my whole force amount, on the 21st, to
nearly 30,000 men of all arms.
Through the blind obstinacy of President Davis, he would not authorize me to order Generals Johnston and Holmes to join me until noon
of the 17th July, when McDowell had already driven my advance guard
(Bonham's brigade) from Fairfax Court-house, only about ten or twelve
miles from Manassas. You may readily imagine what would have been
the fate of the Confederacy if McDowell had attacked me heavily on my
extreme left or right on the 18th with his preponderating and well-organized army, while I had but about 17,000 men, badly equipped and
unused to marching or manceuvring.
Permit me to say that you overestimate General Johnston's forces at
Winchester. I do not think he ever had more than 16,000 men all
told; but if you had not more than 20,000, I believe that it would have
been very imprudent on your part to have attacked him in position, especially with troops in your command whose time of service was about
to expire.
I remain, dear General, yours most sincerely,
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
GENERAL RoBERT PAT'rERSON,

No. 1300 Locust Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

GLEN

CovE, March 7th, 1873.

GENERAL ABERCROMBIE,
Glen wood, L. I.

MY DEAR Srn: I am in receipt of General Patterson's" Narrative of
Operations in the Valley in 1861," for which please accept my thanks.
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A soldier's honor and reputation are dearer to him than aught else on
earth, and I thoroughly sympathize with the General, in his desire to
set himself right, be correctly understood by those who, either through
ignorance of the subject or blind prejudice, have been inclined to censure
him for the results of _his operations in the vicinity of Winchester in
1861, and especially for his failure to hold Johnston in check, and for
not marching on Manassas, and effecting a junction with McDowell after
he, Johnston, had escaped him, &c.
I cannot see of what service General Patterson's column would have
been on the field, as it is genernlly known that a large portion of the
troops that were there did not fire a shot or go into action at all.
Besides, the Commander-in-chief of the Union forces was well aware
that Johnston had abandoned Winchester, and ,united his forces with
Beauregard, and if he did not feel sufficiently strong to attack without
General Patterson's co-operation, it seems to me that he should have
quietly awaited his arrival, especially as there was no need for haste at
that stage of the game.
I have read the report carefully, and am of the opinion that it not
only clearly and satisfactorily accounts for General Patterson"s movements in the campa.ign alluded to, but fully refutes the charges and aspersions of those who ungenerously desired to fasten upon him the odium
and disgrace attending the disastrous results of the Bull Run repulse.
The report has been too long withheld from the pub1ic,. and I hope it
will be extensively circulated even at this late day.
The copy you kindly sent me has already been read by a number of
people in my neighborhood, and I intend to pass it around among my
friends and neighbors generally.
Hoping this will. find yourself and family in good health 1 believe me,
General,
Very respectfully yours,
GEORGE DURYEA,

Late I"'t.-001. 5th N. Y. Volunteer Infantry,
Brevet Colonel U. S.. Volunteers.

THE CITIZENS' AssocrATlON OF NEw YoRK,
No. 813 BROADWAY, March 18th~ 1873-.
GENERAL

J. J.

ABERCROMBIE,

U.S. A.,
Roslyn, L. I.

I have had the honor to receive your polite note of the
6th instant, which reached my hands on the 11th, and on the day folGENERAL:
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lowing, a pamphlet containing a history of the campaign of General
Robert Patterson from the beginning of the rebellion to July 24th, 1861.
I have carefully read the pamphlet, and am constrained to say, in the
face of strong prejudices long and honestly entertained, respecting the
cond net of General Patterson in the case referred to, that in the absence
of any countervailing statement, and accepting the documentary evidence
as full and fairly quoted, I do not see how a vindication could be more
complete and triumphant.
I am happy to say it removes from my own mind the last veBtige of
suspicion respecting his motives, and adds one more to the instances in
which time and truth, working on cooled passions and calmed understandings, have reversed unjust judgments that were inevitable in a conflict so vast, and involving a social not less than a political revolution.
I only regret for the sake of General Patterson and his friends, that
my opinion is not more important, but I feel assured that the candid
perusal of his vindication, will evoke from every just mind a tribute not
less emphatic than my own.
Wishing to him and to you many years of honor and happiness after
your long and arduous service of your country, I have the honor to be,
General,
With sincere respect, your obedient servant;

E. A.

DECA'rUR, ILLS.,

STANSBURY.

April 7th, 1873.

R. PATTERSON.
MY DEAR Sm: I found on my return to the hotel on Monday, after
having met you at Mr. Carey's, "A Narrative of the Campaign in the

MAJOR-GENERAL

Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861, by Robert Patterson," &c, and a
letter from my old commander in Mexico, requesting me to read the
former, a volume of 118 pages, at my leisure, before acknowledging its
receipt. I have the honor, General, to inform you I did myself the
pleasure to carefully read it to-day, and must thank you for the occasion
of again refreshing my memory about the stirring events of those startling days, when all of us were on trial in common with our country and
its precious interests, then imminently at stake. You will not, I trust,
regard me as unusually forgetful, when I assure you the glorious results
of the trials of those sad days, and the grand termination of all our
woes, in freedom, peace, stability, and I hope permanent national happiness, had spread over my memory an entire oblivion of so much as a
suspicion of your loyalty, fidelity, capacity, and patriotism, by any living
man.
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The case as stated in your "Narrative" is an ample vindication of
your military career at that time. I don't know any body under the
circumstances, and at the time, in the midst of such strange affairs, who
could have done better. General Scott himself did splendidly. The
world ought not and will not complain of either of you. At the end of
long ~nd useful lives, you are both, or both will be, entitled to the
praise and gratitude of your countrymen, and will ere long together lie
under the same sacred soi], respected and honored by all who ever knew
or served with you.
Very truly yours,

R. J.

OGLESBY.

Tow .A.NDA, PA.., April 28th, 1873.
MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have read the whole of your "Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah."
It gives me great pleasure to say, I think it presents a full and complete vindication of your conduct of the war.
With kind regards, I remain,
Yours truly,
ULYSSES MERCUR.

251

s.

FOURTH STREET,

PHILADELPHIA,

August 13th, 1873.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have read your book with pleasure and profit. It is a complete
refutation of all the charges alleged against you, and you need not have
the slightest apprehension of the fullest justice being done you as a
citizen and a soldier. I needed not your book to convince me of the
facts, so conclusively proved ,therein, but still it was satisfactory to read
the proofs. My mind was made up at the time. One fact, however,
produced in your book, takes me by surprise. I had always believed
that General Scott had been overruled by the President, in pressing the
Bull Run engagement, at the time the battle was fought ; who himself
was overwhelmed by outside pressure and clamor, confident of success;
but it would seem the President was overruled by the General-in-chief,
who evidently knew of Johnston's departure from Winchester, and of
your inability to check him, and felt confident of victory without your
aid. No one of the authorities seem anxious to inculpate you. The
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desire of those who were responsible for the fiasco, was to shift it from
their own shoulders, and put the clamorous people on any scent plausible
enough to excuse official blunders, official timidity, or official rashness.
Be this as it may, the records are all right as far as you are concerned,
the proof conclusive, and now the clamor is hushed. You stand without
an accuser.
Truly yours,
J. GLANCY JONES.
GENERAL ROBERT

p ATTERSON.

PHILADELPHIA.,

July 9th, 1873.

GENERAL R. PATTERSON.
DEAR SrR: I have been detained here a few days by illness, since
the adjournment' of the Constitutional Convention. Expect to leave for
home to-night. Before leaving, however, I feel constrained to, not only
as a duty to acknowledge the receipt of your "Campaign in the Valley
of the Shenandoah in 1861," but to express to you my belief, that your
vindication is complete and triumphant. I have read it carefully, and
regard it unanswerable. My regret is that in the face of the great array
of evidence you have produced, I cannot see how truthful history can
so thoroughly justify the great Captain-general whose OTders controlled
and necessarily embarrassed your movements. But truth must and
ought to prevail, though the heavens fall.
Yours truly,
T. STRUTHERS.

BREVOORT HousE,

N. Y., November 6th, 1873.

MY DEAR GENERAL:
I read with great attention the book you did me the honor of presenting to me, on the cars coming here yesterday.
I cannot of course profess to offer a military judgment on the facts
therein set forth, but I can say that, exercising ordinary common sense,
or the more critical judgment of a barrister, I think you make out
clearly:
1st. That had your counsel been taken, and you supplied with sufficient forces at the outset, you would have taken and held the whole of
the district, afterwards so memorably important, between Winchester
and Manassas.
If I am not mistaken you will find in the sheets I will send you after
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my return to England, a statement by the author of " Stonewall Jackson's Life" (Major-General Danberry, of the Confederate army), confirming your views. I dare not trust my memory in militai-y matters,
but if I remember right it is stated that the rebels were in a very bad
condition in that quarter at the critical time when you wished to strike
the blow.
2d. You prove that you could have done no more than you did, under
your orders, which are clear and specific, and with the force at your
command. The fact is, you were made a victim to the reputation of
General Scott, in whose place you should have been, or one of your old
coadj uto rs.
3d. You showed that you delayed Johnston's army five days beyond
the time when a battle was expected in McDowell's front; and that you
gave timely notice of his escape: moreover, that you ought to have
been ordered to follow to McDowell's support.
I thank you very much for affording me an opportunity of getting a
clear glance at that part of the history of the war, and sincerely congratulate you on being able to establish so conclusively, that which
ought to have been accepted on your reputation and experience.
I shall have the pleasure of calling on you and talking further on
these matters, on my return to Philadelphia. Meanwhile, General, I
am, with great regard,
Yours very truly,
EDWARD JENKINS.
MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.

LoursvILLE,

KY., November 26th, 1873.

MAJOR-GENERAL p ATTERSON.
MY DEAR GENERAL: I am indeed much indebted to you for your
kind consideration in sending me the picture of our club, and the portraits of yourself and son, which I assure you I prize highly. I shall have
them framed and hung up in my house, as a neverTfailing memento of
one whom I so highly esteem as yourself, and especially am I indebted to
' you for the copy sent me of the "Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah." I have read it through without laying it
down, and fearing lest the interest I felt in the "Narrative" might have
warped my judgment in regard to the acts and movements of the commander of the forces opposed to General Johnston, I again took up the
book, and as carefully and dispassionately as I could read, weighed, and
compared your orders and instructions from the General-in-chief; your
suggestions to him under circumstances where he was oblig'ed to be ignor-
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ant, not being on the field ; your information to him by telegram, three
days before the battle of Bull Run, that Johnston had left in that direction, and the most inexplicable information you received from him by
telegram of the 17th July, "that McDowell's first day's work has driven
the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-house, and the junction will probably
be carried to-morrow," leaving you fairly to infer that the battle was
over, before Johnston left your front, and of which you informed him by
telegram of the 20th July; besides all this, the answers of the officers of
the army, to questions put by the Committee of Congress on the "conduct of the war," clearly show the absurdity of the idea, that Johnston's
arrival at the critical moment (which was false) was the cause of the defeat of the Federal troops on the 21st July, 1861, and I am clearly of the
opinion that your operations, crippled as you were by unavoidable circumstances, were most judicious and deserved, as I am sure they will
hereafter receive the commendations of the people you served so well.
Permit me to say in conclusion, dear General, that I feel great diffidence
in presuming to criticize the military operations of a general once
lauded by General Scott, and admired by the whole army in Mexico.
With kind regards to Mrs. Patterson, and your family and self, I hope
to meet you on our next anniversary at the White House.
I remain, dear General, with great respect and esteem,
Sincerely yours,
T. L. ALEXANDER.

[COPY.]
liEADQU ARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
HAGERSTOWN,

Mn., June 25th, 1861.

Hrs EXCELLENCY A.G. CURTIN,
Governor of Pennsylvania.

GOVERNOR: As in the course of the military operations of the command now in .this department, this force may be withdrawn from this
vicinity and that of Frederick and Cumberland, leaving the frontier of
Pennsylvania unprotected, I consider it my duty to notify you, that you
may take such steps as may appear to you proper, to be prepared to defend your State from encroachments, should the offensive be assumed by
the insurgents.
As you now have a considerable force of reserve troops, which at any
moment the General Government might wish to use for common defence,
I trust you will pardon me for suggesting that they be posted at points
on the frontier of Pennsylvania, which to my mind are the most exposed,
and from which at any moment, if the government desired their services,
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they can be pushed as Federal troops into this State, or sent by rail to
other threatened parts of our country.
The places of importance in a military point of view are Bedford,
Chambersburg, Hanover, or Gettysburg, and York. State troops a~ these
points would sustain United States forces in Maryland, and check in case
of their being withdrawn, encroachments from Virginia. York has the
additional advantage of supporting Hanover, and of being on an easy
line of communication with Washington; at all of them a Federal officer,
authorized by government, can speedily turn the State into Federal
troops1 and throw them where they may be required.
I :respectfully present this subject to your consideration, trusting my
views may meet your approbation, and be found to coincide with State
policy in authorizing a reserve of State troops.
I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

R. p ATTERSON,
Major.General commanding .

•
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January 12th, 1874.

DEAR GENERAL:

I received and read carefully your masterly vindication of your
"Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley." The war and succeeding
events had prevented my ever before understanding the nature of the
complaints made against you in 1861, of which we heard some little at
the time across the border. But I now see clearly the gross injustice
done you by those who would put upon you the failure of the attack on
Manassas, though I was always satisfied as to the real cause of that
failure. Your views as to the strategic advantage of your force occupying Leesburg seem to me unanswerable. An impartial public will regard your vindication complete, and no one of your comrades of Mexico
rejoices more at this result than I.
The kindly consideration and friendship evinced in the tone and
language of your letter, and in your sending me photographs of yourself, is feelingly appreciated and reciprocated, and I should be much
pleased to have you some day look upon them in my parlor. Permit
me to inclose you a card of myself, taken about the time we were
confronting each other on the banks of the Potomac, not to remind you
of me at that time, but rather of the time when I was one of your
colonels in Mexico; I have no good likeness of the latter date.
I shall be most happy to accept your kind invitation for the anniversary dinner, if circumstances shall admit. The last was to me most
agreeable, and I hope you will have the next equally as agreeable. It
was a great success.
Truly and sincerely,

M. L.
GENERAL

p ATTERSON.

BONHAM.
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[From the PUBLIC

LEDGER

(Philadelphia), January 25th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S WINCHESTER CAMPAIGN.

at last, sets all things even. So says one of our favorite English classics, and of the sound philosophy contained in that brief sentence
we are constantly, in these days, receiving convincing proofs. How
much juster is the judgment we are now enabled to pronounce on many
of the general officers, and many of the campaigns, that were themes of
excited discussion in the earlier periods of the war. While General
William T. Sherman was in command of the department of the Ohio,
in 1861, he expressed the opinion that "two hundred thousand men"
were necessary for the Western campaign, and for this he was adjudged
unfit for command, and was banished to garrison duty at St. Louis. He
was even reported to be crazy, and the belief that he was so was for a
long period fixed on the popular mind. That unjust and hasty judgment
came near depriving the country of the services of° its most brilliant general. How vastly different is the public judgment to-day! Immediately
after the battle at Fort Donelson, and again after Shiloh, it was positively asserted that General Grant was a drunkard and unworthy of his
high position, and for a long time he held only a nominal command.
Nothing but the resolute efforts of a powerful friend in Congress saved
him from unmerited disgrace. It required the splendid campaign against
Vicksburg to vindicate his character. It would be easy to name a great
many similar cases, for they sum up by the score. In some of these the
victim has had to wait but a few months for justice, but others have had
their patience taxed over long years of hope deferred.
We are prompted to these remarks by the appearance of a little volume entitled "A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which for the first time places the history of General
Patterson's operations fully before the public. It is a clear and convincing record, and no man who is rightly made up can read it without repeating the words of President Lincoln to General Patterson: "I am
unable to see that you could have done anything else than you did do;
T1ME,
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your hands were tied; you obeyed your orders and did your duty, and I
am satisfied with your conduct."
It will be remembered that after the great disaster at Bull Run, General Patterson was very freely charged with a large share of the responsibility of that defeat. He was fiercely assailed for failing to hold the
rebel Johnston at Winchester; for not attacking that General in his
works there, according to order; and for permitting J obnston to slip
away to Manassas Junction without informing his superior officer. It
was further charged that on account of these military laches of General
Patterson, Johnston was enabled to arrive at Manassas "unexpectedly,"
and that thus the battle was lost. On all these points the "Narrative"
just published is clear and full in General Patterson's favor; there is
fact and date, and order, and report, and document, ample for his complete vindication. It establishes first this fact: that General Patterson's
col~mn was placed on a line of operations where it was as impossible for
him to prevent Johnston from .going to Manassas, as it would be for a
man in Baltimore to prevent a man in Philadelphia from going to New
York. It was a "false line," and was so pronounced by General Patterson and all his experienced regular officers. Among these were the
present Genera.ls George H. Thomas, Newton, Abercrombie, Stone, and
Negley. In lieu of that "false line," he proposed as early as the 20th
of June to fortify and hold Maryland Heights with a brigade, and to
move his main column to Leesburg, where he would have threatened
Johnston more effectually than at Martinsburg, and at the same time
would have been near enough to McDowell to assist him or to have received aid from him, as circumstances might demand. This plan, which
has received the distinguished approval of General Halleck, he was not
authorized to carry into effect. On the contrary he was kept on a line
which, as General Halleck observes, was " an exterior line," sixty miles
from Manassas, with Johnston's army" between him and McDowell's."
This should dispose of the complaint that Patterson failed to hold Johnston; but the facts make a still stronger case than that. N otwithstanding his ''false" position, for which he was not accountable, he did so
manamvre his column as to hold Johnston up to the time indicated in
the order of the General-in-chief, and for several days beyond that time.
General Patterson was informed that McDowell's attack would be made
on the 16th of July, and that he, Patterson, should demonstrate against
Johnston on that day. This he did, according to order, keeping Johnston
in line of battle all that day, and Johnston did not move from Winchester until the afternoon of the 18th, at which time Patterson was led to
believe from the tenor of the General-in-chief's dispatches that McDow- .
ell's battle had been delivered and the "junction carried."
The "Narrative" further establishes that General Patterson was
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never ordered to attack Winchester. Every dispatch of the General-inchief enjoins great "caution" and "circumspection ;" they emphasize
the injunction that "we must sustain no reverse," that "a check or a
drawn battle would be a victory to the enemy;" and that there should
be no attack unless it was clear to Patterson that he was in "superior,"
or at least " equal force " to Johnston. All the evidence goes to show
that he never was in force sufficient to disregard these positive, emphatic
and repeated instructions. Information on the spot showed that Johnston had not less than 32,500 men and 60 guns, some of them of heavy
calibre, and that he was in a strong position thoroughly intrenched.
Johnston's own reports prove that he had, early in July, not less than
twenty-one regiments of volunteers, twenty-five hundred militia in his
works, sixteen field guns, and other heavy guns in position. General
Patterson would have been guilty of flagrant disobedience of orders if
he had attacked 'Vinchester so defended, with his thirteen thousand
available men, and his six smooth-bore guns. But notwithstanding this
great disparity, General Patterson, on the 18th of July, twelve hours
before Johnston commenced his march from Winchester, telegraphed
the General-in-chief, " Shall I attack?" and to that demand for instructions he never got an answer.
'Vith :respect to the "unexpected" arrival of Johnston at Manassas,
the record is unanswerable. On the 20th of July, the day before the
battle of Bull Run, General Patterson telegraphed the General-in-chief,
that Johnston had marched· from 'Vin chester on the afternoon of the
18th. That Johnston would be at Manassas was well known in Washington and on the battle-field among our officers, on that same day.
There are many witnesses to this fact; but if there were none, there
stands the unimpeachable dispatch itself.
The battle of Bull Run was therefore not lost on account of Johnston's . "unexpected" appearance there, nor on account of any of the
circumstances for which it has been sought to hold General Patterson
responsible. Generals Heintzleman, Wadsworth, Franklin, Averill,
Barnard, Griffin, Slocum, Barry, Richardson, and others, have recorded
their evidence to the effect that the battle of Bull Run was lost because
of the delay of several days in the attack; because of the fatal delay on
the morning of the battle; because the batteries were badly posted ; and
because the reserves, 24,000 in number, were never brought into the
battle.
It may be asked, that, if General Patterson had so strong a case, why
it has never been brought before the public in official form. The answer
to this is in the "Narrative." General Patterson repeatedly asked for
a court of inquiry, but it was denied on the ground that he had been
"honorably discharged," and that a court could do no more. It was
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added that the publication of the correspondence was "incompatible
with the public interests," and so with a full vindication in his hands,
he was obliged to suffer on in silence. His aid-de-camp, Senator Sherman, sought to bring out the facts by a resolution of the Senate, but
that likewise failed. General Patterson appealed to the President, but
the President also felt obliged to withhold the correspondence for the
public good, but he indorsed General Patterson's conduct in the strong
words already quoted. Secretary Cameron and Assistant Secretary
Thomas A. Scott held the same favorable opinion, but their hands were
tied.
But, at length the record is before the public, and justice demands
that the people shall be made acquainted with its character, if they do
not see the volume itself. V\Then they read it, it will be strange indeed,
if they do not agree with the President, and say that General Patterson
"obeyed pis orders and did his duty." The military readers of the
"Narrative" will find what should be a conclusive opinion to them,
from Major-General George H. Thomas (who was of Patterson's command), in a letter dated Atlanta, August 8th, 1864. In this letter that
distinguished general says: "I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed myself, that your management of the three months'
campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests of the
service."

[From the

NORTH AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES GAZETTE

(Philadelphia), January 31st, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN OF THE
SHENANDOAH.

Our distinguished townsman, Major-General Robert Patterson, has
just published a work entitled "A Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," which, though intended as a mere
personal defence, yet contains much information which the historian and
the student of history will find it interesting to consult in forming a
judgment upon the events connected with the opening campaign of this
war. Why this book was written or printed General Patterson tells
very clearly in the outset, by narrating the efforts he made to secure an
investigation by some properly constituted tribunal; and we are inclined
to think that many who have heretofore condemned him will regret the
fact when they perceive the patient endurance of misrepresentation and
calumny which he has manifested. The defence of his course while in
command does not rest upon personal declarations of his own. It is
made up of documentary evidence not easily impugned.
This campaign was very brief, although so momentous. General
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Patterson had been second in command to General Scott in the Mexican
war, and enjoyed his confidence as a military man. Upon entering the
national service in this war he was appointed to the command of a department which included Philadelphia and Baltimore, and indeed all
north of Washington and south of New York. This fact, which is
generally forgotten by those most opposed to him, has led to a complete
ignoring of all his connection with the important work of opening the
interrupted communications between the national capital and the loyal
States. The work before us recalls the fact, and mentions that Patterson first designated the Annapolis route as the best avoidance of Baltimore, sent Butler thither to open it, and gave him the troops to operate
with. He states that Butler was ordered to occupy Annapolis, take
possession of the railroad and repair it, and occupy Annapolis Junction
also. Parton's Life of Butler completely sinks this fact, and leaves the
public to infer that the establishment of the Annapolis route was Butler's
own idea. The capture of Baltimore properly belongs to Butler, but
the expedition which soon after occupied the city had been fitted out by
Patterson expressly for the purpose, and hail long been in preparation
under the command of General Cad walader. We do not know that
Butler was aware of this, but should think it quite probable that he was.
The work of opening the routes to Washington being finished, the attention of Patterson was next turned to the defence of the southern border of Pennsylvania, obviously threatened by the strong force of Johnston at Harper's Ferry. Before commencing this campaign Patterson
endeavored to secure the organization of a large force of three years' men
for the defence of Pennsylvania; but the W ·a r Department declined to
accept the offer made for the purpose, and Patterson then ad vised Governor C11rtin to organize the troops already enlisted for tnis corps into a
reserve for the defence of the State. This was accordingly done, under
an act of our State legislature, and the celebrated Reserve Corps th us
had its origin.
The organization of the Army of the Shenandoah was far superior to
that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter was not brigaded at all.
Patterson had his army in the most perfect order, all brigaded and disciplined. McClellan's army of 'Vest Virginia was also well organized.
But neither of these had an adequate supply of artillery, while in that
arm the rebel armies were all strong, they having amply supplied themselves from our arsenals at the breaking out of the war. Patterson took
care to have a brigade of cavalry and some regu]ars of all arms.
We think it probable that Johnston's army was not numerically as
strong as Patterson believed it; for our spy service at that time was the
most ridiculous thing imaginable, and so continued to be for a year or
more. But Johnston was very strong in artillery and cavalry, just where
10
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we were weak, and his works were unquestionably formidable. Johnston's peculiarities were not then so well known as now, and hence his
retreat from Harper's Ferry was generally regarded as an ingenious device to draw Patterson into some trap. It was nothing of the kind.
Johnston knew he could not stand an assault at Harper's Ferry, and
therefore retreated. In the estimation of Scott this terminated the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and so in fact it did and should have
done. But while Johnston remained in the Valley Patterson could not
uncover Pennsylvania and Maryland by marching his army to join
McDowell, without recalling McClellan's corps from West Virginia, and
leaving it at Harper's Ferry to defend the line of the Potomac.
The true movement, as General Halleck suggested at the time in a
published criticism, would have been to Leesburg, and this was proposed
by Scott, and a plan for it asked from Patterson. But he was never
ordered to make the movement, and his regulars and part of his artillery
being taken away from him, Patterson found himself very much weakened, too much so, indeed, to attack Winchester. Still he did expect to
march to join McDowell, and awaited the order for the purpose, but it
never came, and the battle of Bull Run was delayed beyond the time
fixed for it, whereby Johnston had time to get to the scene of action.
We have thus hastily run over the pointg in this brochure, and presented Patterson's case as we view it, and as we think the readers of his
statement will. He furnishes in his pages a letter from General George
H. Thomas, who commanded a brigade under him, and who declares
unequivocally that Patterson could have done nothing but what he did.
President Lincoln came to the same conclusion after a long and careful
examination of the matter.

[From the

REPUBLICAN

(Chester, Pa.), February 3d, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH.

We have heretofore· written concerning General Robert Patterson's
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, in 1861. The facts from
which we then wrote were given to us by men under his commandofficers and privates-who had ample opportunities, from personal experience, to speak with knowledge and certainty on the subject. We
were well aware that it is not what is considered popular to defend a
man, however worthy, against a passionate torrent of public opinion; but
an impartial journalist, which we humbly aspire to be, must often find
his duty to consist in opposition to, rather than in an easy compliance
with, hastily formed prejudice.
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We refer to the course which we felt it right to adopt towards a worthy
Pennsflvanian with pleasure, in view of the Narrative which General
Patterson has published of the campaign which culminated in the disaster at Bull Run. With remarkable forbearance, but characteristic
of true soldierly feeling, for more than three years has he declined
to enter upon the easy duty of vindicating himself from the calumnies and aspersions which have been heaped upon him. The Narrative which he has published, and to which we now refer, amply proves
that the delay has not been from lack of defensive material, but from
considerations of public duty, which are the more commendable, inasmuch as they furnish a striking contrast to the motives or rash impulses
which have prompted the vague and irresponsible slanders with which
he has been assailed. The Narrative shows very plainly, what we have
always asserted, from the evidence of active participants in the campaign,
that whatever were the causes which led to the disaster at Bull Run,
General Patterson was in no manner responsible for them. It shows,
however, much more, namely, that the serious and vital defect of the
plan of operations against the rebels, had been foreseen by him, and that
the recommendations he made would have avoided the disaster to which
it ultimately led. The responsi.bility of the campaign devolved solely on
the General-in-chief. General Patterson's vindication can be safely reposed in the demonstrated facts, that he was active, vigilant, prompt
and obedient to every order of his commande~. No subordinate could
have evinced a more earnest solicitude for the entire success of the plans
of his superior in command, nor a more cheerful, and indeed, anxious
alacrity in carrying out every suggestion made. That General Patterson
did not achieve the now universally recognized absurdity of making an
enemy, vastly his superior in numbers and all the material of war, entirely subservient to a paper plan of campaign at Washington, is quite
true; but of equal verity, and of far more importance is the fact, that
the ablest military criticism which has appeared of that campaign,
written by General Halleck, has shown that the plan of the General-inchief was essentially -wrong.
We have not the space nor the time to enter into an elaborate review
of the very valuable chapter in the history of the war which this N arrative furnishes ; but we take pleasure in remarking, that our judgment of
the campaign, formed, as we have before observed, from information
given us by some of the gallant mep who participated in it, is confirmed
by the testimony of some of the ablest officers of the army, and particularly by the weight of the approval of the glorious commander of the
Cumberland and victor over Hood's army, General George H. Thomas,
who served under General Patterson in the brief campaign of 1861.
We cannot close this brief notice of the volume before us without
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commending it to public attention, and particularly to those who, without a proper knowledge of the facts, may have formed an unfavorable
opinion of its author and his patriotic and disinterested services to the
Union cause.

[ffi·om the

SUNDAY DISPATCH

(Philadelphia), Februm·y 5th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON AND THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

As the battle of Bull Run was our first great national disappointment,
it aroused intense feelings of indignation when, by the official accounts,
it was. discovered to have been lost by a series of blun.ders on our side.
"\Vhilst it was evident enough that the Federal troops had been badly
managed, it was also considered necessary for future success that the
confidence of the people in our military management should not be
weakened by a frank revelation of all the facts connected with the operations before that battle. The position of the troops under Major-General Patterson, in 1861, was supposed to be a check upon the junction of
the armies of Beauregard and Johnston ; and it was his business to prevent, if possible; a union of those troops. That he was unable to do so
is a matter of history; that he failed in his duty has been the general
opm1on. The censure which was visited on General Patterson was universal and intense. It was the result of misinformation among the people; and the consequences have been visited upon the supposed offender
in obloquy and invective almost to this hour. As this journal, misled
by what we supposed to be facts, was among those which expressed decided opinions upon the subject-opinions which, until within a very
short time, were never changed, it is no more than just that upon being
convinced of our error that we should candidly acknowledge it.
For more than three years General Patterson has been silent, but not
contented. He believed that he had fulfilled the commands of his military superiors to the very letter. He had done the best that his means
allowed ; and so far as the reinforcement of Beauregard by Johnston,
previous to the battle of Bull Run, was concerned, he has now shown
in a Narrative lately published that he was unable to prevent it. On
the 1st of November, 1861, he addressed the Secretary of 'N ar, asking for
a court of inquiry upon his conduct of the Maryland and Virginia campaign, stating his reasons why he believed that injustice had been done
him. On the 30th he received a reply from Secretary Cameron, informing him that " there was no precedent for an investigation or trial of an
officer's conduct after he has received an honorable discharge." For
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that reason, and in consequence of the absence of Lieutenant-General
Scott in Europe, the request was declined.
General Patterson then went to Washington and saw the Secretary
and Assistant Secretary Scott. General Cameron acknowledged that
until that time he had not known of the orders from General Scott,
which it was the duty of General Patterson to obey, and that they placed
the case "in a very different light from their previous understanding of
it." At the same tim·e, he said that "a court would throw the blame
upon General Scott, and this he would never consent to." General
Patterson was taken to President Lincoln, to whom all the official orders
and correspondence bearing upon the question of General Patterson's
conduct were read. He listened attentively to all, and at the close
said: "General Patterson, I have 'never found fault with or censured
you; I have never been able to see that you co.uld have don·e anything
else than you did. Your hands were tied ; you obeyed orders and did
your duty, and I am satisfied with your conduct." This was, of course,
gratifying to General Patterson ; but it did not set him right before the
country. Officials at Washington knew everything, but the people did
not. A motion was made in the Senate, in December, by Mr. Sherman,
of Ohio, for the production of the correspondence between Scott and
Patterson. It was adopted; but Secretary Cameron replied that "it was
not deemed compatible with the public interest" to furnish it. Thus
the door seemed to be closed upon all effort to have this matter investigated. The reason is now apparent. It was thought necessary to protect the reputation of General Scott, and this could not be done if the
impression that General Patterson was the cause of the disaster at Bull
Run should be removed from the public mind.
From the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," appointed by
Congress, fair play was expected, but it seems very apparent that this
committee was more anxious to protect its favorites than to conduct an
honest, impartial inquiry. General Patterson was examined before that
committee. He asked permission to hear the witnesses who were examined
in relation to his conduct in the three months' campaign. This was denied. The committee conducted its labors to serve its own end, and as
a sequel it declared that the battle of Bull Run was lost in consequence
of the failure of General Patterson to "hold the forces of Johnston in
the Valley of the Shenandoah." This conclusion was arrived at, not by
an examination of the orders upon which General Patterson acted, but
by passing over them, or paying no attention to them. Thus every effort
of General Patterson to have an investigation, such as was due to the
magnitude of his alleged offence, was fruitless. He has waited until the
progress of time has dissipated every pretence that a promulgation of
the official papers can be injurious to the national cause, and now they
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are published in hope to obtain that justice which a supposed necessity
to protect the public interests had refused. "The Narrative of the
Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, in 1861," which has lately
been published by General Patterson, is intended to set forth his own
defence. It is a full history of his campaign, with all the orders and
reports which were elicited during its continuance; and the whole forms
a connected history of the military operations of General Patterson's
column, and many facts are revealed which were hitherto unsuspected
by the country.
It is not necessary for us to follow the fortunes of this column minutely: the dispatches show that the troops were deficient in transportation and artillery; that they were all raw, without field experience;
and were, of necessity, to be handled 'with caution. On the 8th of June,
while preparing to move against Harper's Ferry, General Patterson received an order from General Scott, which was the guide for all his subsequent operations. "I have said that we must have no reverse," said
Scott; " but this is not enough. A check, or a drawn battle would be a
victory to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, and
his magazines with voluntary contributions. Take your measures,
therefore, circumspectly; make a good use of your engineers and other
experienced officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear
prospect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted, and not
inferior to you in numbers."
At that time General Patterson had about nine thousand men, among
whom were five companies of regular infantry, and one battery of regular artillery, with Burnside's Rhode Island battery and regiment. · These
troops had partly crossed the Potomac, when upon the 16th of June,
General Patterson was ordered to return the regulars and the Rhode
Island troops to Washington. The next day this order was repeated
peremptorily ; and in the beginning of his forward movement, General
Patterson was deprived of his best troops, and left without a ~ingle gun!
Johnston had retired from the line of the Potomac, but General Patterson could not dare to follow him. He was compelled to recross the
Potomac, and thus this enterprise ended in an unfortunate failure.
General Patterson then asked for permission to hold Maryland
Heights, and advance to Leesburg, where he could have been in communication with McDowell, and could have assisted in any movement
made by that General. He would have been in a position to attack the
rebel right wing, and at the battle of Manassas he mjght have brought
his troops into such positions as would have made the subsequent battle
a victory for the Union forces. But he was ordered to remain in front
of Johnston, at Winchester ; and to cross the river and attack him if in
equal or superior force. But he was not even in equal force. He had
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ten thousand six hundred and fifty men, and six guns, when this order
was received; whilst Johnston had fifteen thousand men, and from
twenty to twenty-four guns. With this small force General Patterson,
who could get no batteries or regulars from 'Vashington, crossed the
Potomac beyond Falling Waters, encountered Stonewall Jackson's brigade, and drove it, after a spirited action, and with but little loss, entering Martinsburg on the 3d of July. Jackson fell back to Winchester
and joined Johnston.
General Patterson was ordered to advance on Winchester, but he was
in a sad plight for want of sufficient artillery and transportation. Johnston, by this time, was strongly intrenched with forty-two thousand men,
thirty-five thousand of them regulars, and fifty-two guns. The opinion
of the Federal officers was that our troops were in no condition to fight.
This was declared at a council of war, at which Major-General Thomas
and many officers who have since made reputations on other fields assisted. The time of the three months' men was rapidly coming to a
close, and most of them declared that they would not continue in service
beyond the term for which they had been mustered. An advance would
have been perilous, in consequence of the danger of the men being withdrawn by end of service at a critical moment, and all that would have
been gained would have to be abandoned. At Martinsburg General
Patterson was not in any position to prevent Johnston from joining
Beauregard. He was as much out of the way as if he had been at
Harrisburg, and was expected to intercept troops marching from Philadelphia to New York. Johnston had a railroad, by which he could
send forward twelve thousand men per day, and destroy ~he railroad
after him. If General Patterson should follow, he could never catch
the enemy. Now, why was General Patterson at Martinsburg? Because he had been ordered there by General Scott. He wanted to be at
Leesburg, where he could have been of service; but he was not permitted
to go there when he asked. General Johnston had the interior line, and
easy communication. General Patterson had to move round the curve
of a circle to reach Washington, and was without proper transportation
and sufficient artillery. These facts are sufficient to show that the order
of General Scott, that General Patterson should hold General Johnston,
was impossible of performance, and they account for the ease with which
General Johnston marched to Manassas when he was wanted there.
In the meanwhile the advance from Washington, which resulted in
the battle of Manassas, was planned. General Patterson requested, on
the 9th of July, to be permitted to move to Charlestown, from which
point he could either attack Winchester, or march to Leesburg. On
the 13th of July he obtained permission to make this movement, and
requested General Scott to apprise him when he should attack Winches-
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ter. General Scott wrote back in a manner which signHied that the
attack upon Beauregard was to be made on Tuesday, the 10th. Meanwhile General Patterson did all that he could, and marched to Charlestown. But in the meantime, General Johnston had stolen away, leaving
militia at Winchester. On the 18th, the day that the great battle was to
be fought, he apprised General Scott that the enemy had stolen avvay. If
the battle had been fought dn that day, as was originally intended, General Johnston's reinforcements would not have been on the field, and the
victory would have been an easy one for the Union. But Patterson did
move; he telegraphed to General Scott, "Shall I attack Winchester?"
To that question he never received a reply.
He was now in great trouble about the three months' men of his
command, most of whom had but six days to serve, and who had declared that they would not stay a single day beyond their terms. Eighteen regiments were to go out of service on the 24th. On the 20th he
apprised General Scott that Johnston left Winchester on the 18th with
32,000 men. It would take him .three days to reach Manassas. If the
battle had been fought on the 18th, this force would not have strengthened Beauregard. Even on the 20th, Scott, who then knew of it, could
have succeeded in an attack. Officers high in reputation declare that a
victory might have been won on the 21st, if an attack bad been made
early in the morning. It was delayed until near noon, and then Johnston was enabled to come in at the critical movement, and turn what
would have been a glorious victory into a shameful defeat.
The President of the United States knew of this reinforcement by
Johnston, and begged Scott to hold back the battle by seizing the
heights at Centreville until he could be reinforced by Patterson and
troops from Fortress Monroe. But the General-in-chief had his blood
up. He would listen to no delay. Everybody was in the best spirits, and
sanguine of success against all odds. The battle was fought, and badly
fought; it was a series of blunders from beginning to end. Patterson,
in Virginia, knew nothing of it; he heard nothing more from Scott.
After the 18th he was waiting for orders to attack Winchester, but never
received them. He supposed that the battle had been fought on the
18th. He knew not of the delay, and only heard of the result at Bull
Run by common report, on the 22d. He was now losing his men rapidly
by expiration of their terms; but three regiments-the Twenty-fourth
Pennsylvania, Colonel Owen; Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Oakford, and one other-agreed to stand by him. The rest left punctually
on the expiration of muster. In a few days General Patterson was
without a man, and receiving his honorable discharge on the 25th of
July, he returned to his home to find that he was held responsible for a
misfortune that he was not allowed to prevent by his own action, and
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with which he really had no more to do than the lowest subaltern in his
ranks.
We ha.ve written this because we consider it our duty .to do so, being
convinced that the views which ourselves and the public held upon General Patterson's responsibility for the failure at Manassas were erroneous, for which the only excuse can be that we never had an opportunity
to learn facts concealed from the country, until now.

[.F?·om the SUNDAY MERCURY (Philadelphia), Feb1-uary 5th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN.

If General Patterson had needed in the opinion of all thinking men,
or with the future historians of this "the bloodiest war on time's record,"
a personal vindication of his conduct of the campaign of 1861 in the
Valley of the Shenandoah-the Narrative he has just issued would be allsufficient. · The "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," is a plain, frank, and complete statement, a presentation of the facts concerning the memorable and disastrous battle of Bull
Run, an indisputable expose of the causes which led to our defeat.

[.F?·om THE PRESS (Philadelphia), February 7th, 1865.]

THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR-GENERAL PATTERSON AND THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SHENANDOAH.

The early campaigns of this war have gone into history, and men
speak of the battles of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff with almost the same
reverence and mystery with which they speak of Marengo or Buena
Vista. These actions belong to the paElt, and, in many respects, the
men who commanded in those early days are almost as absent from the
public eye as Napoleon or Taylor. Winfield Scott has laid aside the
sword and adopted the pen; Johnston is in retirement; McDowell is far
off in California; their subordinates are now commanding departments
and armies; and men who filled obscure positions on their staffs are now
among the most eminent warriors of the world. One of the generals
then in command, now living in retirement, is a beloved and respected
fellow-townsman. He has carried his country's sword in three wars,
and by some sad freak of fortune (for we think we can use this phrase
in the sense we have written it), upon his name is showered much of the
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reproach of our early military failures. So long as General Patterson
was content to remain silent, and bow before this opinion, it did not become us to speak, especially as all information on the subject was locked
away in his own archives and those of the War Department. The time
has come for him to speak, and, with his Narrative before us, the time
has also come for us to express our opinion of the merits or demerits of
his Shenandoah campaign. We welcome the opportunity, for however
much we may dissent from the opinions of General Patterson, or take
exception to his political affinities, his fame as a soldier of Pennsylvania
is very dear to the people of our State. This soldier of three wars,
this general commanding Pennsylvania troops, this friend and fellowcitizen, whose history is to such a great extent the history of our commonwealth, has every claim to our just consideration, and we shall
simply be just in our criticism this morning.
"General Patterson,'' said the President, at the close of an interview
that lasted for five hours, "I have never found fault with or censured
you; I have never been able to see that you could have done anything
else than you did do. Your hands were tied; you obeyed orders, and
did your duty, and I am satisfied with you." After carefully reading
this Narrative we find no difficulty in indorsing Mr. Lincoln's opinion.
We have before us the story of a soldier, who entered the war with an
unusually extensive experience. He had been an officer in the war of
1812. He had held a high command in Mexico, where he distinguished
himself for discretion and bravery. When the rebellion broke out, he
was assigned to the command of the Pennsylvania militia, who were
called out by the President. While engaged in the duty of organizing
these troops, General Patterson was placed by General Scott in command of what was then called "The Department of Washiugton," embracing the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the
District of Columbia. At that time no military command was more
important. The attempt to pass the Massachusetts soldiers through
Baltimore had led to a memorable and bloody riot, and the uprising of
the secessionists in Maryland had entirely severed all communication
between the national capital and the loyal States. Here was a position
of great embarrassment. Patterson, by the mere accident" of circumstances, became, as it were, the only available general of the country.
He held an independent command to all intents and purposes, and in
this extraordinary position acted with great decision and promptitude.
To him must be given the credit of opening communication with Washington. Taking Butler as the first instrument, he sent him to Annapolis
to occupy that point, and secure the route to the capital. These orders
Butler obeyed. The importance of Annapolis now, and the perils we
should have incurred if the line of railroad from the Junction to Wash-
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ington had been destroyed, will show conclusively, we think, that in this
first act of his embarrassing administration General Patterson behaved
like a soldier and a statesman. It may not be too much for us to add
that, if equal promptitude and sagacity had been at that time shown by
other men in high command, many of the early mistakes of the war
would have been a voided.
In the early part of the war many of our distinguished men were of
the opinion that it would be a temporary insurrection, and might be
easily suppressed with a 8mall military force. A few clear-headed men,
who saw the real bearing of this war, thought differently, and among
this number we must place General Patterson. He early believed that
a large army was necessary, and, although the government overruled
his conviction, he made many applications for power to raise regiments
for " the war." No one now doubts that this would have been the true
policy. He called for twenty-five thousand men, and when communication was opened the call was overruled by the military authorities. The
men who answered to his call afterwards became the great Pennsylvania
Reserve Corps, whose glorious career General Patterson truly says,
" forms one of the brightest pages in the history of the war." Having
administered with great judgment, the affairs of his department, General
Patterson took the field, at the head of a small body of men, for the
purpose of attacking Harper's Ferry. His plan was submitted to General Scott and approved. General Patterson advanced towards the
Potomac, and Johnston, who held Harper's Ferry, abandoned that
point, and fell back to Bunker Hill, a position equidistant between
Martinsburg and Winche.ster. Our army then did not consist of ten
thousand men, and there can be no doubt, we think, that if this plan of
General Patterson had been unmolested, he would have succeeded in
holding the Valley of the Shenandoah. He desired, first, to transfer to
Harper's Ferry his base of operations; second, to open and maintain
free communication east and west along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; and third, to hold Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, and Charlestown,
a strong force gradually and securely advancing, as they were prepared,
towards Winchester and Woodstock, and thus cut off all communication between the rebels and the West. Now, whatever may be said of
the early strategy of this war, one thing has been proved by events, and
that is, that if Winchester and Martinsburg ~ad been occupied and
held in the beginning of the war, the Valley of the Shenandoah would
, not so frequently have been the valley of our national humiliation.
General Scott, yielding, we believe, to the temporary clamor of a nation
of military theorists, who imagined they were familiar with war, differed from General Patterson, although the judgment of that general
was strengthened by subordinates who subsequently gained high renown
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in this war-men like General Newton, General Charles P. Stone, General Negley, General George H. Thomas, and General Abercrombie.
Most of these officers were young soldiers then, but they were as competent to advise General Patterson at that time as they were subsequently
to take command of large and victorious armies.
We entirely agree with the Hon. John Sherman, now Senator in Congress, and then on General Patterson's staff, that "the great error of
General Scott undoubtedly was that he gave way to a causeless apprehension that Washington was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress." Acting under this apprehension, General Scott ordered the expedition of General Patterson to recross the river Potomac into Maryland, and took away from that officer all of his regular troops and
artillery, leaving him without a gun, and with but a single troop of
volunteer cavalry. It was thought at that time that the General's course
was marked by vacillation, and that his failure to attack Johnston was
to be attributed to the worst of causes. At that time no one was safe
from suspicion, and a nation ignorant of the art of war preferred to think
that an unsatisfactory general was swayed by the worst motives. We
are surprised that General Patterson should have submitted to these
cruel imputations, but the vindication of to-day is sweetened by the
patience and forbearance of the past. We see, in the first place, that
Patterson was recalled from his pursuit of Johnston, when he abandoned
Harper's Ferry, by a peremptory order from Scott; and, in the second
place, we find his subsequent plan of operations overruled. This plan
shows, we think, that the much-abused General Patterson of 1861 had
the clearest conception of the necessities of the Virginia campaign of any
general at that time in command. He desired to abandon the upper
line, hold the Maryland Heights, and thus command Harper's Ferry,
and, with Frederick as a base of supplies, move upon Leesburg, and
there unite with Colonel Stone, who was to command a co-operating
column from Washington. The advantage of this would have been that
General Patterson would have been in a position to co-operate with
McDowell. The much-wanted column of Patterson-the long-lookedfor and eagerly-expected column, instead of nestling under the works of
Harper's Ferry, on the sad summer day of Bull Run, would have made
our rout a victory and summarily ended the war. On this subject General Patterson is entitled to the opinion of General Halleck, written on
the Pacific coast before he re-entered the army, and in ignorance of
General Patterson's proposition to Scott: "Had Patterson," says General
Halleck, "crossed the Potomac at Leesburg, he would have threatened
Johnston's communications much more effectually than at Martinsburg,
and at the same time would have been near enough to McDowell to assist him, or to receive assistance from him, as circumstances might have
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required." This is precisely what General Patterson wished to do, and
precisely what was refused by General Scott.
Another point in General Patterson's defence which should be considered, is his explanation of the belief that he was outgeneralled by
Johnston, who left him at Charlestown and hastily joined Beauregard
on the day of the battle of Bull Run. The General shows that he was
kept against his own judgment upon what he believed to be a false line,
and that General Johnston had the power to join Beauregard whenever
it suited his purpose to do so, being on an interior line, with the command of a railway, and in the country of friends. General Patterson
was on an exterior line, without a railway or adequate transportation,
and with an army whose term of service had expired, who were clamoring for home, and many of them without clothing. Had he been at
Leesburg, he might have assailed the left of the rebels at Manassas precisely as Johnston attacked Stone at Ball's Bluff, a few months subsequently, and drove him into the river. He might also have torn up the
railrnad that ran from Winchester to Manassas. As it was, he detained
Johnston by his manamvring until two days after the day when Bull Run
was to have been fought, and the results of his strategy were that General
Johnston arrived on the field of Bull Run.five days after the day fixed by
General Scott in his dispatch to General Patterson for the attack by
McDowell. The evidence in this Narrative shows conclusively that the
mistakes of this campaign were not made by our Pennsylvania commander, and that the words of Mr. Lincoln were very true when he said
to General Patterson: " Your hands were tied; you obeyed orders and
·
did your duty."
Left in ignorance of the results of Bull Run, General Patterson telegraphed to General Scott his opinion of the probable result of an attack
upon Winchester, and asked, "Shall I attack?" This was at 1.30 .A..M.
on the 18th of July, twelve hours before the first of General Johnston's
troops left Winchester on the route to Manassas. No answer was returned, and General Patterson was left to hear the result of McDowell's
movement from the newspapers of the following Monday. On the 20th
of July General Patterson informed General Scott by telegraph that
Johnston had left \Vin chester on the afternoon of the 18th, and the telegraphic dispatch was received in season to have delayed the battle until
reinforcements could have arrived. The evidence before the Committee
on the Conduct of tbe ·vv ar shows that twenty-four thousand men were
held in reserve at the battle of Bull Run, which was more than double
the number of Patterson's command. These men were never handled
at all. If Patterson's column ·was so necessary to decide that battle
(a battle, after all, that was little more than a Chinese fight), why were
these reserves not employed? The question as to who mismanaged Bull
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Run remains to be decided. We do not propose to enter upon the discussion, but there is enough evidence, we think, to show that none of the
mismanagement can be attributed to Major-General Robert Patterson.

[From the

DAILY CHRONICLE

(Washington, D. C.), February 8th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON AND THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

There are not a few persons in this country who are satisfied that the
Bull Run disaster was due to the inefficiency of General Patterson. It
is claimed that he ought by all means to have held General Johnston in
check, and failing in that, to have reinforced General McDowell. A few
have gone so far as to attribute his failure to do one or the other, or both
of these things, to want of patriotism. Aware of the damaging criticisms
on his campaign, General Patterson early demanded a court of inquiry,
but was assured that there was no precedent for any such procedure in
the case of an officer honorably discharged. He subsequently sought to
have all his correspondence and the orders given him published, but it
was alleged to be incompatible with the public interest. After several
years' delay he has at last collected together the facts of his campaign in a
briefN arrative, and, we think, thoroughly exposes the injustice which has
been done him. It is clear that his force was overrated-that it was but
ill provided-that he never got any orders to attack, but was ad vised to
·caution; that his best officers sustained his policy; that there was a manifest blunder made in not allowing him to threaten Johnston at a point
like Leesburg, between Johnston's force and McDowell's; that he, however, kept Johnston engaged on the day in which he had reason to believe that McDowell was to make his attack, viz., the 16th of July, and
that it was due tb the unfortunate delay of that attack till the 21st, and
the failure of General Patterson to get further orders, that his services
were not made more available. Had General Patterson been a man of
bol~er temper, and more inclined to assume responsibility, he might have
attacked Johnston, and successfully; but the undertaking, with raw
troops, whose term of service was nearly ended, would have been extremely hazardous. He contented himself with obeying his instructions,
without assuming any risks. It is, moreover, very doubtful whether, if
he had been in striking distance of Bull Run, its issue would have been
any different; for the testimony of all the experts is that our defeat was
owing to very different causes than want of sufficient force. The censure
of General Patterson shows how great injustice may be done a good
soldier and an honest patriot by ex parte statements.
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(New Haven, Conn.), February 8th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S DEFENCE.

The public will remember that this General, who was in command of
the volunteer forces in the Shenandoah, at the time of the first Bull Run
battle-was severely censured, for letting General Joe Johnston fall
back to Manassas, and "turn the tide of fight," in that memorable battle.
General Patterson has published his vindication, which embraces his
orders, and gives facts showing that he did exactly what he was ordered
to do, and was in no sense derelict in duty on that occasion. He shows conclusively, that from the place where he was posted, he could not control
Johnston, that he apprised his superiors of the fact of Johnston's leaving, and that his reaching Bull Run did not cause the loss of the battle.
In short, it is an admirable and clear defence of his conduct on that
occasion, and will, as it ought, be accepted as a complete vindication of
an able and patriotic officer, who has unjustly suffered for the blunders
of others.

[From the

DAILY EXPRESS

(Lancaster, Pa.), Febritary 9th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON AND BULL RUN.

There are not a few persons in this country who are satisfied that the
Bull Run disaster was due to the inefficiency of General Patterson. It
is claimed that he ought by all means to have held General Johnston in
check, and failing in that, to have reinforced General McDowell. A -few
have gone so far as to attribute his failure to do one or the other, or
both of these things, to want of patriotism. Aware of the damaging
criticisms on his campaign, General Patterson early demanded a court
of inquiry, but was assured that there was no precedent for any such
procedure in the case of an officer honorably discharged. He su'bsequently sought to have all his correspondence and the orders given him
published, but it was alleged to be incompatible with the public interest.
After several years' delay he has at last collected together the facts of
his campaign in a brief Narrative, and the Washington Chronicle expresses the opinion that General Patterson thoroughly exposes the injustice which has been done him. It is clear that his force vms overrated;
that it was but ill provided ; that he never got any orders to attack,
but was advised to caution; that his best officers sustained his policy;
that there was a manifest blunder made in not allowing him to threaten
Johnston at a point like Leesburg, between Johnston's forces and
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McDowell's; that he, however, kept J obnston engaged on the day in
which he had reason to believe that McDowell was to make his attack,
viz., the 16th of July, and that it was due to the unfortunate delay of
that attack till the 21st, and the failure of General Patterson to get
further orders, that his services were not made more available. Had
General Patterson been a man of bolder temper, and more inclined to
assume responsibility, he might have attacked Johnston, and successfully;
but the undertaking, with raw troops, whose term of service was nearly
ended, would have been extremely hazardous. He contented himself
with obeying his instructions, without as·mming any risks. It is, moreover, very doubtful whether, if he had been in striking distance of Bull
Run, its issue would have been any different; for the testimony of all the
experts is that our defeat was owing to very different causes than want
of sufficient force. The censure of General Patterson shows how great
injustice may be done a good soldier and an honest patriot by ex parte
statements.

[From the

NEW YORKER

(New York CUy), February 11th, 1865.J

HASTY JUDGMENTS

Are al ways open to revision, and when a name prematurely obscured
can be justly restored to its lustre, the truth should be welcome. General Robert Patterson (Sherman & Co., Philadelphia, Printers) has
prepared "A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." In an opening page of the Narrative we have these
significant words, addressed by the President to General Patterson :
"General Patterson, I have never found fault with or censured you; I
have never been able to see that you could have done else than you did
do. Your hands were tied; you obeyed orders, and did your duty, and
I am satisfied with your conduct." The spirit of this passage animates
the whole statement, and as the personal character of the General will
not be questioned, we must accept his allegations until they are challenged by conclusive evidence. This Narrative is in fact exhaustive as
far as the author is concerned; his positions are clearly taken and ably
sustained, and if at times he crosses the path and affects the position of
eminent men, we are disposed to ascribe the collision to the has.te, the
heat, and the misapprehensions incident to a great crisis, civil and promiscuous in its character, suddenly sprung upon the country, and that
General Patterson appeared at the cross-roads, so to speak, at its most
critical period. The perusal of the Narrative, while it will awaken
many painful feelings, cannot fail to inspire a reconsideration of the
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·case, and a regard for General Patterson which will compel any who
seek to answer him, to enter upon a fair examination of the whole
question.

[From the

UNIVERSE

(Philadelphia), February 11th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON'S VINDICATION OF HIMSELF.

Political malice often finds it easy to destroy a good man's name; and ·
military jealousy, when unfortunate discomfiture is upon the heads of
those who feel it, is the most unprincipled of slanderers. Major-General
Patterson has suffered much from this double animosity. The two together, fastened on him the first Bull Run defeat. Time, however, has
caused passion to subside, antipathies to .disappear, and the whole truth
to rise clearly to the surface. The brave soldier has had the virtue of
patience, and he has just printed a good-sized pamphlet, in which a full
history of his service is candidly given. 'Ve have read over these pages
with great pleasure. Every tittle in the defence they contain is authenticated by dates, by telegraph dispatches between the General and th~
War Department, and between himself and other officers, by letters from
the President himself, and by a long number of letters from the first
commanders in the army. The General has made these points clear:
that he did much more than there was any right to expect from him ;
that, had he been properly corresponded with, he would have effected
the most important results; that the rebel General Johnston's position
was fully understood by the Washington authorities some days before
the fight took place; that it was neglect in Washington that enabled the
same commander to realize his plans; and that Bull Run was lost by
delays and other things of that nature in the men intrusted with the
chief command. The real truth is, General Scott and General McDowell
are the men who lost Bull Run. We are glad General Patterson has
published this pamphlet. Justice to himself and to his race-he is, as
all know, an Irishman-required it, and the true history of the war
required it. vV e should now like to see a pamphlet from General
Shields. Why was he removed? He' is the only man who ever defeated Stonewall Jackson.

I

[From the

PILOT

(Boston), February 11th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON AND THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

History, and especially the history of campaigns, cannot be written
contemporaneously with the events they record. If we were to take the
11
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current accounts of the campaigns of any year, written at the time and
upon the spot-very great stress is laid upon the last fact, but erroneously-and hand them down to posterity, as the authentic record, how
differently would the history of these terrible times appear to the world
from what they will now, when time has mellowed asperities, cast out
bitter prejudices, and suffered servile sycophancy and injudicious friendships to rot, preserving only those features in the record that have been
crystallized by justice into enduring truths.
All remember that after the first battle of Bull Run, the general verdict of reprobation rested upon General Robert Patterson as the author
or cause of the defeat. The General who has borne this load of obloquy
for three years, and refrained from hasty answer in a matter that was
to pass into the history of a nation, has wisely waited until the minds
of men, cooled and. toned down, could look dispassionately upon his defence, and reverse the judgment, if the facts produced should warrant
it, which they first passed upon the prominent actors on that disastrous
day. Accordingly, he has now published a volume, from his home in
Philadelphia, for private circulation, entitled "A Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," a copy of which has
been placed in our hands.
This Narrative, coolly and calmly written, fortified by official documents, meets and answers with the most patient, and, at the same time,
most convincing exactness, all the charges of dereliction in duty which
have been laid upon General Patterson. It is, as a Philadelphia reviewer concisely remarks, "a clear and convincing record, and no man
who is rightly made up, can read it without repeating the words of
President Lincoln to General Patterson: 'I am unable to see that you
could have done anything else than you did do; your hands were tied ;
you obeyed your orders and did your duty, and I a.m satisfied with your
conduct.' "
We are unable to afford space for so lengthy a notice of this valuable
document as its importance perhaps demands. Suffice it to say, that the
charge against General Patterson of failing to hold the rebel Johnston,
at Winchester; for not attacking that general in his works there, and
for permitting Johnston to slip away to Manassas without informing his
superior officers, are fairly met and squarely answered; and the documents he adduces attest facts that fully vindicate him. The Narrative
establishes positively, that General Patterson never was ordered to attack
at Winchester, and the unexpected arrival of Johnston at Manassas is
completely met by the unanswerable fact that, on the 20th of July, the
day before the battle of Bull Run, General Patterson telegraphed the
General-in-chief, that Johnston had marched from Winchester on the
afternoon of the 18th. That Johnston would be at Manassas was well
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known in Washington and on the battle-field among our officers on that
same day.
The battle of Bull Run, therefore, was not lost through any act that
can be traced to General Patterson, or for which be is responsible. He
has repeatedly asked for a court of inquiry; but it has been denied him
on the ground that he has been "honorably discharged," and that a
court could do ·no more. It was added that the publication of the correspondence "was incompatible with the public interests,'' and so, with
a complete vindication in his hands, he was obliged to suffer on in silence.
That silence has been broken, and the voice is the voice of truth. w· ould
that that voice had been heard from the beginning of the rebellion,
through all its stormy scenes-the nation would have been in a better
condition; the public, so often hoodwinked, cajoled, deceived, trifled
with, would have looked with more confidence to official disclosures
than they can now yield them; many who are exalted might never have
risen; many who have been laid low would have lived for the glory of
the nation, or died defending its honor; public morals would not have
been imperilled, and truth, with her serene and august effulgence, would
have shed a light upon the nation and its affairs, which, alas! we look
for in vain to-day.

[From the

UNION (

), February 13th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON.

To

THE EDITOR OF THE UNION:

I have read with great interest ".A Narrative of the Campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley, in 1861, by Robert Patterson, late Major-General of
Volunteers." The disastrous defeat of our army at Bull Run at the
opening of the war is still fresh in the recollection of all. Who does not
remember the almost universal burst of indignation which resounded
through the land at the alleged failure of General Patterson to come to
the rescue on that terrible day? The public opinion created at that
time by exaggerated newspaper reports against this General was confirmed by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. So
strongly had the tide set against Patterson that an investigation by his
peers in the military service was denied him, and that, too, on the most
ridiculous and flimsy grounds, lest the blame might rest upon broader
shoulders.
The facts presented by General Patterson in this Narrative, while they
are highly vindicatory of his course as a commander, are equally damaging to his superior in command as well as to the then Secretary of
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War, who refused to furnish on the call of the Senate the correspondence
between General Patterson and his chief, and also to the Committee of
Congress on the Conduct of the War. It strikes the uninitiated as a
strange mode of procedure, that it should be deemed incompatible with
the public interest to furnish such correspondence between military officers, especially while one of them was resting under the ban of public
opm10n. Subsequent developments show that the assumed ground for
withholding this correspondence was by no means so much in the way
of public interest as it would have proven to be in the way of certain
individual interests. But what is most remarkable of all is that after
the testimony of fourteen out of eighteen general officers who participated
in the battle, in which they do not in a single instance allude to Patterson's command as having anything to do with the failure, the Congressional Committee gravely decided that" t.he failure of General Patterson
to hold the forces of General Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley was
the principal cause of the defeat." These officers unite in declaring
that the delay of General McDowell to attack before the 21st of July,
and then the delay of hours on the morning of that day (Sunday), the
miserable management of throwing out batteries to the front without the
necessaTy infantry supports, the failure to bring in an entire division of
reserves which had been left beyond supporting distance, and, finally,
the entire want of discipline, chargeable to the absence of a headquarters
on the field, were the prime and only causes of this mortifying defeat.

s.

[Prom the

NEW YORK HERALD,

February 13th, 1865.]

THE FIRST CAMP.A.IGN IN THE VALLEY OF THE
SHENANDO.AH.

In a pamphlet under the title of" The Campaign in the Valley of the
Shenandoah, in 1861, by Robert Patterson, late Major-General of Volunteers," the author presents a narrative and vindication of his conduct
in the management of the campaign in question. The prominent features of his plans are stated, discussed, and indorsed by a variety of testimony from officers then subordinates, but who since have become conspicuous and eminent. Aside from the design of the Narrative, the facts
are interesting as a chapter of history.

•
EDITORIALS FROM LEADING JOURNALS.

[From the

DISPATCH

165

(Pittsburg), February 14th, 1865.]

THE ''THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN" IN THE SHENANDOAH
VALLEY.

We have often wondered why General Robert Patterson, who commanded the forces in the Shenandoah Valley, in the summer of 1861,
did not promptly expose, as we were aware he could, the gross injustice
of the obloquy cast upon him aner the close of that campaign, when it
became necessary to use him as a "scapegoat" for the blunders of those
who were responsible for the disaster at Bull Run, by attributing it to
his not keeping Johnston at Winc;hester, and preventing his alleged to
have been unexpected reinforcement of Beauregard. The mystery is
solved in a "Narrative" by that officer, issued from the press in Philadelphia, the pages of which we have just perused; and a more triumphant vindication of a much-abused man and a worthy officer we have
seldom seen.
It has been none of his fault that this vindication has been thus delayed, and we cannot say it has been to his injury. An earlier publication (even if free from the effect of being "detrimental to the public
service") might not have received the calm consideration it deserved
from a public incensed against him by frequent repetition of calumny,
and the good soldier finds it occasionally necessary to risk, perhaps lose
for a time, what is more valuable than life, his reputation, for the good
of his country, consoled only by the consciousness of having performed
a duty, and the hope that the future may do justice to his name.
No one who participated in the campaign alluded to, and was aware
of the orders and instructions under which General Patterso.n actedbeing at no time cut off more than a very few hours from telegraphic
communication (via Sandy Hook) with the commanding general-ever
censured him for his conduct, and those most intimate with those orders,
and best acquainted with all the circumstances, have been the heartiest
in their commendation. That many a soldier or officer was disappointed
in his not leading ten thousand raw men, under officers a majority of
them incompetent, to· attack three times their nurn her within the earthworks at ""Winchester (having a siege train of one 30 pounder, a 24
pounder and an old 8-inch howitzer, whilst Johnston left twenty-six
pieces there when he moved to Manassas), is true; but, had General
Patterson done so, it is probable "Bull Run " would have been enacted
on a less scale in the Valley 0£ the Shenandoah, by a force which, compared with the same troops now, was little more than an armed mob on a
kind of picnic excursion.. We should probably have felt quite insulted,
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at that time, had any one so termed it, but after-experience in the field
satisfies us it is most correctly so described.
Application for an investigation of his conduct, soon after the campaign ended, was refused, because he had been honorably mustered out
of the service, no charge being made against him ; copies of his orders
were denied to Congress then, their publication being deemed detrimental
to the public service, and he has suffered nearly three years, lest his
vindication might he deemed objectionable on the same ground. It now
appears, and is unanswerable.
It establishes first this fact: that Patterson's column placed where it
was, was as. impossible to prevent Johnston from going to Manassas, as it
would be for a man in Baltimore to prevent a man in Philadelphia from
going to New York. It was a "false line," and was so pronounced by
General Patterson and all his officers. In lieu he proposed to fortify
Maryland Heights and move his main column to Leesburg, where he
would have threatened Johnston more effectually, and been near enough
to McDowell to assist or receive aid from him, as circumstances might
demand. This plan he was not authorized to carry into effect. On the
contrary he was kept on "an exterior line," sixty miles from Manassas,
with Johnston's army between him and McDowell's. Notwithstanding
his "false" position, for which he was not accountable, he did so manceuvre his column as to hold Johnston up to the time indicated in the
order of the General-in-chief, and for several days beyond that time.
General Patterson was informed that McDowell's attack would be made
on the 16th of July, and that he should demonstrate against Johnston
on that day. This he did, according to order, keeping Johnston in line
of battle all that day, and Johnston did not move from 'Vinchester until
the afternoon of the 18th, at which time Patters<m was led to believe
from the tenor of the General-in-chief's dispatches that McDowell's
battle had been delivered and the "junction carried."
The "Narrative" further establishes that General Patterson was
never ordered to attack Winchester. Every dispatch of the General-inchief enjoins great "caution" and "circumspection;" and that there
should be no attack unless it was clear to Patterson that he was in "superior," or at least "equal force" to Johnston. All the evidence goes
to show that he never was in force sufficient to disregard these positive,
emphatic, and repeated instructions. General Patterson would have
been guilty of flagrant disobedience of orders if he had attacked Winchester so defended, with his thirteen thousand. But notwithstanding
the great disparity, Patterson, on the 18th of July, twelve hours before
Johnston commenced his march from Winchester, telegraphed the General-in-chief, "Shall I attack?" and to that demand for instructions he
never got an answer.
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With respect to the "unexpected " arrival of Johnston at Manassas,
the record is unanswerable. On the 20th of July, the day before the
battle of Bull Run, Patterson telegraphed the General-in-chief that
Johnston had marched on the afternoon of the 18th. The battle of
Bull Run was therefore not lost on account of Johnston's "unexpected"
appearance there, nor on account of any of the circumstances for which
it has been sought to hold General Patterson responsible. The record
is now before the public, and justice demands that the people shall be
made acquainted with its character, if they do not see the volume itself.
When they read it, it will be strange indeed, if they do not agree with
the President, and say that General Patterson "obeyed his orders, and
did his duty." The military readers of the "Narrative" will find what
should be a conclusive opinion to them from Maj or-General George H.
Thomas (who was of Patterson's command), in a letter dated Atlanta,
August 8th, 1864. In this letter that distinguished General says, "I
have always believed, and have frequently so expressed mys.elf, that
your management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious,
and was to the best interests of the service.. "

[From the

CLINTON DEMOCRAT

(Lock Haven), February 16th, 1865.]

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF OUR ARMS
AT BULL RUN? "THAT IS THE QUESTION."

Before the battle of Bull Run the country was in high glee and jubilant of the contemplated success of the Union arms. The country responded with alacrity to the President's call for 75,000 men, for many
were of opinion that to crush out the Southern rebellion was only child's
play, and could be crushed out or driven (as it was said by Republican
wiseacres) into the Gulf of Mexico before breakfast. "But experience
teaches all things," and so it is in this case, and if we reflect upon any
great evil that has befallen us, we can always trace its source to some
blunder or fault of our own; but instead of acknowledging our own
faults are very glad to put the blame on some one else, although our
consciences accusing and not excusing our own miserable and dishonest
conclusions.
Sudden was the call made by the President, and prompt was the call
responded to by the patriotic people of the North, for 75,000 men to
vindicate the honor and integrity of our glorious Union.
Much was expected and great deeds promised to be performed by our
army, and so confident of success were the stupid and imbecile powers
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at Washington that even Senators, Congressmen, and ladies, wended
their way to the scene of carnage as they would to a fashionable picnic.
Such a display of profound imbecility and folly could do nothing else
than inspire the rebels with certainty of success, as it was well known
that not a single Congressman possessed the genius of a Marlborough or
female the spirit or intrepidity of Joan of Ar~, or the Maid of Saragossa. The mighty army of the Potomac, under McDowell, unlike that
of the king of France, who "with 40,000 men marched up the hill and
then marched down again;" but who, with 60,000 raw undisciplined
volunteers, a score of weak-minded Congressmen, and a bevy of equally
gf,rongminded women, ran to Bull Run, and after seeing the bnlliphant,
ran back again, and a bully run it was !
Now hacl these troops six months been drilled,
With McClellan in command,
Ten thousand dollars to one cent
No Rebs now in the land.

But the great and irreparable blunder was committed, and all that
.now remained was to make an official report of the shameful disaster,
shirk the responsibility and put the blame on the innocent.
This the honorable fleet-footed heroes who followed McDowell's army
were ready to do as soon as their cowardly hides were safe and secure
bebin<l the defences of Washington. As soon as the intermitting pulse
of the fleet-footed heroes settled down to 120 per minute, res0lutions
were offered in Congress and passed in favor of a Committee on the Conduct of the War. This committee, after using ~allons of ink and cartloads of paper, finally gave to the country volume~ of hitmbug and an
immense amount of useless inforniation. Now, this committee on useless
information, after much labor both of body and mind, made the brilliant
discovery that General Patterson was the sole cause of the disaster at
Bull Run. Now, had the committee been allowed to prosecute their investigation still farther, no doubt they would give us the name of the
great hero who struck Billy Patterson before the end of the present rebellion, and thus put an end to that long and vexed question; aud for
this alone the committee would have deserved not only the thanks of
the Loyal League, but deserved also to have their names engraved upon
the memory and hearts of our great public benefactors-the shoddy contractors. And now let us see in what way General Patterson coutributed to the disaster of Bull Run. At the outset of the war, General
Patterson was appointed Major-General of the Pennsylvania forces, and
after rendering most signal service to the country between Baltimore
and Washington, was assigned to the command of the army of the Upper
Potomac, and made his headquarters at Hagerstown. Here he under-
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took to organize bis army of undisciplined volunteers, with the enemy
posted in overwhelming force and strong positions at Harper's Ferry
and Maryland Heights.
·
After the organization of his army, General Patterson advanced towards the Potomac, intending to attack Johnston at Harper's Ferry.
His plan was submitte<l to the General-in-chief and was approved. The
moment Patterson advanced Johnston abandoned Harper's Ferry and
fell back to Bunker Hill; and no sooner had Patterson crossed the
Potomac with part of his force, when orders came from General Scott,
to recross th~ river into Maryland, and took away from Patterson all
bis regular troops and artillery, leaving him without a single gun and
with no cavalry save the First City Troop of volunteer cavalry.
Patterson was now ill prepared to assail the powerful force under
Johnston at Bunker Hill, and General Scott did not expect him to do
so. "I have said we must have no reverse," said Scott; "but this is not
enough. A check or drawn battle would be a victory to the enemy,
filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, and his magazines with
voluntary contributions. Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly;
make a good use of your engineers and other experienced officers and
generals, and attempt nothing withoid a clear prospect of succeBs, as you
will find the enemy strongly posted and not inferior to you in numbers."
General Patterson asked for permission to hold Maryland Heights
and advance to Leesburg, where he could have been in communication
with McDowell, and could have assisted in any movement made by that
General. He would have been in a position to attack the rebel left
wing, and at the battle of Manassas he might have brought his troops
into such position as would have made the subsequent battle a victory
for the Union forces. But he was ordered to remain in front of.Johnston at 'Vinchester, and to cross the river and attack him if in equal or
superior force. But he was not even in equal force; he had ten thousand
six hundred and fifty men and six guns when this order was received,
whilst Johnston had 15,000 men and from 20 to 24 guns. 'V ith this
small force, on th~ 2d of July, General Patterson, who could get no
batteries or regulars from vVasbington, crossed the Potomac. General
Abercrombie's brigade, composed of the 1st Wisconsin, Colonel Starkweather, and the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment under Colonel Jarrett,
led the van, encountered "Stonewall" Jackson's brigade beyond Falling
Waters, and after a sharp conflict put the rebels to rout, aud with but
small loss entered Martinsburg on the 3d of July. Jackson fell back to
Winchester and joined Johnston.
General Patterson was ordered to advance on Winchester, but was in
a sad plight for want of sufficient men, artillery, and transportation.
Johnston by this time was strongly intrenched with 42,000 men, 35,000
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of them regulars, and 52 guns. The opinion of the Federal officers was
that our troops were in no condition to fight. This was declared in a
council of war, at which Generals Thomas, Keim, Stone, Abercrombie,
Fitz John Porter, Negley, Gordon, and Colonel Simpson of the engineers,
were present and assisted. General Patterson now moved to Bunker
Hill and made bis dispositions to attack Johnston, should the Generalin-chief so direct. Here Patterson received permission to make a flank
movement to Charlestown, where he could threaten Johnston at Winchester or move his column to Leesburg, where he could have been in
time to reinforce McDowell before the battle of Bull Run. Patterson
had orders to keep Johnston in check until the 16th of July, as the battle
at Manassas was to come off on the 17th. General Patterson now received
a dispatch from General Scott, stating that McDowell's first day's work
had driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-house, and that the J unction would probably be carried to-morrow.
Thus, from Charlestown on Tuesday, the 18th of July, three days
before the battle of Bull Run, at 1.30 A.M., twelve hours before any part
of General Johnston's command left Winchester for Manassas, Patterson
telegraphed General Scott his opinion of the probable result of an attack
on Winchester and asked, "Shall I attack."
To this no answer was returned, and General Patterson was left in
utter ignorance of General McDowell's movements from Wednesday,
July 17th, until Monday, the 22d, when he first heard of the disastrous
result through the newspapers. If the Commander-in-chief, who was
perfectly acquainted with General Patterson's condition, desired him to
attack, be had an opportunity of doing it ; with his orders General Patterson would cheerfully have advanced, let the result be what it might.
An~ if General Scott had desired Patterson to join him at Manassas,
an order at that time would have effected it, and he could have been
there as soon or sooner than General Johnston.
General Patterson succeeded in detaining Johnston up to the afternoon of Thursday, the 18th, and no portion of his force arrived on the
field of battle at Manassas until the afternoon of Sunday, the 21st, so
that Johnston was kept from joining Beauregard not only on "Tuesday,
or the early part of next week," but during the entire week. That the
battle of Manassas was by that time fought and won by our troops no
one doubted.
Now from the dispatch mentioned before in relation to the junction
being carried, &c., and knowing that Johnston was still in front, and
that it would take him three days to reach Manassas, Patterson felt confident that everything was progressing in accordance with the plans of
the General-in-chief.
Instead, however, of "the Junction being carried to-morrow" (Tues-
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day), there was not even an attack made upon it until Sunday, the 21st,
and then late in the day, of all of which General Patterson was kept in
profound ignorance. General Scott informed Patterson that he would
fight on the 16th, and on the 17th told him he had driven the enemy
beyond a certain point, and would probably complete the operation on
the next day; now it was his duty to inform Patterson if he had not done
it, otherwise he must of course infer that he had done it, more especially
when it was in his power to communicate with him by telegraph. General Patterson obeyed orders strictly, and cannot be held responsible for
the disaster that befell our arms at Manassas.

[.F1·om the

HOME INTELLIGENCER

(Mineral Point, Wisconsin), February 25th, 1865.]

We are indebted to General Robert Patterson for a copy of his " N arrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861." We
were al ways firm in the belief that the General had done everything that
could be accomplished with the limited means under his control, and
now, after reading and examining the official orders given in this very
interesting pamphlet, we are thoroughly convinced that he did more
than most officers could do with the same troops under similar circumstances. General Patterson was unfortunate in this, that our troops
were defeated at Bull Run through the blundering of high officials at
Washington. Somebody must be the "scapegoat" for the mismanagement, and the General was selected-with what injustice is shown by
the testimony of officers, now among the most honored in the country.
"re shall endeavor to make room for liberal extracts from the "N arrative " in a future issue.

[From the

hLINOIS STATE REGISTER

(Springfield), February 28th, 1865.]

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

A friend has placed upon our table, a "Narrative of the Campaign
in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," by Major-General Robert
Patterson. Amongst the details of battles, we perceive is recorded the
story of our humiliating defeat in the first Bull Run battle. We are
indisposed to recall the mortifying circumstances of that ungracious
aflair; but if recurrence to those events is necessary in order to do
justice to a distinguished general, we ought not to shirk the responsi-
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bility, even if by so recalling the history of those times, unpleasant
memories should be awakened.
It seems indisputably shown, that the blame which has been so liberally cast upon General Patterson in reference to the original Bull Run
disaster, is entirely unjust. 'Ve have examined the history with care,
and are glad to be enabled to make this avowal. Indeed, in this view,
we but reiterate the approving remarks of the President himself: "I am
unable to see that," said Mr. Lincoln, "you could have done anything
else than you did do ; your hands were tied ; you obeyed your orders
and did your duty, and I am satisfied with your conduct."
Should it be asked why General Patterson, having so strong a case,
has never brought it before the public in an official form, we answer, he
repeatedly asked for a court of inquiry; but this was denied ·him on the
ground that having been "honorably discharged" a court of inquiry
could do no more. To this it was added that the publication of the
correspondence ·was incompatible ·with the pnbli.c service. So he was
compelled to suffer in silence, though he had a full vindication always
at hand. At length, however, tardy justice is being done General Patterson. The record is now before the public, and justice' demands that
the people shall be made acquainted with its character, if they do not
see the volume itself. 'Vhen they read it, it will be strange, indeed, if
they d'O not agree with the President, and say that General Patterson
"obeyed his orders and did his duty." The military readers of the
"Narrative" will find what should be a conclusive opinion to them,
from Major-General GeoTge H. Thomas (who was of Patterson's command), in a letter dated Atlanta, August 8th, 1864. In this letter that
distinguished General says: "I have al ways believed, and have frequently
so expressed myself, that your management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests of the service."
It affords us real pleasure to assist in doing justice to a brave and
skilful officer. General Patterson served in the Mexican campaign with
distinguished success. Second in command to the venerable hero, General Scott, he deserved and received the highest commendation of that
distinguished soldier. At Cerro Gordo, General Scott says; "Ma:jorGeneral Patterson left a sick-bed to ehare in the dangers, fatigues, and
glories of the day, and after the surrender, went forward to command
the advanced forces towards Xalapa." The record would be incomplete
did we fail to mention that s.o early as in the war of 1812, General Patterson, then a lieutenant and captain in the regular service, achieved distinction and acquired renown as a soldier, even in those early days of
his manhood. 'Ve repeat our expression, that the opportunity of doing
him justice is none the less agreeable because it has been so long delayed.
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(Norristown, Pa.), Feb1·uary 28th, 1865.]

SHENANDOAH VALLEY C.A.MPXtGN OF 1861 .

.A pamphlet with this title, issued by Major-General Robert Patterson, of Philadelphia, has been sent us. It gives the General's version
· of his campaigu with the three months' men, against Johnston, in the
summer of 1861. For that elaborate explanation and review which is
necessary to a perfect undei;standing of the subject, we must leave to
other hands, but we are free to say that we think a perusal, with a comparison of the official papers published in it, will go far to relieve General Patterson from the blame which has been put upon him for his
conduct of the campaign.

[From the NEW

HAMPSHIRE p A.TRIOT

(Concord), March 1st, 1865.]

GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON.

There are but two or three officers connected with the present war
who have been more unjustly treated, both by the government and the
public, than General Robert Patterson of Pennsylvania. Holding a
most important command at the very opening of the war, he proved
himself a brave, prudent, skilful, and competent officer; yet because,
through the fault of his superiors and by reason of his proper obedience
to their orders, he did not perform utter impossibilities, he was made the
object of the greatest injustice from the government, and the grossest
abuse from the public press and the "loyal" people. To him alonehis alleged negligence, incompetency, or cowardice-was attributed the
disaster and disgrace of the first battle of Bull Run ; and from that clay
to this he has been the object of the coarsest abuse and the most unreasonable calumny, both from those who desired a scapegoat for their own
blunders and incompetency, and from the jackals in their service, and
from the great mass of men who had no other means of information in
regard to the real facts of the case.
For over three years, General Patterson made every effort to induce
the administration to permit justice to be done him. He applied to the
President and Secretary of War for permission to publish his correspondence with the General-in-chief, or to order a court of inquiry upon
his conduct. He appealed to the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, when investigating the matter of the Bull Run battle, to allow
witneeses to testify to the facts in reference to his conduct. He caused
a call to be made by Congress for the production of the orders and cor-
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respondence in regard to his operations. But all this was denied upon
the plea that the public interest would suffer thereby: and so the injured officer continued under the cloud-the victim of malice and the
scapegoat of imbecility, rather than injure the country's cause by vindicating his persona.I and military reputation. But as the time has arrived
when that cause cannot suffer by his so doing, General Patterson has
recently published a "Narrative" of his campaign, which is a most complete and triumphant vindication of his reputation and conduct-so
complete that no one who reads it can fail · to wonder at the wickedness
of those who so long and persistently labored to make him the scapegoat
of their blunders and crimes, as well as at the patriotic patience of this
much-abused officer in so long forbearing to vindicate his good name
through fear of doing injury to the public interest.

[From the

LUZERNE UNION ( Wilkesbarre,

Pa.), March 1st, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON VINDICATED.

A friend has placed in our hands a pamphlet of 128 pages, printed by
Sherman & Co., Philadelphia, which is a Narrative of the Campaign in
the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861, by Robert Patterson, late MajorGeneral of Volunteers. We have cursorily examined this little work
with more than usual interest, for we find in its pages a complete vindication of the character of one whose reputation belongs to Pennsylvania,
and who was more aspersed in the beginning of the war, perhaps, than
any man in it. General Patterson's career in Mexico, his uniform high
military character, and the esteem in which he is held by all who have
ever served under him, should have been at once proof against all assaults or insinuations. But the blundering manner in which the present
war has been conducted, from its incipiency to the present, must be excused in some way that would shield an irn becile administration from
responsibility. Hence, in the start, General Patterson was selected as
the target for all the censure due to the defeat of our arms at the first
battle of Bull Run. He has borne it patriotically and patiently, rather
than do any act which would seem to militate against the public interests,
until now, when the time seems right for him to speak. "Time at last
makes all things even," is indeed true in General Patterson's case ; for
even so excessively loyal a journal as the Philadelphia Press does him
the justice to say that he had been greatly abused.
We have not the time to read as carefully as we would like the whole
of the pamphlet, but that our readers may know about the gist of it, we
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copy in another column, an article from t e Philadelphia Ledger, on the
subject. General Patterson was a Democrat, and for that reason he
must be hounded down by the fanatics; but his case also is another
proof that
" 'l'ruth crushed to earth will rise again.''

[From the REPUBLICAN (Chester, Pa.), March 3d, 1865.]

THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

A few weeks since we made a hasty notice of a little volume which
had been furnished us, entitled, "A Narrative of the Campaign in the
Valley of the Shenandoah, in 1861, by Robert Patterson, late MajorGeneral of Volunteers." Since then we have had opportunity to peruse
the work with that care which it seemed to require at our hands. The
author comes before the public with a plain unvarnished story of actual
transactions to refute calumnies, which, born of ignorance, and fostered
by hasty prejudice, have long been persisted in by many intelligent,
patriotic, and well-disposed persons who would not willingly form harsh
judgments. Indeed, we think that the American people, of all others,
are the last knowingly to practice injustice. They are, it is true, very
swift to hear, and not slow to speak, and the quick sense of bearing too
often finds its dangerous neighbor of an unguarded tongue, but they are
ever ready to repair any wrong they may have done by a too hasty
opm10n. The Narrative to which we allude, not only furnishes a complete vindication of General Patterson's management of the campaign,
as far as he was concerned, but maked a very important and valuable
contribution to the history of the war. Many of the important facts
developed by it would otherwise have been entombed in the chaotic
mass of state papers for which bureaus of administration have been so
often found the convenient receptacle. These facts are necessary for a
proper understanding of the early history of the war, and they stand in
comparison with the onesided reports of Committees of Congress about
the disaster at .Bull Run in a similar relation that Napier's masterly
history of the Peninsular Campaign would bear to some distempered
and partisan declamation of ignorant members of Parliament. Everybody can recall the feelings of mortification and disappointment at the
defeat of the national army at Manassas, but few were then prepared
to accept the humiliating truth which may be made apparent to every
one that the plan of the campaign against the· insurgents was radically
defective, and carried with it the seeds of its own failure. The nation
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was not awake then, perhaps is not ready now, to acknowledge the inexorable fact. The General-in-chief was the idol of the old regular army.
In the active memory of the present generation, the only military affair
in which the Republican giant, unconscious of its dormant power, had
been engaged, was the Mexican war, and it was regarded as a mighty
illustration of the force of the republic, although in the terrible
light of the last four years it is now looked upon as a small side-scene
in our national drama. A grateful sense of his services caused him to
be looked up to as almost, if not indeed quite, infallible in military
judgment and capacity. How could the great American people, supremely fixed in the justice of their cause, and conscious of their power,
be beaten, under such a leader, in a contest with the wicked anarchists
who had raised the unholy front of rebellion on the worst plea that
ever drove men to perdition, against the righteous supremacy of a free
government? It was a question to which the popular· mind would admit
of but one answer. But instead of success in the mid~t of the nation's
highest hopes came disaster. Our great strength was made to appear
contemptible weakness, and the strongest and most powerful nation in
the world, in the hour of its highest hopes of triumph, was forced to accept defeat at the hands of its insurgent population. Upon whom should
the failure be visited? As the event proved, not on the Chief, whose
hedge of military infallibility repelled alike executive assault, or the intrusion of civil criticism-not on him, but on one unfortunate su bordinate, who could be made a scapegoat with the easy and natural resource
of an incensed and disappointed people. We all know how readily the
public mind accepted the order reUeviug General Pattereon from command of the Shenandoah, and the substitution of General Banks, as ·the
unmistakable and unerring indication that be was the immediate cause
of our failure; and we all know how unguarded tongues in private and
public talk, and facile pens in the service of public journals, made public opinion. There was one man, and one man only, who could have
stayed this tortuous course of public sentiment, and it was not too much
for those who admired him to expect that the General-in-chief, secure
in the confidence and regard of a generous people, should have turned
aside undeserved reproach and unjust opprobrium from a faithful subordinate and a loving friend. That he did not, is for him to make account to that conscience which finds no sterner arbiter on earth than
military judgment; but he may yet live to know, that the American
people, trusting and generous as they are with men, are inflexibly just
when the interests of the republic are concerned, and will break their
idols before the supremacy of equal and exact justice to all men. But
for the time it was so ordered, that General Patterson was made to endure censures and reproaches which found no motives too bad to give
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weight to the calumny by which his good name for soldierly conduct, or
loyalty to his country, was overborne. It mattered not that in the regular army, in the war of 1812, he then, as Captain .Patterson, had proved
himself a good soldier; nor that in the Mexican war the value of the
military accomplishments which, to an unappreciative public, in the
midst of peaceful prosperity, he had sedulously cherished, had been
illustrated as the able coadjutor of General Scott at Vera Cruz and
Cerro Gordo, and for which he had received the especial mention of
that great General. Past services as a faithful soldier, unseeking merit
as an able commander, the fair record of good citizenship, and unstained
personal probity, all went for nothing against the insensate craving of
the hour for a victim.
In vain did he ask, as a measure of justice for himself, for his family,
for his friends, and for his native commonwealth, the simple justice of a
court of inquiry. Equally vain was a request in the interest of the
public service, by a resolution of the Hon. John Sherman, in the U. S.
Senate, December 17th, 1861. They were alike denied. Had he been
continued in command, this might have been denied, or postponed, but
in the case of an officer in high command, who was summarily relieved
of it under implied censure, and who was afterwards made the object of
censure by a Congressional committee, a court of inquiry was his simple
right, and the interests of the country required that it should have been
granted. It was, however, denied, and the obloquy cast on him by indirection, which also involved many a brave officer and soldier of the
republic, was permitted to endure. An alleged incompatibility with the
public interests was made the reason for denial. As General Patterson
most pertinently remarks in his Narrative, "Had a court of inquiry been
allowed me, no publication of the orders or correspondence would have
been necessary. The court would have investigated the case, and if it
had appeared that I had obeyed my orders and done my duty, they
would have said so, I would have been satisfied, aud then the case would
have terminated."
It was reserved, however, for an agency, over which General Ptttterson
had no control, to turn the public mind from the false direction it bad
taken by the virtual suppres~ion of the facts by the military authorities
of the day. This was done by a military criticism on the "Art of War,"
from the pen of Major-General Halleck, in the New York Times, of July
22d. That article made apparent to the common intelligence, what had
long been known to military men, namely, that not only were the censures which had been heaped on General Patterson wholly unjustifiable,
but that the whole plan of campaign which resulted in the disaster at
Manassas, and which, as it now appears, was made in spite of General
Patterson's suggestions, was radically defective. General Halleck's
12
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criticism closed all controversy on this point, and the conclusion he
fastened on the minds of all who read the article was irresistible, and it
is safe to say, that the military blunder which contemplated the impossibility for General Patterson to compel Johnston to abandon his interior
line, and consequent facility of communication with Beauregard, has
been without defence or extenuation, since General Halleck's trenchant
exposition of the fallacy of the campaign. This indeed, by fair inference,
relieved General Patterson from censure, but the public did not know,
what is developed by the official correspondence published in his N arrative, aud which the War Department declined to publish, that the true
plan of campaign, as demonstrated by General Halleck, would have
made Leesburg the pivoted point of operations by the army under Patterson's command, was distinctly and specially recommended by him in
a plan of operations submitted to the General-in-chief under date June
21st, 1861. This plan anticipated in entire scope and detail what was
afterwards pointed out by General Halleck as the true mode of operation, and it was a sad misfortune that it did not obtain the sanction of
the General-in-chief. · It would not only have saved the disaster at
Manassas, but would have made the on ward march to Richmond an enterprise embracing the most favorable military conditions for success.
The testimony of the principal officers under command of McDowell is
clear, that if General Patterson's plan had been acted on, the attack at
Manassas would have resulted in an overwhelming victory for the
National army. Although kept in a false position, the disadvantages
of which no one knew better than himself, General Patterson, with true
soldierly feeling, made no complaints, but with his army looking daily,
almost hourly, to a return to their homes, he kept on the alert, and
whilst obeying every order of his chief and holding himself in active
readiness for any feasible offensive movement, carefully provided for
the defence of the border by the most judicious use of the men and material at bis command. Thus it will be seen that General Patterson's vindication rests not merely on what a superficial view would regard as the
negativ~ merit of faithful subordination and vigilant obedience to orders,
but rises to the height of a sagacious comprehension of the military position, anrl that be is entitled to the merit of submitting the only plan
of operations which could have secured success. Had he attempted what
an unthinking clamor, raised by the mortification of defeat and fomented
by a prejudiced course of Congressional inquiry, censured him for not
doing, we should perhaps have had to mourn a double defeat, or would
have lost our main reliance at that time to prevent the advance of the
rebel army on the National capital, for it is a well-attested fact, that
the integrity of his army was thus felt and acknowledged by the rebel
commanders as their chief obstacle, after the battle of Bull Run, to a
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triumphant march on Washington. His defeat, which from Johnston's
greatly superior force, and the advantages of his position, must have
been almost inevitable, would surely have sacrificed the defences of our
border, and would have made an offensive campaign in Pennsylvania
follow swiftly on the heels of the disaster at Manassas.
It is now se8n, after four years of war, in which the Valley of the
Shenandoah has been so often made the vale of our national humiliation, only illumined by the brilliant and victorious campaign of General
Sheridan, that the defence and security of the Maryland and Pennsylvania border and the defence of the capital are now secured by the occupation of the same base of operations, and are comprehended in the
same plan which General Patterson recommended in 1861.
'Ve are quite unable in the limits of a newspaper article to do adequate justice to the Narrative, which in its calm, dignified, and thoroughly
candid statement of facts, supported by documentary evidence, leaving
no room for cavil, completely exonerates its author from the cruel censure with which he was assailed. While these calumnies were at their
height, upon knowledge derived from officers and men who had served
with him, and felt keenly the injustice which had been done, we defended him.
'Ve know that it was the too common fate of men who strive to serve
the public, to have their best motives aspersed, and their worthiest actions mistepresented; but every true man, especially he who has felt the
bitter tooth of calumny, will rejoice in the chance that may be afforded
him of defending a fellow-sufferer. That we raised our voice in his just
defence at an early day is the more satisfactory to us now, inasmuch as
that many of our most influential journalists who were misled at the time
into censure of General Patterson, since the appearance of the Narrative
have given space to the correction of the erroneous impressions which
had been so widely spread abroad. 'Vhilst we rejoice in these manifestations of manly justice and fearless uprightness which should always
characterize every man who occupies the responsible position of a public
journalist, we cannot forbear, in the interests of public justice, to call attention to the unfortunate refusal of the court of inquiry which General
Patterson asked for. The public interests involved far outweighed any
personal considerations that could attach to him or any other individual,
however high in station, and the country had a right to know who, if
any one person, was responsible for the disaster at Bull Run, or to know
if it resulted from circumstances beyond individual control, whatever
the causes that led to it, that a recurrence of a similar disaster might be
avoided. The nation could least afford to be misled in this matter
whether the error related to individual or general causes, and the only
way to get at the truth was by an inquiry conducted with the care and
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precision which military experienee has found indispensable for its attainment in such cases. The truth would have freed the nation from
unhappy misapprehensions, and given to our military rulers information
which would have been invaluable. It is not too much to say, that the
result of such an inquiry by the comparison of military opinions, would
have avoided subsequent errors in plans of campaign, which were only
taught by fatal experience.
'Ve cannot close our review of the Narrative without expressing our
admiration of the courageous endurance under a weight of unfounded
calumny and the patriotic submission to cruel aspersions which General
Patterson has exhibited. We are glad to hail such an instance of the
highest qualities of manhood on the part of a worthy Pennsylvanian,
and a true, gallant, and devoted soldier of the Republic.

• [From the

WORLD

(New York City), },farc!i 4th, 1865.]

THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND
GENERAL PATTERSON.

The crimes of criminals, the evil deeds done by persons upon whom
the laws are brought to bear, and who expiate in legitimate penalties
their illegitimate passions, plans, and acts, by no means make up the
darlrnst or most discouraging chapter of human experience. It is the
atrocities perpetrated in the name of public policy by men whom the
world honors instead of hanging them ; it is the baseness of intrigues
gilded by the "official" rank of the . intriguers; it is the decorated villainy of place and power which go furthest to wring assent from honest
minds to the pessimist philosophy of the preacher, and to provoke the
nineteenth century into echoing the cry come down from the night of
ages past, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity."
°¢hen the history of the war we are now waging. shall come, in some
calmer future day, to be fully and justly written, the world, we may be
sure, will be once more startled and shocked into exclaiming with
Madame Roland," Oh! liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!''
It will then be seen, what is now only vaguely surmised, how many
human lives have been sacrificed; how much human happinesg has been
destroyed ; how many fair names have been trifled with and blasted, to
make a political point, to secure a party or a personal ad vantage, by
the public and sworn administrators of the state's affairs.
Mr. Tennyson's noblest eulogy on England's "Iron Duke" is to challenge for him this impartial scrutiny of times to come, and to say:
''Whatever record leap to light, he never shall be shamed I"
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Of whom among the leading personages in this western-world drama of
ours can as much be said to-day by their boldest admirers?
The true history of one single wheel in the administrative machine,
that of the "Congressional Committeee on the Conduct of the War," so
involves all the enginery besides as to predude the hope of exemption for
any part of it from the scathing which posterity is always so ready to
bestow on the selfishness, the sins, and the folly of its ancestors. The
proceedings of that committee since its first institution have in the main
escaped the public eye. Its sessions have been unwatched; its reports,
issued in bulky official volumes, have been, for the most part, uncriticized. But its influence has been felt in every quarter of the military
field of operations; and, setting in motion a hundred different organs of
opinion, it has wrought persistently through Congress, the telegraph, the
press, and private correspondence, in the forn]ation of public sentiment,
concerning the character and conduct of our generals, the causes of our
dirnsters and our successes, and the objects at which we either are aiming or ought to aim in the prosecution of the war. Its course has been
fully familiar only to the members of the administration themselves, to
the executive and his ministers; and as these have been in a position to
understand the nature of whatever injustice it was doing, and whatever
misrepresentations it was propagating, upon them equally with the committee must the shame at1d scandal finally fall of evil things done in the
abused name of the public good.
The case of General Patterson gives us one of the most characteristic
pictures of the temper and the purposes of this strange Congressional
star-chamber, this aulic council of partisan coroners sitting in permanent
inquest upon men whose lives and fortunes have been given to the
national cause. For now nearly four years, General Patterson, a brave
and experienced soldier, who had fought for his country against England in 1812, against Mexico in 1846, and whose sword leaped again
from its scabbard at the first cry from the imperilled capital in 1861,
bas been crucified in the public eye as the guilty cause of that first lamentable defeat at Manassas which so confirmed the hopes of the rebel
leaders, and so consolidated the wavering front qf rebellion. He has
been charged with actual complicity with treason as well as with disobedience of orders, imbecility in the field, and indisposition to move
against the enemy. That one or another uninformed person, seeking in
the first flush of national shame and disappointment to account for the
overthrow of our troops on that dark day, should have turned to General Patterson as the party responsible, is not surprising. But "the Committee on the Conduct of the War," after months had passed, and the
whole case had been fully investigated, deliberately set forth to the
world "that the principal cause of defeat on that day was the failure of
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General Patterson to bold the forces of Johnston in the valley of the
Shenandoah."
Who then could question such a verdict? Not the public, unable to
command all the evidence in the case; not General Patterson, restrained
by a soldier's and a patriot's sense of duty from raising a personal controversy in the then condition of our public affairs.
A "court of inquiry" might have substantiated the justice or injustice of this literally fearful charge, and a court of inquiry General Patterson had demanded. But the demand was refused by Secretary Cameron on the ground that "such a court would throw the blame on General
Scott," and that rather than "plant a thorn in General Scott's pillow"
General Patterson ought to consent to see himself execrated as the cause
of a great public shame and misfortune, and to accept for his children,
his friends, and his State, this odious weight of scandal. The President
took the same view of the case, assuring General Patterson, that "I
have never found fault with or censured you; your hands were tied, you
obeyed orders, and did your duty, and I am satisfied with your conduct."
A call made by the Senate on the War Department for the documents
in the case was met with a. refusal, as "incompatible with the public
interest." Thus utterly silenced, and "honorably discharged" from the
public service, General Patterson retired to private life. There the
committee found him. They never permitted him to hear or cross-examine one witness testifying against him, and they expressly refu8ed to
let him know what had been testified against him. "\Vorking thus in
the dark, as toward himself, the committee yet had all the necessary
light on the truth of the case. They had the evidence of numbers of
officers as to the real causes of the disaster at Manassas. They had the
evidence that Patterson had telegraphed the advance of Johnston to
Scott twentyjour hoiirs before the battle; that Patterson had been notified
by Scott of his intention to fight on the 16th, and never notified of any
change in that intention; that no order to attack Johnston was ever
sent by Scott to Patterson ; :and that, notwithstanding the condition of
his troops, most of them volunteers, impatient to escape from the service,
and whose terms were actually expiring, Patterson had kept Johnston
from joining Beauregard five days beyond the day specified by Scott.
All this the committee knew. They knew, moreover, that the formation of the Pennsylvania Reserves, to which the capital owed its safety
after Bull Run, was the work of Patterson, done in the teeth of the "\Var
Department, which had declined to accept these troops when Governor
Curtin, at Patterson's request, had begun to raise them. They knew
that the refusal of lhe administration to grant Patterson an open military
vindication of his character and conduct wtts expressly based upon their
wish to shield the reputation of General Scott.
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But General Patterson was a Democrat; and the committee, all, no
doubt, "honorable men," who would scorn to filch the good name of
their neighbors in private life, saw no harm ~n suppressing the truth,
and in sending a shameful slander forth, officially inrlorsed, to consummate the cruel work of ignorant and passionate detraction. General
Patterson, at last, has spoken. In a pamphlet of a hundred pages he
has arrayed the simple facts of the case with such force and clearness as
to carry to every mind capable of candor and justice the conviction, not
only that, by the Committee on the Conduct of the vVar, he was made
the scapegoat· of the blunders and the folly of his military and political
superiors, but that this was done by the committee with a distinct and
perfect knowledge of the atrocity of the injustice which they were perpetrating.
He thus sums up the real history of his connection with the opening
campaign of the war:
" In fact I was never ordered to attack at all, and as I did not see a
probability of success, nor did any of the officers he had attached to my
command and instructed me to consult, I claim that I was right not to
attack the enemy's intrenched position at Winchester.
"Every dispatch I ever received impressed upon me, not the necessity
of striking a blow, or making a bold dash upon the enemy, but the exercise of the greatest caution ; to risk nothing, and never give battle
without a well-ascertained superiority. All felt that the first blow should
be a decisive one, and that any success by the rebels would prove, as it
did, an encouragement to years of resistance. After act:ually issuing
the order for an attack on Winchester, I yielded reluctantly to the belief of my inability to do what I hoped, on the clearest evidence, and
upon the judgment of those entitled to be consulted.
"I did, with greatly inferior numbers, 'hold the rebel army in my front
on the alert,' and I did prevent it from reinforcing Manassas Junction,
by means of threatening manamvres and demonstrations 'as ordered by
my superior,' not only on the day General Scott desired me to do so, but
for five days afterwards. That no advantage was taken of this was not my
fault. That the General-in-chief should cast any reflection upon the
movement to Charlestown is certainly singular, as be had himself ordered
me to go there (ante, p. 68), and I had told him the precise day I was
going and the route, via Bunker Hill, which I should take (ante, p. 70).
After my arrival in Charlestown, the expiration of the term of service
of most of my troops prevented any further demonstration. The fact
that they would not in any number remain beyond their term of serviee
at my request, created remark at the time; but as every commander who
has since tried the experiment has met with similar experience, I do not
deem it necessary to give any of the details of my efforts to detain them.
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"I regretted the recall of certain troops, just as I was partially across
the Potomac, as it left me entirely without artillery. If it was necessary
to paralyze my force to save '\Vashington, I have no complaint to make.
But after it was done, I do object to being blamed for the temporary delay occasioned by it.
"I did subsequently move, two days after receiving a single battery
of six guns, and crossed the Potomac with less than eleven thousand
men, in the face of a force proved by the official report of General Johnston to be greatly my superior, and having, according to my information,
twenty-four pieces of artillery.
"\Vhether batteries and cannon could or could not be supplied me, I
shall not discuss. As my adversary had, as he admits, at. least sixteen
pieces of field artillery, together with heavy siege guns, I think no one
will blame me for my at Lem pts, iueffectual though they were, to obtain
some additions to my six. My siege train when near Winchester consisted of one 30-pounder, one 24-pounder, and an old 8-inch howitzer.
"General Scott scorus to avail himself of the misstatements of the committee, but frankly ad mi ts that he received the intelligence of Johnston's
approach, but determined to fight the battle of Bull Run in spite of it.
How absurd is it, then, to attribute the disaster of that day to the imexpected arrival of Johnston. It was known, but evidently deemed of
small moment; so great was the confidence at "\Vashington, that they
would not wait until I could· come up. They deemed, and public opinion
supported them in it, that their force was perfectly irresistible against
everything that the rebels could oppose to it. To use General Scott's
own words:
"'Though opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and sanguine of success.'
"I did not write to General Scott 'as if assured of victory,' though
repeatedly declaring my readiness to assault "\Vinchester if ordered by
him to do so. I said nothing in my reports to foster the too sanguine
expectation of success which precipitated the attack of McDowell, while
from my position it was impossible for me to co-operate with him. That
my estimate of the difficulties of an ad yance in the Shenandoah Valley,
with the three months' volunteers, was not exaggerated, sufficiently appears from the ill success that has since attended the movemeuts in that
direction, of more experienced troops, successively commanded by Generals Stone, Fremout, Banks, Miles, Milroy, Siegel, Wallace, and Hunter. The first successful campaign there Eince I relinquished the com~
mand was made very recently, by General Sheridan, at the head of a
veteran army, after first meeting serious reverses.
"General Scott, in his recent autobiography, bas added nothing to his
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criticisms on this campaign, further than to say, in speaking of the attack on Vera Cruz :
"'Several generals and colOnels, among them Maj-or-General Patterson,
an excellent second in command, notwithstanding his failure as chief
on the Shenandoah in 1861, solicited the privilege of leading storming
parties.'
'
"While I am duly grateful for this compliment to my services in
Mexico, I must protest against the assertion that I acted 'as chief on
the Shenandoah in 1861.' I was a subordinate, without knowing the
plan of my principal. I was ordered to co-operate in the movement
which was not-and I was not informed of its postponement-made at
the time indicated. When I was in a condition to move into Virginia,
and had actually crossed the Potomac, I was ordered back, and told 'to
keep within my limits, until I could satisfy the General-in-chief I ought
to go beyond them.' -When I presented my plan to go to Leesburg, it
was disapproved. When I asked for instructions, they were not given.
My movements were regulated by telegraphic dispatches, received from
day to day an<l hour to hour, aud I never was invested with the dignity
of 'chief,' until it became expedient to make me responsible for the
failure of the campaign."

[From the

TIMES

(Chicago), March 9th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON.

General Patterson, who has been so severely denounced for failing to
hold or to assail Johnston, and thus prevent his reinforcing Beauregard,
at the first battle of _;Manassas, has published a pamphlet which candid
men must admit is a complete justification of himself, if the statements
therein made of his having been restrained by orders from General Scott
are admitted as true. General Patterson says that Mr. Lincolu, after a
full knowledge of all his action in the matter, assured him as follows:
"I have never found fault with, or censured you; your hands were tied;
you obeyed orders and did your duty, and I am satisfied with your conduct." The Committee on the Conduct of the War, in investigating his
. case, never permitted him to hear or cross-examine a witness testifying
against him, and explicitly r~fused to let him know what had been testified against hiin. A call made by the Senate on the \Var Department for
the documents in the case was met by a refusal, as beiug "incompatible
with the public interests." A court of inquiry was demanded by General Patterson, but Secretary Cameron declined to grant it, on the ground
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that "such .a court would throw the blame on General Scott," and that
rather than "plant a thorn in General Scott's pillow," General Patterson
should submit to the weight of censure and misrepresentation with which
he was visited. The General alleges that the Committee on the Conduct
of the V.l ar had all the necessary light, and that their report was in defiance even of the facts gathered in the partial investigation, conducted
with an evident intention to reach the conclusion attained. General
Scott, in his recent autobiography, in speaking of the storming of Vera
Cruz, thus speaks of General Patterson:
"Several generals and colonels, among them Major-General Patterson,
an excellent second in command, notwithstanding his failure as chief
on the Shenandoah in 1861, solicited the privilege of leading storming
parties."
To which General Patterson rejoins as follows:
"While I am duly grateful for this compliment to my services in
Mexico, I must protest against the assertion that I acted ' as chief on
the Shenandoah in 1861.' I was a subordinate without knowing the
plan of my principal. I was ordered to co-operate in the movement
which was not-and I was not informed of its postponement-made at
the time indicated. When I was in a condition to move into Virginia,
and had actually crossed the Potomac, I was ordered back and told 'to
keep within my limits, until I could satisfy the General-in-Chief I ought
to go beyond them.' When I presented my plan to go to Leesburg, it
was disapproved. When I asked for instructions, they were not given.
My movements were regulated by telegraphic dispatches, received from
day to day and hour to hour, and I never was invested with the dignity
of 'chief' until it became expedient to make me responsible for the
failure of the campaign."
While every tme American must feel a just pride in the fame of General Scott, and must be grateful to him for his services to the country,
it will not be alleged that a gallant and meritorious officer, who distinguished himself in the last war with Great Britain and in the war
with Mexico, and who was among the foremost to take the field when
the rebellion began, should be sacrificed merely to prove that General
Scott had not erred in judgment. Either the facts stated by General
Patterson in his pamphlet must be successfully controverted, or it must
be admitted that he has been the victim of deliberate and cruel injustice.
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(St. Louis), March 15th, 1865.]

GENERAL PATTERSON IN DEFENCE.

In justice to a man who has been the subject of much obloquy, and an
object of the cruellest suspicions, we extract from the Philadelphia Press
a defence, or rather an explanation of General Patterson's conduct at
Harper's Ferry, about the time of the battle of Bull Run. By almost
common consent, General Patterson has been charged with the responsibility of that disaster, and that, too, in the teeth of positive evidence
that he twice ask~d permission to attack Johnston's army without receiving authority to do so. It will be scarcely possible to read the Press
articles without being convinced that Patterson has been most unjustly
treated.

[From the

DEMOCRAT ( William~ort),

March 16th, 1865.]

THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR; GENERAL PATTERSON AND THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SHENANDOAH.

It gives us sincere pleasure to lay before our readers (many of whom
were members of the "gallant old Eleventh"), the following manly and·
complete vindication of the operations of General Patterson's column in
the Valley of the Shenandoah during the first three months of the war.
Coming as it does from The Press-one of the most influential as well
as timeserving organs of the dominant party-it must bring conviction to the mind of the most "loyal" of all the "loyal leaguers," who
were loudest in their denunciation of an officer of whom the President
thus said: "I am unable to see that you could have done anything e.lse
than you did do; your hands were tied; you obeyed your orders and did
your duty, and I am satisfied with your conduct."

[Prom the

REPUBLICAN

(St. Louis), Ma1·ch 16th, 1865.]

MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.

Hardly one in ten of the officers in command of departments and
corps have escaped censure for failure to carry out a successful campaign. Almost every one has been saved by favoritism at 'Vashington,
and that with a very small margin to go upon. A committee of Congressmen, composed of men who never saw a battle-field, and who are
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controlled by their factious and political prejudices, have assumed to
pass judgment upon every unsnccessful campaign, and as a matter of
course, have al ways summoned witnesses before them to substantiate
their precarious opinions. This committee is doing infinite injury to the
service and the country.

[From the

AMERICAN VOLUNTEER

(Carlisle, Pa.), llfarch 23d, 1865.]

MAJOR-GENER.AL PATTERSON.

It is with much pleasure that we give place in our columns to an
editorial which appeared in The Pre8s of February 7th. The great
injustice done Major-General Patterson seems 3:t length to have become
too manifest even for those most bitterly opposed to him, to permit a
longer silence on their part. The opposition press of the State, be it
said to their credit, with scarcely an exception, are out strongly in his
vindication from the unjust and wicked assaults which this venerable
old man ~as quietly submitted to for the last three years.
vVe have al ways felt, and so expressed our opinion, through this paper,
that the day would come when justice would vindicate the truth of history, and instead of General Patterson receiving condemnation he would
receive the gratitude and praise of his countrymen. This day, long
delayed, has at length arrived, and from the President of the United
States down, the almost uni versa.I verdict of candid men is not only an
acquittal of the charges made against his loyalty and ability, but a sincere acknowledgment of the debt of gratitude due him from the nation.
Whilst thus vindicating the fame of an old soldier to whom the republic
owes much, these acknowledgments relieve the commonwealth from the
unjust odium attempted to be fastened upon her through these f~lse
charges made upon one of her noblest citizens.
We hail with joy this manifestation of a return from passion to
reason; for nly in the triumph of truth over blinded prejudice and
error can the people hope for a future worthy the earlier promises of the
nation.
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(Carlisle, Pa.), .Marcli 23d, 1865.]

MAJOR-GENERAL PATTERSON.

On our first page we publish, with some remarks of our own, an article
from the Philadelphia (Abolition) Press, in vindication of General Patterson's military character. It will be recollected that in the early
campaigns of the war General Patterson had command of the Pennsylvania militia in the. Shenandoah Valley. It will be remembered, too,
that after the terrible disaster at Bull Run, Patterson was severely criticized by ignorant and vindictive political demagogues, because, as they
said, "he failed to attack Johnston, when he advanced to participate in
the battle." Military men-those who were on Patterson's staff-knew
very well why he did not give battle to Johnston. He wanted to do so
-plead to do so-but his request was refused, his advice disregarded,
and he with his command ordered to recros~ the river, aHer doing which
he was deprived of all his regular troops and his artillery, leaving him,
as The Press says, "helpless and without a gun." General Scott, with
all his military experience, committed this grave error-an error which
General Patterson· tried his best to avert. This blunder, it is more than
probable, caused the disaster to our arms.
Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, as we have said, the paid
minions of the administration commenced their assaults upon the veteran General Patterson. Well did Mr. Lincoln and his Secretary of
War know that these assaults were UJ:\just and libellous, but yet, with
that cold indifference for which both are noted, they looked on and
smiled, and refused to call off the political puppies who were yelping at
the heels of as brave and sagacious a general as the Union army contained. It was political bias that actuated these miserable defamers and
cowards. It was a conspiracy, as treasonable as it was devilish. General Patterson was a prominent Democrat, and the administration and
its hirelings considered it necessary to assail him, and, if possible, tarnish
his fair reputation as a soldjer aud patriot. The same infernal motive
induced the magnates at 'Vashington to conspire against McClellan,
Fitz John Porter, Franklin, and other military chiefs. Lincoln, even
at that early day, was at work for a renomination by his piebald party,
and he felt disposed to put bis big feet upon all who disputed his right
to hold power as long as he pleased. It was not patriotism, it was not
country, it was not decency, that prompted him; it was a low, grovelling
desire for power. Every man who was not an Abolitionist, and who
was not willing to make the war a contest for negro equality, was to be
put down. This was the Abolition programme, and hence it was that
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the most distinguished officers in our army were defamed by remorseless
Abolition demagogues.
But we have been digressing. Our object in commencing these remarks was to call attention to General Patterson's vindication on our
first page. This candid and fair justification of the military conduct of
the old hero could not have appeared in The Press previous to the
election ; but no matter. Late as it is, it is 'triumphant, and settles
malicious slanders forever.
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Shenandoah Campaigns.
'l'llE SHENANDOAH VALLEY AND VJR..
GINIA. (1861-65.) A War Study. By Sanford C, K-ellogg. U. S. A. Washington: The
Neale Publishing Company.

Mr. Kellogg's war ~tudy is a very technl'bal account of the military operations 1n
the Shenandoah Valley during the civil
wa.r. It ts wr.itten purely from the soldier's standpoint and is devoid -Of historical
or Ilterary interest. The following extract
will serv€ to indicate Mr. Kellogg's method
of narration:
Fremont (12{()()()) was then at Middletown.
Banks (12,UOOJ at and near Front Royal;
McDowen was gathenng a new army · at
Frederkksburg, and McClellan was on the
Chickahominy.
The
only Confederate
troops left in the valley were some of Mumford's cavalry, which, later, were also
withdrawn.
The author tells us in his preface that he
has •• made a very exhaustive study of the
war of the rebellion records and maps."
We should know this even if he had not
taken th~ trouble to tell us. His book
reads like an account accompanying a map,
but unfortunately he has not had the foresight to provide a map for us and consequently we are Jost in an intricate maze
of detail.
Mr. KeJiogg departs from his rule of
adhering. strictly to detail in giving a few
words of general appreciation of Jackson's
wonderful campaign of 1862; Sheridan, how€Ver, the other great hero of the valley,
does not receive even tl1is .scant courtesy.
It is very difficult to know what Mr.
Kellog-go thinks of the Genemls whom he
mentions, or whether 11e has formed any
opinion of them. Of Grant, Lee, Hooker,
and Burnside he has nothing to say. He
speaks of McClellan as moving with " characteristic ponderousness and elaboration."
He evidently believes in leaving readers
unprejudiced.
In spite of the title of th~ book, " The
Shenandoah Valley and Virginia,'' it is
clear that the author does not intend to
treat of the Virginia campaigns except as
Incidental to military operations in the valley. The battle of Chancellorsville is dealt
with in four lines, and the battle of Frederleksburg is merely alluded to. The same
is true of McClellan's Peninsula campaigp
and Grant's movement across the Rapidan

on Richmond. ~M'\..

t. . \<\ ~ ~

·

